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 1. Ouverture: Thinking in Accordance with the Real 
     There is always already a Real of the political discon- 
tent and it is one that is transmillennial, beyond history 
and always already founding the very possibility of (a) 
History. The Unthinkable itself, the Uncanny enveloping 
any nameable existence in this or any other World, the 
Real, is the kernel of (political) life and (political) death. 
The Real (the “Void,” the “Event,” Tuché) not only 
participates in the political, but also grounds the very 
possibility of its heterogeneous origin. And here I am re- 
ferring both to the Real in the Laruellian and to the Real 
in the Lacanian sense of the word. Although the two 
respective conceptualizations are different, they share 
one trait and it consists in the Real’s immanent tendency 
to elude signification, meaning, Language. In both Laru- 
elle’s and Lacan’s work the Real is the kernel of 
“that-which-is-out-there”: it is the  identity-in-the-last-instance 
of any and of all “existence” always already escaping 
naming and signification. It is the remainder that Language 
can never grasp and control. It is also a term congruous 
with Alain Badiou’s  notion of the event (or  the  Void).
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Yet the Real remains an abstract instance in the work 
epistemological possibility of “thinking in accordance 
-
ory. Slavoj Žižek is the only thinker today who has openly 
-
This chapter is inspired by this call and Žižek’s arguments 
of its liability. It is dedicated to exploring the epistemic 
the few thinkers today who argue in favor of a “theory 
to determine the epistemological viability of the “real-
ist thesis” advocated by Žižek. We will undertake close 
reading of François Laruelle’s realist or non-philosoph -
ical epistemology (primarily his theory of non-Marxism), 
but will also take a look at the epistemological pos-
-
the Real. One would say even opposed to it. And yet, the 
-
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-
lated through – language. The Real always already evades 
François Laruelle calls in one word – the Transcendental 
(1989 passim; 92 ,1992ff). Yet again, in spite of this eva-
sion-in-the-last instance, the Transcendental renders the 
Real livable by way of transposing it into a Sign and there-
by re-producing it into and for the World. Both accord-
Language is, through the figures of the Stranger (Laru-
-
ate the stupefying, overwhelming presence of the Real. 
The task of Language is to transpose the “in-itself” of 
the “out-there” into a structure of names, of assigned 
rhizome/the lump of traces of experiences of the taking-
place-of-the-Real. It is the inescapable, unstoppable ef-
fort to reflect in the literal sense of the word, the desire 
to mirror the taking-place of the Real (the Event) against 
-
In the context of François Laruelle’s non-philosophy, 
the terms “transcendental,” “philosophy” and “the 
world” are synonyms (1989 passim -
es the Transcendental, which always already produces 
the figure of Philosophy. In other words, the Transcen-
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
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sense,” that is – a (or: the) Philosophy. A universe of 
meanings – that is what a “world” and a “philosophy” 
is (Laruelle 1989, passim -
ent with respect to the Real and they are so in a uni-
World (the Thought, the Transcendental, the Language 
or the Philosophy), and this indifference is what grounds 
unilaterality in its inevitability. Regardless of Thought’s 
(Philosophy’s) pretension to found the Real – the “Thing-
in-itself” or the “Thing-out-there” – the Real remains 
stubbornly indifferent (Laruelle 1989). This is what 
renders Thought – any thought – inevitably unilateral. 
The phantasm of bilaterality is necessarily the result of 
dédoublement, redoublement), of 
its refolding (repliement) over itself (Laruelle 62 ,1989).
In his Après la finitude (2006), similarly to Laruelle, 
-
losophy’s “redoublement,” arguing for a thought which 
strives to think the Absolute (the Real) – or rather the 
-
(or the Absolute) and the Thinking Subject, to the always 
already supposed inter-mirroring of the Real and the Self.
THINKING THE POLITICAL BY WAY OF “RADICAL CONCEPTS”
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it is impossible to know “the-Thing-out-there,” accord-




with the always already inconceivable Real), are termed 
-
“out-there” that we can only imagine, that we can only 
fantasize to know – but never actually know it – is, in 
fact, a claim about the existence of the Out-There that is 
Absolute. What this means is that the Real is ungrasp-
able, inconceivable, inaccessible through knowledge, 
that it is a certain “in-itself,” indifferent to our preten-
sion to know it, that it is – a self-sufficient transcen-
dental. Moreover, that it is the Transcendental. It is the 
Real that stands for the endless myriad of encounters 
-
the thesis about the radical split between knowledge 
and the absolute object of knowledge implies that the 
Real is an “in-itself,” an “out-there” which, in its inacces-
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
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sibility, gains the status and performs as – the Absolute. 
 The Cartesian legacy, on the other hand, claims the 
-
less, Meillassoux shows that it is precisely this philo-
sophical legacy, through its pretension to reflect the Ab-
solute, implying the inter-mirroring of Reason and the 
In order to avoid the vicious circle each of these two 
-
-
ity” (factualité). Factuality is: “[the] non-factual essence 
of fact as such, which is to say, its necessity, as well as that 
 
2. 
    Discontent and Change
2.1. 
       the Real Intertwining 
phenomenon. Yet, we shall claim that, apart from its 
of the Real and through the instance of the Real. It acts 
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as the Real – it works according to the Rule of the Real. 
par excel-
lence (Lacan 55-54  ,1998), but it also takes place as 
accident(ia), as an unpredictable throw of the dice – as 
an event, as the destabilizing void within the discursive, 
as  Tuché (Lacan 55-54 ,1998).
the Real, or rather the constant taking place of the con-
the transcendental category of the Real – is what hap-
grasp, and to control – the Real, that is, the sheer-tak-
ing-place or the event, by organizing it into a meaningful 
-
experience (i.e., the trauma) into the bearable – intel-
-
i.e., perpetuated – in order to counter the overwhelming, 
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
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these occurrences. The effects of the Real are namable 
them (Župančič 235 ,2000). 
The event of another form of discursivity and nor-
-
REAL
means primarily – is an occurrence of the Real. When a 
new form of discursivity takes place, when a new dis-
course acquires a hegemonic status, it is an event – it is 
on its aspect of the evental or – the Real.
-
in-the-last-instance – it is the sheer event at the heart 
-
which, in its own turn, originates from the Void itself 
(Badiou 173  ,2005), from that which is always already 
beyond the discursive, radically and irreconcilably dif-
ferent from it, says Alain Badiou (Badiou 175-174 ,2005; 
129 ,2001). 
-
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cal) Truth which implodes into/as the Real (as an Event). 
incursion of Tuché par excellence, happens as the result 
-
cursive. Also, it is the Real (of violence), it is the Trauma 
real
taking place – one becomes an aroused body, and one’s 
event taking place. The 
-
ated event – founded by the void of the evental, while 
the discursive merely mediates it – is a body in the Spi-
i.e., of the discursive or of the “ethical,” and vice versa 
(Spinoza II 13p, 13n). 
Truth, explicates Alain Badiou (173 ,2005ff). The Event is 
always already pre-discursive: as soon as it finds its trans-
in the last instance, a “taking place” par excellence). And 
it is a single body that can undergo these transforma-
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
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ity to, around which Language is re-invented. The new 
-
a cause that is beyond (au-delà
Badiou’s terminology, a  – which is discursive. 
discursively induced.
The challenge I set here for myself is to establish a cer-
tain insight into – to arrive to a certain vision and knowl-
-
uct of the interplay between the Discursive and the Real. 
In this endeavor I will adopt the epistemic posture of 
thought proposed by François Laruelle’s non-philosophy 
or mirror the Real (50 ,1989). It merely correlates with it 
k
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by way of acknowledging it to be the decisive instance 
philosophy is synonymous with the “immanent,” the“radical” 
in “the immanent way” (de la manière immanante), a 
-
elle 61 ,21 ,2000 et al.). Radical concepts are those that 
-
nomena, with their “instance of immanence.” In other 
words, it is the conceptual, the transcendental that cor-
responds with the Real.
2.2. The Syntax of the Real 
The correspondence of the Transcendental with the 
Real is confirmed by coincidence: a concept is affirmed 
-
tue of experience – by the instance of the Lived which, 
in the form of a symptom, confirms that a concept cor-
relates with it (Laruelle 57  ,1989). Theory as “thought 
(of) force” (Laruelle 48 ,2000 et al.) should spring out of 
en-dernière-instance, or DDI), that is, out of a radical 
the Real. 
The Real imposes its own syntax – it cannot and does 
not establish perfect correspondence with a doctrine (a 




“philosophy”), it cannot be reflected by or reflect an en-
tire theoretical universe. The Real, inasmuch as it is “the 
Lived,” produces a “syntax” consisted of the symptoma-
tology it displays in its uniqueness; the “behavior” of the 
Real can be “cloned,” says Laruelle, into and from a con-
cept. The Concept (the “Transcendental”) and the Real 
belong to two entirely different orders, the first to that 
of Transcendence and the latter to that of Immanence. 
The two can never be reduced to one another – the 
Transcendental can attempt to “describe” (to “clone”) 
the Real by virtue of acknowledging that it can never 
have the “same structure” (Laruelle 1989, 50). 
In other words, having affirmed that the Real pos-
sesses a different status (that of immanence) in relation 
to Thought (which is always already the transcendental), 
one strives to think the Real by means of transcendence. 
The Thought can correlate (unilaterally) with the Real, 
following the “syntax” it dictates, it can attempt to de-
scribe this syntax without the pretension to reflect it 
(Laruelle 2000, 46-47; 1989, 50). In the following quota-
tion from Introduction au non-marxism (2000) the op-
eration of establishing a thought in an “immanent way” 
(de la manière immanante) is presented:
The ‘real’ solution to the problem of the DDI as the ob-
ject and cause of its own theory should avoid Hegelian 
idealism better than it has been done by the materi-
alism. Neither a cause in exteriority nor a dialectical 
identity of contraries, the Real is the cause by virtue of 
immanence and determines cognition of its own syn-
THINKING THE POLITICAL BY WAY OF “RADICAL CONCEPTS”
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tax, of its own causality, through a process that one 
would call ‘cloning.’ [….] Suppose there is an object X 
to be cognized. Provided it is affected by immanence or 
susceptible to DDI, that is seen-in-One, it also can clone 
“itself” from the material that is its transcendence. 
(Laruelle 2000, 47)
The Real is an effect of trauma, of a violent thrust into 
the automatism of the chain of signification. Put in La-
canian vain, it is the Tuché (the accident, the throw of 
the dice) which happens to the Automaton. Or in Lacan’s 
own words: 
We can succeed in unravelling this ambiguity of the reality 
involved in the transference only on the basis of the func-
tion of the real in repetition. What is repeated, in fact, is 
always something that occurs – the expression tells us 
quite a lot about its relation to the tuché – as if by chance 
… Is it not remarkable that, at the origin of the analytic 
experience, the real should have presented itself in the 
form of that which is unassimilable in it – in the form of 
the trauma, determining all that follows, and imposing on 
it an apparently accidental origin? (1998, 54-55) 
The Real is what happens, and what takes place as 
sheer happening, sheer experience – an event, unme-
diated by Language. That is why it is traumatic – it is 
the uncontrollable, meaningless (not yet mediated as a 
meaning), brutal incursion of the overwhelming Real into 
what “makes sense,” into the meaningful world made up 
of discursivity, i.e., into the realm of signification or Lan-
guage, into the “automaton” that the signifying chain is.
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
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Accordingly, the Real is an effect – it is the Lived (Laru-
elle) or the traumatic (Lacan), or “the-taking-place-of,” i.e. 
and Event (Badiou). Such an effect can be produced by 
Discourse as well (and not exclusively by instances that 
are pre-discursive in their identity in the last instance, 
such as sheer violence, or the mute force of the “materi-
al”). Discourse that instills normality, discourse that brings 
about revolution, discourse that exerts power is lived as 
trauma. Discursive power is assumed through an act of vi-
olence, or rather – the act of discourse instituting itself as 
power is in itself a traumatic, i.e., violent or forceful event 
(regardless of the fact that the taking over of power may 
be exerted via discourse exclusively). The taking place of 
discourse produces the effect of the Real. 
3. Naming the Real as the Condition of
    Fundamental Political Change 
There is an instance where the Discursive and the 
Real are indistinguishable from one another, constitut-
ing a heterogeneous kernel of political force and action. 
I am subscribing to the claims Žižek makes in Interro-
gating the Real (2006) as well as in his contributions 
to Contigency, Hegemony, Universality (2000) that only 
a thought in correspondence with the Real can be the 
source of radical political critique and change. 
Antagonism is a namable effect of the Real – an effect 
that bears a “political name” (that of antagonism) – and 
THINKING THE POLITICAL BY WAY OF “RADICAL CONCEPTS”
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it is what provokes political movement, processes (of 
change) in the symbolic field. Žižek applauds Laclau and 
Mouffe for their advancement of the thesis about an-
tagonism as the kernel of the political (2006, 249-250). 
However, he criticizes them for not having “radicalized” 
the concept sufficiently, for having omitted to notice that 
antagonism is an instance of the Real. His main remark is 
that they have failed to arrive to a concept of a subject 
as one constituted by antagonism in the (epistemologi-
cally) radical sense of the word, i.e., for “conceiving the 
subject in a way that characterizes ‘post-structuralism,’ 
from the perspective of assuming different ‘subject-po-
sitions’” (2006, 250) Instead of the latter, Žižek proposes 
the following epistemic possibility: 
We must then distinguish the experience of antagonism 
in its radical form, as a limit of the social, as the impos-
sibility around which the social field is structured, from 
antagonism as the relation between antagonistic sub-
ject-positions: In Lacanian terms, we must distinguish 
antagonism as Real from the social reality of the antago-
nistic fight. And the Lacanian notion of the subject aims 
precisely at the experience of ‘pure’ antagonism as self 
hindering, self-blockage, this internal limit preventing the 
symbolic field from realizing its full identity: the stake of 
the entire process of subjectivization, of assuming differ-
ent subject-positions, is ultimately to enable us to avoid 
the traumatic experience. (Žižek 2006, 253-254) 
Antagonism as Real or, rather, the Real as antagonism 
is what conditions the Subject, what grounds its very 
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
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possibility. The Subject is born out of the very neces-
sity to incessantly strive to avoid the traumatic experi-
ence – the immediacy of the Real. Pure antagonism (as 
the internal or external limit) is an instance of the Real 
which has a political function and a political name. It is 
the origin of the “entire process of subjectivization, of 
assuming different subject-positions.” It is the origin of 
the political. And in the confrontation between differ-
ent discursive stances, in the antagonistic interaction 
between political discourses, it receives different empty 
shapes that bare a name or names and give birth to dif-
ferent usages of the Language, to different discourses. 
In other words, the Real is not merely an abstraction – 
an instance beyond Language and, therefore, irrelevant 
for theory or for the Discourse in general. According to 
Žižek, the Real is not the pure Negativity (of or with re-
spect to Language). It is rather an effect that is nameable, 
and one conditioning the re-production of the Symbolic 
(such as, e.g., the effect or the “lived” of antagonism).
In his exchange with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau 
published under the title of Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality (2000), Žižek insists that fundamental politi-
cal change – installing of a new “hegemony” – can take 
place only if political language is re-invented around a 
name that corresponds most immediately with the node 
of traumatic experiences, i.e. the Real. The symbolic or-
der is structured – viz. the hegemonic political discourse 
– around a certain Real that it mediates and whose trau-
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matic effect it incessantly strives to moderate. Radical 
change can take place, entirely new hegemony can oc-
cur, only if – let us resort to Laruellian terminology for a 
moment – a new “radical concept” is invented in an “im-
manent way,” “cloned” from the experience of the real 
with the help of the “transcendental material” at hand.
Or, in Žižek’s words:
[…] the determination of the Real as that which resists 
symbolization is itself a symbolic determination, that is, 
the very gesture of excluding something from the Sym-
bolic, of positing it as beyond the prohibitive Limit (as 
the Sacred, Untouchable), is a symbolic gesture (a ges-
ture of symbolic exclusion) par excellence … In contrast 
to this, however, one should insist on how the Lacanian 
Real is strictly internal to the Symbolic: it is nothing but 
its inherent limitation […] (2000, 120).
The fact that the Real is an “inherent limitation” to 
the Symbolic does not mean that the Real is “beyond 
symbolization,” that it is some absurd, mute instance 
that disables speech, language or symbolization. On the 
contrary, it is the reason for symbolization to occur – it 
conditions and enables it. 
Precisely because of this internality of the Real to the 
Symbolic, it is possible to touch the Real through the 
Symbolic – that is the whole point of Lacan’s notion of 
psychoanalytic treatment; this is what the Lacanian no-
tion of psychoanalytic act is about – the act as a gesture 
which, by definition, touches the dimension of some im-
possible Real (2000, 121).
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Similarly to these claims made by Žižek, in his rein-
-
vokes the necessity of radical concepts in order to arrive 
to “thought (of) force” – theory that works as “act,” and 
-
manent, i.e., in correspondence with the Lived (le vécu) 
that the Real is. Radical concepts depart from the de-
-
mum transcendental established in accordance with the 
Real. Considering that, also according to non-philosophy 
-
verse” (= hegemony, the Symbolic) is a symptom (Laruelle 
7 ,2000), DDI is checked against the plane of the Lived (or 
instead by that within a doctrine or a philosophy.
When the DDI is the cause or the immanent object of 
its own theory, one would say that this theory is the 
force (of) thought, the theory of the force (of) thought 
is itself in-the-last instance […] Object to knowing, while 
remaining the known object, should also be capable of 
-
bor force’ is finally capable of its own ‘proletarian’ the-
ory, without the Hegelian idealism, or has become the 
restricted model of the universal instance of the force 
(of) thought. (Laruelle 48 ,2000)
Instances of the Real are always already “lived” (vécu) 
from within the World (in Laruellian sense of the word 
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similar in meaning to the Symbolic Order or “hegemonic 
discourse”) and, therefore, they receive names, they 
produce “radical concepts” – thought (of) force issues 
from radical concepts founded in their DDI. Similarly, 
Žižek argues that one should tackle the kernel of the 
and envisage a world based upon a different “radical 
concept” issuing from a radically different “lived” (i.e., 
instance of the Real).
-
for hegemony, today’s Real which sets a limit to resigni-
that which remains the same, that which ‘always returns 
to its place,’ in the unconstrained struggle for hegemony. 
(Žižek 223 ,2000) 
Thought (of) force -
cal change, viz., demise or abandonment of the old and 
birth of a new hegemony. Both Laruelle and Žižek (and 
Badiou as well), in their own, different vocabularies, claim 
that such change is possible only by virtue of thought in 
is not an abstract, external to the World (Laruelle) or 
to the Symbolic order (Lacan) Transcendental. It is not a 
per se. Rather it is the Lived, the experience par ex-
cellence, it is a concrete instance of trauma that receives 




Žižek claims that antagonism -
cal par excellence (and that which defines in the last in-
stance); Capital is the name of the Real underlying and 
Laruelle insists that the Real of Marxism is determined 
in the last instance by virtue of the radical concepts of 
“labor force” and/or “proletariat.” Both claim that the 
is authorized by the instance of the Lived (Laruelle) or 
the acted -
uelle 92-91 ,2000) never opposed to theory, or by virtue 
of an empirical proof provided by the methodology of 
and utopia, one is bound to step out of the vicious circle of 
upon establishing a posture of thought in accordance 
with the Real which manifests itself as symptom, and is 
verified through the sheer experience (of trauma). One 
is called upon establishing a map of symptoms displayed 
the power exercised by way of the ruling discourses of our 
thought (of) force responding to the 
cry of this body (or, these bodies).
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The proximity to the “Lived” renders radical concepts 
descriptive and devoid of theoretical rigor. Nonetheless 
this does not mean that a political theory developed de-
parting from a radical concept cannot be rigorous. On 
the contrary, as the model of science and scientific pro-
duction of theory has proven, departing from descrip-
tive presuppositions derived from empiric examination 
ensures greater rigor of interrogation than the solid 
transcendental concept backed up by the authority of a 
doctrinal system. 
Exactitude is the characteristic of a theory. It is a qual-
ity pertaining to Language or to the Transcendental, and 
indeed the Real cannot be “exact.” Yet, it is a theory’s cor-
respondence with the symptoms of the Real that proves 
it “true” or “relevant.” For a political theory “to work” 
– to make sense and to be able to introduce change – its 
correspondence with the Lived needs to be proven.
4. Monstrously Hybrid Concepts 
Thought does not and cannot reflect the Real, but it 
can describe it, says Laruelle (1989, 50; 2000, 47). The 
work of description is done by means of transcenden-
tal material by means of which the Real is “cloned.” The 
object of cognition is one “affected by immanence,” 
claims Laruelle. Immanence is susceptible to determi-
nation-in-the-last-instance. The latter is a transcenden-
tal minimum, language bordering with the Lived (Real). 
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(describing the “Lived” that the Real/the immanence 
is), one “clones” the experience of the Real behind the 
(47 ,2000).
Having made this claim, one faces the quandary of 
how the direct link between the Real and the Language/
to the former is maintained. Or, put in Laruellian par-
-
-
nence”? How does one know one is not fully entangled 
in the web of the World, how does one know that the 
by the Transcendental rather than by Immanence? 
4.1. François Laruelle: Naming the Real is Always
       Done By Way of Radical Concepts 
Laruellian Real is one building on the Lacanian while 
non-philosophically reversing its meaning. The aim of this 
reversal is overcoming the split at the heart of the Real, 
overcoming Dualism (between Thought and the Real) 
sustained by Philosophy (any philosophy of any epoch, 
according to Laruelle) in which Lacanian psychoanalysis 
-
ity or Unthinkability, non-philosophy claims one can and 
should think in accordance with the Real while affirming 
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its radical difference and the impossibility of Thought to 
grasp and explain the Real in its totality. The Real itself 
does not have an identity-in-the-last-instance. It does 
not have a diferentia specifica determining and fixing its 
“meaning”-in-the-last-instance. The Real is a symptom 
or an instance or a modality of immanence rather than 
an identity. Nonetheless, the identities theory explores 
do have a reality – they are in the last instance deter-
mined by the order of the Real (Laruelle 1992, 91). 
Laruelle proposes an epistemological stance accord-
ing to the scientific model: science thinks, he explains, 
according to the “real order” (l’ordre réel), moving from 
the Real toward the Phenomena, unlike the Philosophy 
which does precisely the opposite (Laruelle 1992, 91). 
“Phenomena” are of transcendental material – they are 
full-fledged representations – and so are the “objective 
facts” (they are mental, cognitive products). Taking the 
so called “objective facts” as points of departure rather 
than “what takes place” in the register of the Real is what 
philosophy usually does narcissistically dealing with it-
self instead of the world out there, says Laruelle.
Laruelle maintains that, according to what he claims 
to be the epistemic model of science, the “real object” 
of study is a quadruple postulation a priori consisting of 
reality, exteriority, stability and unity (Laruelle 1992, 92). 
(Unity is meant in the sense of oneness or singularity. In 
contrast, the unity which is the result of dialectics or of 
any other form of unification or uniting is based on du-
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
30
alism/duality and spilt and the latter is what the entire 
project of non-philosophy argues against, aiming at its 
overcoming.) The object of cognition is one necessarily 
belonging to the register of the transcendental, and sci-
ence inevitably thinks its object via the transcendental 
while “succumbing to the real” as the authority in the 
last instance (1992, 93).
Theory that assumes the non-philosophical posture 
of thought (homogeneous to that of science, according 
to Laruelle) does not “objectify the real” (1992, 91). It 
is “non-thetic”: it issues from “an experience of real-
ity” and consists in a “rigorous description of the latter” 
(1992, 94) always already by means of the transcen-
dental material. It corresponds with a realism which is 
“local,” “finite” and “in-the last instance,” deprived of 
metaphysical certitude and it rectifies its representations 
on the basis of its submission to the Real rather than to 
(a) philosophy (1992, 98). Non-philosophy or a theory 
in terms of the Real manifests itself as more primitive 
and more elementary than the philosophy (1992, 101). 
Just like the science it thinks the Real “at once” (en-une-
fois), without splitting it and without splitting itself: that 
is why it thinks the multiplicity “at-once-each-time” 
(chaque-fois-une-fois), as a “veritable multiplicity in un-
divided terms or as chaos” (1992, 117).
When it is the “World” (in Laruelliean sense of the 
word), i.e., the political or social reality, which is ex-
plored, when one theorizes the reality of human experi-
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ence, in order to establish an object of cognition which 
succumbs to the Real as its ultimate authority one must 
resort to “radical concepts,” claims Laruelle (2000). They 
rely on a determination in the last instance. The latter is 
necessarily “affected by immanence” (2000, 47). Being 
affected by immanence is checked by the concept’s cor-
respondence with an experience of reality – the experi-
ence or the “Lived” is the authority that gives legitimacy 
to the concept. 
The radical concept that is a transcendental mini-
mum describes the Lived, and it is “more primitive” 
than a philosophical definition. Description is the work/
the practice of mediation (via language) of the experi-
ence, the experienced and the experiment. It does not 
pretend to define, to convey or give (ascribe, assign = 
“give”) an essence, to establish possession of the Real it-
self. It is a rudimentary (“primitive”) practice of mimesis 
– by means of Language – aiming at conveyance to the 
Other/mediation of what takes place in the order of the 
Real. Mimesis inevitably implies/speaks of the radical dif-
ference – unbridgeable fissure – between the Real and 
Language. Consequently, sheer descriptiveness guaran-
tees and irrevocably affirms the insurmountable-in-the-
last-instance abyss between the Real and Thought.
Non-philosophical posture of thought does not con-
fuse its ambition to explain a certain reality with the 
metaphysical desire to close this ontological gap (be-
tween Real and Thought). It produces knowledge of that 
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certain “local” and “finite” reality without feeling an ob-
ligation to make sure this knowledge corresponds with 
a certain ontological decision vis-à-vis a metaphysical 
anxiety. The particular truth of a particular reality does 
not need to conform with any ontological outlook. It is 
irrelevant if it contains contradicting ontological implica-
tions. What is relevant is whether the produced knowl-
edge is confirmed by the experience of reality, or by the 
“Lived.”
I will argue that assuming a posture of thought in ac-
cordance with the Real – informed by Laruelle’s non-phi-
losophy – does not imply passing a decision about the ir-
relevance of ontology all together. Laruelle, for that mat-
ter, argues against any ontology simply because it is al-
ways already derived from the notion of the Being which 
he considers to be the source of philosophy’s intrinsic 
corruption with dualism and auto-fetishism (1989, 17). 
My own position on the matter is somewhat different: 
I would claim that “being” does not have to be seen as 
the spectral duplication of the Real; thinking the “being,” 
creating a theory of the “taking place,” of how certain 
categories of “being” (of taking place and of ceasing to 
be there) relate to each other and of how they establish 
a “universe” is not irrelevant. On the contrary, it is a per-
tinent theoretical endeavor that should be undertaken 
in radical terms, by recourse to a “thought in accordance 
with the Real.”
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4.2. Some of the Many Names of the Real
Returning to the question of a political theory in 
terms of the Real, based on a methodology of radi-
cal concepts (conditioned by the determination in the 
last instance), I will reaffirm the position that it is the 
instance of the Lived that is the ultimate authority legiti-
mizing the produced knowledge. Proximity to the Real 
of the (radical) concepts is ensured by their descriptive-
ness. Radical concepts describe the Real without ever 
attaining it. They describe the Lived (that the Real is). 
The Lived is the Experience. The pure Lived is anterior 
to Language: it is the mute experience before it takes 
recourse to transposing itself onto the Transcendental 
Plane, prior to the effort of making sense. Description 
of a sheer taking place is always a very rudimentary lin-
guistic act. Descriptiveness (at least in the context of a 
theoretical endeavor) is about resorting to use of an im-
poverished (transcendentally minimal) language. Hence, 
it is “primitive.” 
It also borders with that which is radically different, 
with the radical exteriority, with the “out-there” – with 
the Real. Julia Kristeva claims this is something that 
produces horror, disgust or terror (1982). Adopting this 
claim, we will call this instance of bordering a “thērion,” 
a monstrosity. Besides being the characteristic of scien-
tific discourse, description of experience (rather than 
experiment) or the impoverished account of the Lived 
(which by definition is rich) can also be defining of the 
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Poetic. In Vico’s vein, we could claim another instance 
of monstrosity, the one originating from the bordering 
between the Scientific and the Poetic. Radical concepts 
produce “monstrous” discourses: “monstrosity” of polit-
ical thought and action is that which can radically under-
mine the existing discursive possibilities and bring forth 
a new political utopia.
 Such “monstrous concept” is the “Poor” we find in 
Negri, Hardt (2001) and Rancière (2004). It provokes un-
easiness by its directness (i.e., by its radicality), it embar-
rasses by its shamelessness echoing of poetic expression, 
yet it is very exact. It is a term susceptible to determina-
tion-in-the-last-instance and to exact scientific investiga-
tion (far more so than a term such as “class”). It provokes 
a sense of convocation (and recognition via the Lived) 
rather than interpellation. Similar can be said about the 
Schmittian terminological dyad of “friend” and “enemy.” 
And such is the name of “Capital” which, according to 
Žižek, is the determination in the last instance of the po-
litical hegemony of today, i.e., liberal democracy. 
The notion of “Capital” possesses the status of the 
Real in all of the variations of the hegemonic discourse, 
including the most subversive ones, i.e., the ones aim-
ing at radical critique of hegemony, claims Žižek. He 
finds that “capitalism” is one of the indispensable ele-
ments, a condition, founding presupposition of Laclau’s 
and Mouffe’s project of “radical democracy” as well as 
of Butler’s feminism (Žižek 2000; 2006). In liberal-demo-
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cratic discourses, “Capital” is a term that is rarely used. It 
is always already presupposed but almost never directly 
referred to; as if it needed constant re-signification, in 
order for it to “mean something”; as if the term “Capi-
tal” meant nothing unless it was developed in a more 
complex concept such as “free market economy”; as if 
the concept of “Capital” were the Real itself facing us in 
its absurdity. 
“Capital” is a radical concept indeed: it borders with 
the Real, it is a transcendental minimum determining in 
the last instance a constitutive aspect of the global he-
gemony of today. Finally, it is “primitive,” it is overly de-
scriptive and confirmed by and derived from the Lived. 
Yet it is an indispensable concept of the economical sci-
ences. Radical critique departs from and is constantly 
realized by means of radical concepts.
“Gender” is another radical concept enabling radical 
critique, and it is the source of thought-(of)-force – put 
in Laruellian parlance – in Judith Butler’s writings. But-
ler’s theory operates with the concept of “gender,” one 
dangerously close to the Real rather than with that of 
feminism which is an entire political-ideological project. 
Again it is a transcendentally minimal concept which 
must be affirmed and confirmed by the Lived. Namely, 
any political or theoretical project, discourse generated 
around “gender” must gain legitimacy from the instance 
of the Lived. Concrete, singular realities (that can be 
voiced collectively) need to confirm the validity of a gen-
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der equity related political project in order for it to come 
into reality. Laruelle gives an account of his dream of a 
(non-)Marxist project that would receive its legitimacy 
directly from the proletariat which should be able to rec-
ognize it as its “thought-(of)-force.” It seems that in the 
gender equity related movement(s) this is something 
that normally takes place.
In the polemical exchange with Žižek that tackles, 
among other issues, the question of universality versus 
particularity, Butler (2000) demonstrates that this di-
chotomy is false and that it is precisely the presupposi-
tion about the grounding status of a universality which 
gives rise to a political reasoning in terms of “particu-
larities.” In other words, it is precisely the “universals” 
which produce “particularities,” whereby the former is 
always already a transcendental ideal that the latter fail 
to “fill in” without a remainder (Butler 2000, 144). Žižek’s 
insisting that the universals are founding of the Symbol-
ic order and that they are in this respect purely formal 
and never fully embodied by “particular” individuals is 
a transcendentalist claim according to Butler, which she 
opposes by evoking Hegel:
Of course, the reply from even my most progressive 
Lacanian friends is that I have no need to worry about 
this unnamable sexual difference that we nevertheless 
name, since it has no content but is purely formal, forev-
er empty. But here I would refer back to the point made 
so trenchantly by Hegel against Kantian formalism: the 
empty and formal structure is established precisely 
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as form. (Butler 144 ,2000)
 Butler explains that the universal of “sexual differ-
ence has a transcendental status even when sexed bod-
ies emerge that do not fit squarely within ideal gender 
dimorphism.” Concurring with Butler, I would claim that 
it is her concept of “gender norms” that works as a radi-
cal term since it enables bypassing transcendentalism of 
-
experienced by the sexed bodies. Knowledge or theory 
-
ated in living, biological bodies, for the ineffability and 
non-symbolizability of this most hollowed of differences 
).
Butler’s Psychic Life of Power (1997) disassembles 
bodies of knowledge, i.e., corpuses of different doctrines, 
turning them into a chôra of transcendental material she 
operates with irreverently with respect to the schools of 
thought they may represent (or rather, are represented 
by). In this study, the concept of gender (norm) works as 
a radical term since it succumbs to the authority of the 
experienced (by a sexed body) rather than to the ideal of 




5. Instead of a Conclusion: The Question of a
    “Realist” Utopia
If we retain fidelity to the epistemic choice of thinking 
in terms of radical concepts, we cannot propose an ide-
ology or utopian universe based on a single (“master”) 
radical term that would be unifying of everything else 
that inhabits (all other terms and all instances of experi-
ence) that universe. Unification under a master signifier 
is precisely the opposite of a political theory (and activ-
ism) based on radical concepts. Radical concepts enable 
radical critique irreverent of the master-terms (such as 
capital today) of hegemonic discourses, and they can 
inadvertently – or advertently – depose them. On the 
basis of an experienced affinity, alliances of political 
critique based on radical concepts can be established. 
However, it is arguable whether an alliance of affinities 
based on radical concepts exclusively can establish a dis-
cursive universe called utopia.
Utopia is founded upon a teleological and eschatolog-
ical desire. It is a dynamic transcendental system driven 
by an eschato-teleological aspiration. I maintain that a 
utopian horizon of thought is indispensable for creating 
and carrying out of a political project. The two necessi-
ties, i.e., that of a utopia and the one consisting in the 
choice to think in radical political terms, do not have to 
exclude one another. Eschatology, I would claim, does 
not have to be subsumed under a single master signifier 
and it can be the product of a number of concepts that 
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experience or by the “Lived.”
In  
(2004) Laruelle argues for a utopia that is transcenden-
tally impoverished, ideologically minimal and radical in 
the sense of being “affected by immanence.” In fact, his 
utopian project is founded upon the single, minimal goal 
“affected (as much as possible) by immanence.” It is a 
goal endowed with universality which is so transcen-
dentally and ideologically impoverished that one cannot 
expect it to be universalizing or subsuming of other con-
cepts. It cannot be a universal establishing dominance 
term since it is too transcendentally minimal to contain 
hierarchy of concepts and to be able to propagate hier-
archies that could be considered cultural. Any discursive 
universe, any World (vis-à-vis the Real) is suspended in 
in a world “affected by immanence.”
It seems arguable whether such a stance can be 
-
-
scendental” phenomenon par excellence. And it is the 
World that we inevitably live in – a pure dwelling in 
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brought about by a “World” (a discursive universe), the 
Real is uninhabitable.
A utopia which is produced by a radical (non-philo-
sophical) political thought is also transcendentally rich: 
it is a phantasmatic plenitude, which is indispensable for 
the production of radical concepts. The latter are indeed 
determination in the last instance established in accord-
ance with the Real – radical concepts are “cloned” from 
the Real, yet they remain products of the transcendental. 
Thought is always already transcendental regardless of 
the fact that it succumbs to the Real as the (radically, ir-
revocably heterogeneous) authority in the last instance. 
Utopia that is transcendentally rich, yet legitimized in the 
last instance by the Real, is what the thinking in terms of 
radical concepts can argue for.
The utopian dream which seeks its determination/s 
in the last instance to be transcendentally impoverished 
radical concept/s always already confirmed by the Real, 
is a transcendentally rich universe, yet submitting to the 
authority of the Lived. The fantasmatically rich utopian 
world is born out of radical concepts. One distinguishes 
radical concepts from the ones that are transcendental-
ly multilayered concepts by way of being able to make 
a determination-with-the-last-instance (as explained 
above). In other words, the Laruellian Real can be opera-
tive in the theorizing of the political only if coupled by 
the Žižian model of interrogating the effect of the Real 
as one always already and unavoidably transposed into 
the realm of the fantasmatic.
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It is the desire circulating through the vessels of the 
fantasmatic which makes a utopia politically functional, 
i.e., which makes of a utopia an object of desire that con-
stantly eludes, but is unavoidably pursued. One cannot 
either attain or posses the object-in-the-Real; nonethe-
less, the only way of extracting radical political pleasure 
is when the pursuit of desire, the repetitive desiring act 
follows and/or is followed by a symptom of the Real. It 
entails, by definition, a certain traumatic aspect, but it 
is the obsession with that traumatic which gives birth to 
any or all fantasmatic producing and sustaining the flow 
of the Real in its most brutal aspect, in its direct form of 




The Location of Resistance:
Persistence as its Nest
1. The Grounding Minimum of Revolt: Perseverance
In Psychic Life of Power (1997) Judith Butler engages 
into an exhaustive investigation of the questions of for-
mation and location of resistance within the Subject. In 
Chapter 3 of the book, entitled “Subjection, Resistance, 
Resignification,” Butler repeatedly returns to the ques-
tion of the Body as the possible site of resistance. The 
repetitive opening of this question, I will argue, contains 
the implication that resistance is in fact persistence. 
Namely, seen in its radical difference to the Subject as 
an instance of ceaseless transformativity, the Body as-
sumes the status of the immanently stable topos always 
identical to itself. And it is precisely in the body, in that 
site of sameness and uninterrupted continuity which 
serves as the “polygon” for the subjective transforma-
tion, that Butler tends to look for the site and the source 
of resistance.
If the Body is expected to resist the Rule of Discipline 
which is the order of subjectivation, and if the latter 
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is expected to represent an always already relentless 
transformation, it can, consequently, be expected that 
resistance means to persist as the same, as one and inte-
gral. Disintegration, Foucault claims, is the aim and the 
means of Discipline (Foucault 1977, 147-148), whereas 
the latter is the means of subjection and normalization. 
We can, hence, conclude in Foucauldian vein, that the 
Resistance against the Norm/ativity consists in resisting 
Disintegration. Resistance is about persisting as integral, 
as one, as the same. In other words, resistance is about 
survival. Survival or self-preservation is the origin of re-
sistance and of critique – paradoxically, the revolutionary 
potential is provided by that fundamentally conservative 
stance of self-preservation.
Persistence as (corporeal) unity is to be understood as 
the determination in the last instance of (subject’s) re-
sistance. That which survives the change incessantly im-
posed by the Order of Power, which perseveres, which 
persists – resists. In fact, what is explored in Chapter 3 
of Butler’s Psychic Life of Power is the possibility for the 
Body to be not only the location, the site, the topos, but 
also the “substance” of resistance, i.e., “what resistance 
is made of.” Continuity and resistance seem to be mutu-
ally complementary and supplementary notions – even 
identical in meaning, at least in the context of the closer 
reading of Butler’s analysis which is proposed here.
Chapter 3 of Psychic Life of Power struggles with the 
fact that in Foucault no other explicit definition of the 
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Subject can be found except the one claiming it to be the 
direct product of the disciplinary process, of the process-
es of normalization imposed by the Order-of-Normativi-
ty-in-Power. Employing an approach of rigorous reading 
of Foucault, Butler points out to the fact of the absolute 
absence in his writings of any other definition of the 
Subject, or of the “Soul,” except as the one determining 
it as the product of disciplinary processes. At the same 
time, Butler offers an interpretation of the Foucauldian 
notion of the Subject as one endowed with the possibil-
ity of critique and resistance through subversion. In this 
attempt Butler takes recourse to Lacan; but before she 
does so, she exhausts all conceptual and methodological 
possibilities provided by Foucault himself. The relentless 
attempt at exhausting the entire theoretical/conceptual 
repository of the Foucaultian theory, repeatedly brings 
Butler back to the question of the possibility for the 
body to be that site of resistance and to the question of 
the substance of resistance.
I would like to point out here that the aporia – of the 
advocated yet seemingly impossible resistance – pro-
duced by the Foucauldian radically disciplined Subject is 
one that stems from – and applies to – Butler’s heuristic 
reading of Foucault. It is Butler, and not Foucault who 
unravelled the radical ambivalence of the Foucaultian 
Subject. Its fundamental ambivalence consists in the si-
multaneity of the two opposed processes: on the one 
hand, the relentless and unavoidable disciplining to 
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which the Self is always already subjected, by virtue of 
its auto-founding surrender to the power and the rule of 
Norm/ativity, and its acting as the agency of the Norm, 
as the bearer and the active force of the Law, on the 
other hand. In other words, it is both disciplined and dis-
ciplining at the same time.
Power and discipline can be enforced but through 
its subjects – through those that have subjected them-
selves to the Norm and have, hence, gained competence 
to insure its rule. The radical ambivalence of the Sub-
ject consists in its constitutive simultaneous passivity 
and activity. The normal (disciplined and normalized) 
Subject becomes the agency of Normativity (i.e., of Nor-
mality) precisely by way of assuming discipline. In the 
process of subjection to the Norm, i.e., of being disci-
plined, the Subject endorses the Law, since in order to 
gain discipline one needs to understand the rule, that 
is, one needs to “see its point.” Or, put differently, the 
Discipliner does not only want you to just be obedient 
in exteriority, it demands your “passionate attachment” 
(Buttler 1997, 129), it wants your soul, it requests your 
love. In the process of disciplining, in the process of en-
dorsing the rule and the rules of the Law, the Subject 
establishes a relation. 
The Subject exists only by virtue of its role within 
the Symbolic order, since it has always already been 
produced as its function, says Lacan. Similarly to Lacan, 
Foucault explains that the subject is always already im-
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plicated by the Discourse in/of Power, since it is condi-
tioned by it. The only possible world for the Subject is 
the Universe of the existing and historically determined 
discursive possibilities. It s impossible for the Subject to 
think itself outside the horizon of thought introduced 
and maintained by the Law, outside the universe the 
Symbolic Order represents (except hypothetically). The 
stronger the hold of discipline is, the more impossible it 
is for the subject to imagine itself outside its world, and 
hence assume a critical position with respect to it. Let 
us reiterate, in this way a fundamental complicity with 
the Norm is established, whereby the Subject assumes 
competence with respect to it. Hence, it inevitably be-
comes the Subject in the etymologically incorrect, mod-
ern sense of the word, i.e., an active instance, an actor 
in a process – and, finally, a potential agency of political 
subversion.
Competence and power invested in the Butlerian 
Subject conceived as the active force of Normality and 
Norms, render the interpretation of this (the Butlerian) 
concept of subjectivity as fundamentally passive and 
always already subjugated entirely inadequate. Para-
doxically, the complicity (with Norm) itself is that which 
ensures critique and, consequently, resistance. Self-re-
flecting (about) itself as the active and competent – au-
thoritative, powerful – instance of exercising and re-pro-
ducing the Norm, the Subject re-invents itself as also the 
instance of the production of the Norm (and not merely 
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of re-production). This process does not only imply com-
plicity with the Norm but also the possibility of resist-
ance since the pretension itself to assume the position 
of an authority with respect to the norm implies also 
the clam to the right to authorship. To create Norms is 
also to exercise critique of the existing ones (regardless 
of whether more conservative norms were introduced). 
The fact that Butler cannot resist tackling the problem of 
the body indicates her desire to identify a site of resist-
ance which is inherently stable, an instance immanently 
opposite to that of ceaseless transformation.
It is, hence, no surprise that in Undoing Gender (UG), 
seven years after the publishing of PLP, Butler strongly 
insists on the irrevocability of the “tasks of persistence 
and survival” for the “I” (2004, 4). Persistence and sur-
vival – “continuity through dissociated unity” (Butler 
1997, 93) – are inherently related to and often conflated 
with resistance, since it is that same instance and “site” 
which enables both resistance to the Norm and persist-
ence of the (dissociated) unity in spite of the unstoppa-
ble process of transformativity.
Considering that Foucault is a declared Nietzschean, 
and that Butler declares herself a Foucauldian, it seems 
necessary to explore how the thesis about self-preserva-
tion as the origin of resistance, that I am attributing here 
to the Foucauldian-Butlerian line of thought, relates 
to Nietzsche’s idea of the “Untergang” as the basis of 
(political) change. The seemingly radical difference be-
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tween the two positions will be reconciled – or rendered 
nothing but seeming – by way of resorting to Francois 
Laruelle’s “non-philosophy” and its epistemology of 
“thinking in terms of the One.” The latter refers to a non-
relationist thought, to a thought in terms of singularity 
conditioned by the unique, singular reality of the object 
of investigation (of “theorizing”) rather than inter-relat-
edness and inter-conditioning of concepts within a doc-
trinal universe.
A Laruellian perspective will enable us to bypass the 
question about the possible radical divergence or split 
within the Nietzschean-Foucauldian-Butlerian line of 
thinking on the issue of self-preservation (and resistance). 
A Laruellian stance will enable an investigation into the 
questions of the location and formation of resistance that 
operates with the “conceptual material” provided by But-
ler, Foucault and Nietzsche inasmuch as sheer material 
and not a “structural function” within a legacy of thought 
(=a Doctrine). A non-philosophical approach of treating/
operating with this conceptual material is to render it a 
“chôra.” (Laruelle 1989, 18) The latter refers to a concep-
tual (Laruelle would say “transcendental”) material that 
the non-philosophical posture of thought chooses to see 
as unorganized within a “Doctrinal Universe;” a conceptu-
al material that is used according to the dictate of the sin-
gularity of the issue at stake in a theoretical investigation, 
rather than succumbing to the imperative to contribute to 
the coherence of a Legacy of Thought (=a Doctrine).
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The heuristic reading and the non-philosophical 
stance will be the main tools of this attempt to “denude” 
the substratum of Foucauldian-Butlerian position on re-
sistance. Once again, the “substratum of the position” 
that this essay strives to unravel is an implication or a po-
tentiality of thought that will be inferred by means of the 
approach of heuristic reading rather than a Foucauldian-
Butlerian explicitly declared position. In the end, the 
position maintained in this chapter, and derived from 
the potentiality of the Foucauldian-Butlerian discourse, 
will look for support in Freud’s thesis about grief as the 
source of revolt. As it will be demonstrated in the con-
clusion of this essay, according to Freud, grief/mourning 
is the solitary labour of survival of the Ego. From Freud’s 
Mourning and Melancholy we will learn that the Ego’s 
labouring for self-preservation always already issues 
into – or is marked by – a stance of Revolt (against the 
outside World).
2. The Origin of Revolt:
Self-Preservation or Self-Demise?
According to Nietzsche, it is precisely the instinct of 
self-preservation which disables, cancels any critique 
(and revolt). The heroic act – a gesture of revolting against 
the ruling values – consists in an action of untergehen. 
Untergang is a recurrent metaphor of Zarathustra’s 
quest: his “going down” among the people – his descent 
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from the spiritual heights of his solitude – bringing them 
the gift of Love for the Humankind is an act of unterge-
hen. In Also Sprach Zarathustra, untergehen is used in a 
multilayered sense, referring to “the sun going down,” 
“transgression” and as “going down into peril.” As op-
posed to self-preservation, heroism (action which is not 
mere re-action, action stripped off ressentiment) – i.e., 
revolt and resistance – should be understood and exer-
cised, according to Nietzsche, as willed self-demise. Cer-
tainly, the latter is oversimplification, however intended. 
It serves our debate by opening a trenchant opposition 
between a philosophy of resistance according to which 
the latter is inherently related to survival, and another 
philosophy according to which it can be anything but 
that. 
However, Nietzsche’s “heroic position” with respect 
to the issue of self-preservation is not that unequivocal. 
In Beyond Good and Evil (13, 262)1 and in Will to Power 
(Book I, 4, 45), Nietzsche maintains the instinct for 
self-preservation to be one of the effects of the will to 
power. He insists that desiring one’s own decay, death 
and disempowerment, to be the sign of weakness and 
decadence. At one point in Will to Power (Book IV, 495) 
he unequivocally establishes an equation between self-
preservation and will to power (“’sense for truth’ […] as 
a means of the preservation of man, as will to power”). 
Still, again in Will to Power, he insists that the “true will” 
of the will to power, the conatus of Will-Power is to 
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transcend, to go beyond, to step out – to be an ex-stasis 
from – the state of self-preservation. 
Means of enduring it [the eternal recurrence]: the 
revaluation of all values. No longer joy in certainty 
but uncertainty; no longer ‘cause and effect’ but the 
continually creative; no longer will to preservation but to 
power; no longer the humble expression, ‘everything is 
merely subjective,’ but ‘it is also our work!’ (IV, 1059, 3)
Here we find the terms of “will to preservation” and 
“will to power” opposed. The one who fully embraces 
the principle of eternal recurrence is called upon revalu-
ing of all values (1059: 2), and in such an endeavour 
will to power replaces, or rather, suspends the principle 
of self-preservation. The latter is a form of the will to 
power, albeit the most rudimentary one, closest but not 
reduced to biology. It furnishes the precondition of the 
exercise of the will to power by being its primal actuali-
zation. However, power’s telos, according to Nietzsche, 
is to “discharge itself” (Beyond Good and Evil, 13), while 
self-preservation is one of its most frequent indirect re-
sults (ibid.).  
Zarathustra exclaims that he loves the one who 
knows how to live solely through his own perishing, that 
he loves the one who justifies in advance the people of 
the future and redeems those of the past, while his will 
is to perish by the people of today (Part 1, Ch. 4). He 
loves those who live in the form of auto-consumption, 
as the flame of life being the living blaze and at the same 
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time the process of burning into one’s own disappear-
ance. Zarathustra loves those who live only through 
their will to die sacrifying their life for some worldly 
reason, contingency, nothing grand in significance, over 
a “small thing” (ibid.). These are the people who, like 
himself, love people, and it is they who willingly “cross 
the bridge” (ibid.). Since “their souls are as deep as their 
wounds,” they can “die of some futile incident” – “be-
cause it is willingly that they cross the bridge” (ibid.). 
The incident can be futile precisely because their souls 
are as deep as their wounds, since in their great will/
power they are airily fragile; and precisely because it is 
with will that they “cross the bridge.” The source of this 
will is love. 
Those who live through their perishing, those whose 
life is self-consuming flame, are the ones who justify the 
people of the future and redeem those of the past (by 
dying by the hand of the people of today) – these are 
heroes according the Greek tragic model. These are the 
people of revolt, of resistance. And it seems that their 
principal driving force is that of death, not of survival. 
There is a seeming opposition between the view accord-
ing to which resistance lies in the striving for survival and 
the one according to which it is in the will to die that 
resistance lives. And it is indeed but a seeming opposi-
tion. The conceptual kernel in each of the two positions 
a priori disables any opposition, any mutual exclusion on 
the basis of contradiction. Here is why. 
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In UG, Butler explicitly claims that one is always al-
ready engaged in the “tasks of survival” and that latter 
is the legitimizing instance of one’s claim to (the right 
to) realness (inscription in the legible discourses ruled by 
Norm/ality) which is an act of political resistance. None-
theless, the category of self-preservation that Butler 
proposes, according to our reading of her theses in PLP 
and UG, is not the same as the one Nietzsche despisingly 
rejects. In fact, as quoted above, Nietzsche insists that 
will to power and will to self preservation are, in certain 
instances, the same. It is affirmed as the source of soul’s 
health, and its lack brings “weakness” and “decadence.” 
In the name of precision, it needs to be clarified that 
the opposition between the two theses is heuristically 
constructed, on the basis of our reading of chosen frag-
ments of the authors’ writings. I am not saying there is a 
general unequivocal position vis-à-vis this question held 
by either Butler or Nietzsche and that the two positions 
are opposed. 
Survival upon which Butler calls is primarily a psycho-
logical notion, referring to the psyche’s and body’s “tasks 
of survival” as an “I” (unity, even though in the process 
of constant transformation). It is also a concept of both 
the ontological and the political registers in reference to 
the potentiality (its instance and its substance) of resist-
ing against the disciplinary hold of the Order of Normal-
ity. Hence, the “survival” in question is an instance of the 
Self which revolts against Normativity and its aspects of 
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disciplining, subjugating – subjection and subjectivizing. 
The form of self-preservation despised by Nietzsche is 
precisely (self)preservation, (self)conservation of Norm/
ativity – conservatism, i.e. the lack of will to “revaluation 
of all values.”  
In the last instance, Nietzsche and Butler do not seem 
to be opposed at all. The work of survival, in its identity-
in-the-last instance, is consisted of the ultimately de-
structive gesture of revolt – against the Order-in-Power; 
survival is rebellion against the violence of subjugation 
and bodily and psychic disintegration, which, according 
to Foucault, is the primary means by way of which Norm/
ativity produces the “dissociated unity” of the Self. Resis-
tance is a stance situated at the border between survival 
and peril. It is, as Heidegger would put it, inasmuch as 
heroic (i.e., tragic) act indeed a “Gränzsituation.” “Death 
drive,” destruction (including auto-destruction), seems 
to be the constitutive element of that of survival or Life. 
This does not mean that Life is Death and Death is 
Life. This type of paradoxes – or “making sense” through 
a paradox – is something I do not embrace, following in 
this respect François Laruelle’s advice. The latter consists 
in Laruelle’s observation that the paradox as a category 
of philosophical truth represents a “romantic solution,” 
(Laruelle 1989, 231) through which one remains en-
trapped in the binary logic of opposition, in the grasp of 
the dualistic reason. Laruelle calls upon non-relationist 
thinking, thinking in terms of singularity whereby the 
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definition of the object of investigation is not condi-
tioned by a constitutive opposition or, for that matter, of 
any dual relation whatsoever.
3. A “Laruellian Twist:” Bypassing Opposition
I would like to briefly present the grounding 
constituents of the methodology of François Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy, his “Thought-in-terms-of-the-One” (or 
“Vision-in-One”). Non-philosophy’s main goal consists 
in surpassing dualisms produced by philosophy’s “self-
mirroring.” And this is something I subscribe to. “Thinking 
in terms of the one” is a methodological position that will 
help us bypass the opposition between self-preservation 
and tragic heroism. 
Thinking-in-terms-of-the-One, copying (“cloning” as 
Laruelle would put it) in this respect the model of the 
scientific thinking, correlates with the Real of its object 
of investigation. The object of investigation is always 
of “transcendental material” – simply: it is a concept – 
but the ways in which one attempts to think it are not 
conditioned by another concept as part of a conceptual 
construct (a discourse or “Doctrine”). Rather, one thinks 
the concept in correlation with the (or: its) Real: with 
the Real behind the Transcendental (a term that in non-
philosophy functions as “Language” or “Discourse”), 
which the latter always attempts to grasp and reflect. 
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The Real, on the other hand, is the elusive instance 
that each concept strives – by always already failing – 
to discipline and reduce to a meaning, to Language. The 
meaning with, the Lacanian Real; it’s rather its (non-)
Euclidean twist. Laruelle argues for thinking in correla-
thought’s radically different structure, the thought which 
describe it in its sin-
gularity. Hence, what non-philosophy advocates is an at-
tempt to “reflect” the Real “without a mirror,” without 
purports that “language can describe the One [the Real], 
which has not at all the same structure, without reflect-
ing it exactly or reproducing it” (Laruelle 50 ,1989). 
-
philosophical research. The “real object” of research is a 





the Discursivity in which we are all inevitably born and 
live in) contains “theorico-technico-experimental in-
gredients,” claims Laruelle (1992, 93). The two objects, 
“the Real” and “the real object” of (non-philosophical) 
research, contain “the same representations, but of an 
entirely different status” (ibid.). The distinction between 
the two, insists Laruelle, “is not epistemological […], but 
only of-the-last-instance, that is to say, either transcen-
dental or immanent […]” (ibid.). Furthermore, it does not 
imply the distinction between “experience and concept, 
the concrete and the abstract, the experimentation and 
the theoretical – nor any of their ‘dialectizations’ or ‘cou-
plings,’” insists Laruelle (ibid.). 
It is important that the thought correlates with the 
“Real” and it is this process that brings us to the “real 
object” of investigation.  It is the result of acknowledg-
ing the Real as the identity-in-the-last instance of that 
which has been subjected to theoretical investigation, as 
that to which the cognition succumbs as to the ultimate 
authority. In sum, this posture of thought suspends re-
lationism, cancels the authority of a discourse to deter-
mine the status of the “real object” of investigation by 
the position it holds inside its own doctrinal universe.
Returning to the paradox of Life and Death simulta-
neously present in the instance of revolt and resistance, 
I will attempt to explicate my claim in non-dualistic, 
non-binary terms whereby one does not exclude the 
other, nor reduce it to itself. They do not establish inter-
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changeability. The two terms do not mutually condition 
each other. Subscribing to the non-philosophical critique 
of dualism, I will argue that the simultaneity of the active 
role of both Life-drive and Death-drive in the labour of 
survival is not something that renders the two notions 
paradoxically interchangeable. In such a case, to quote 
Laruelle, we would have a situation where “the form of 
the equation has been changed, but the equation as a 
form of thought still persists” (1989, 231).
I will argue that the destructive stance is invested in 
the labor of persistence and survival, of Life; the paths 
and modes of this investment do not render it reducible 
to the other term (to Life); the stance of (auto-)destruc-
tiveness, seen in its singularity, in its “identity-in-the-last-
instance” is integrated in a process which is, in the last 
instance, one of sustaining, re-creating Life. Executing 
the task of survival in its paroxysm of pure revolt implies 
the participation of Death-drive as the inevitable result 
of the risk always already present in the revolt against 
the Order-in-Power. Death is unilaterally invested in the 
tasks of Life without establishing an equation with it. 
Revolting against the Order, against Discipline and 
Self-Discipline, implies the risk of Punishment, of Peril, 
of Death. And it is by assuming this risk, passionately, 
that one confronts the Rule-of-Power, rebels against it 
aiming its disintegration, overpowering or death. One 
desires the death of the instance of discipline (working 
through bodily and psychic disintegration, claims Fou-
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cault), and one passionately embraces the possibility of 
one’s own death. Revolt is traversed by Desire: Desire 
for Life (for one’s own survival, and liberation from the 
disciplinary hold of the Norm) and Desire for Death (of 
the Repressive Forces); but also by the desire forming 
the passionate embracement of the possibility of one’s 
own peril. The “passionate attachment” to the Threat 
of disintegration, in the case of the revolutionary sub-
ject, is jouissance consisting in the savoring of the phan-
tasm about the Liberation from the violent Norm and of 
the taste of its imminent realization, rather than in the 
Bondsman-Master dialectics. 
This modality of a desire for Death, the passionate at-
tachment to the possibility of one’s own death, is pos-
sible only as a constituent of the revolutionary act, only 
as a component of the Subject-and-Body-situating as an 
instance of resistance, and in the name of persistence, 
survival, self-preservation. 
4. Searching for the Site of Resistance
In line with Foucault’s theory of subjectivity, drawing 
on his conceptualizations of the “body” and the “soul” 
and their respective roles in the Subject formation, in 
PLP, Butler refers to the Body as “the site” of transform-
ativity (of the Subject). The Body as “the site” of – the 
polygon for – transformations in Subjectivity is clearly 
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referred to in its aspect of “materiality,” or rather physi-
cality. In fact, by way of making a distinction of opposing 
terms between Transformativity (inasmuch as workings 
of the Sign/ifer) and its Site (the Body), it is implied that 
the latter is considered in its aspect (rendition) of the 
Real. The “site of transformations”– through its defining 
opposition with respect to transformativity – is assumed 
to be always already the same and one (at least math-
ematically). Butler is explicit in her claim that the Subject 
is never really identical to itself: it is always already re-
created, re-invented through the endless process of re-
subjectivation imposed by the Order-of-Power. 
Through the search for the “site” of these transfor-
mations, inasmuch as it is the opposing term to trans-
formativity itself – both terms constituting a binary 
enabling their respective definitions precisely through 
the mutual exclusion and opposition they establish – 
it is implied that the Body (the “Site”) subsists as the 
same and one. It is clear here that Butler does not write 
about the imaginary/imagined body from Bodies That 
Matter (1993) that is a territory of signification and, in 
that respect, itself subject to a process of certain trans-
formativity. Inasmuch as “the site” of transformation, 
the Body, in PLP, is conceived in its opposition to the 
“Soul” (both terms inherited from Foucault). The body 
in this context is pure physicality and it is the Real. It is 




At one point in her analysis (in PLP), Butler con-
cludes that “[F]or Foucault […] process of subjectivation 
takes place centrally through the body” (Butler 1997, 
83), where upon she enters into a critical re-reading of 
Foucault through the hybrid lens consisting of the inter-
section between the psychoanalytic and the Foucauldi-
an perspective. It is a critical re-reading of Foucault via 
Foucault whereby “[…] criticism will entail re-emergence 
of a Foucauldian perspective within psychoanalysis” 
(Butler 1997, 87). The latter is a methodological inter-
vention that enables bringing to the fore an important 
dimension of the Foucauldian Subject, one of central sig-
nificance – that of its constitutive ambivalence. 
Nonetheless, Butler’s reading to the letter of Foucault 
shows that, according to his conceptions of subjectiva-
tion by and/or subjection to the Order-of-Power, the ef-
fects of the processes of Subject-production seem to be 
“totalizing” (Butler 1997, 86). The dimension of totality 
would be the immediate result of the imprisoning effect 
of the “soul” as it is explicitly conceptualized and termed 
by Foucault. However, by way of making Foucault re-
emerge into psychoanalysis, and vice-versa, Butler con-
ceives of a Subject endowed with the capacity for re-
sistance, which still adheres to the Foucaldian legacy of 
theorizing subjection/subject-production. The choice of 
taking recourse to psychoanalysis is only meant to un-
ravel and re-invent the ambivalence that Butler deems 
inherent in the Foucauldian Subject – its Janus-like con-
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stitution whereby Passivity is the opaque of Activity and 
vice-versa. Still, the thesis about the ambivalence is only 
implicit in Foucault’s own writings, or rather left with-
out an explicit and exhaustive elaboration of the ways in 
which it operates and of its constitution. 
Defining trait of the Foucauldian Subject’s ambiva-
lence, as revealed by Butler’s heuristic reading, is its 
double constitution enabling it to operate on two lev-
els simultaneously, both on that of passivity and on the 
one where activity takes place. Namely, apart from be-
ing constraining, the effects brought upon by the “im-
prisoning soul” also form an instance which has “forma-
tive or generative effects.” “Prohibition and restriction,” 
are Power’s procedures of producing the Foucauldian 
“Soul.” Yet, the “Soul” is the Executor of the Order/s of 
(in) Power. Discipline, “prohibition and restriction,” is 
brought upon the Body and the Self. The latter is sub-
jected to the Order. On the other hand, in its role of an 
agency of assumed Power (always already taking a Form 
and the form is always already a Norm), in its role of the 
inevitable “personification” of Power/Norm, the Sub-
ject produces “formative and generative effects” (Butler 
1997, 87).
The only explicit statements we find in Foucault’s 
writings seem to be claims about an unequivocal di-
chotomy between the body and the soul, which would 
indeed leave no possibility for the body to resist either, 
being reduced to a “malleable surface for the unilateral 
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effects of disciplinary power” (Butler 1997, 86-87). But-
ler also makes the observation that Foucault’s Discipline 
and Punish (DP), reduces “soul” to the Subject as a “posi-
tion within the Symbolic order,” to use Lacanian parlance 
(Butler 1997, 86). Consequently, if not complemented 
by psychoanalysis, Foucault’s discourse on subjectivity, 
according to Butler, leaves little, if any, space for the “lo-
cation” of resistance of the Subject.
 Butler looks for an answer to this aporia in what she 
calls “incommensurability between psyche and subject” 
(Butler 1997, 87). However, she refuses to resort to an 
easy answer that psychoanalysis could provide to the 
questions of the location and of the identity-in-the-last-
instance of resistance, one that could locate the Resist-
ance on the territory of the Unconscious. The latter would 
be a “romantic solution” building on a romantic notion of 
the Unconscious as the “Land of Innocence” as far as Nor-
mativity is concerned. She hypothesizes that the uncon-
scious is also “structured by power relations that pervade 
cultural signifiers” (Butler 1997, 88). 
Having adopted this position with respect to the Phan-
tasm about the “Purity of the Unconscious,” Butler situ-
ates the Subject’s ambivalence, or rather its complicity 
with power, in the Unconscious as well. From this point 
on, it becomes even more difficult to establish the loca-
tion and trace the mechanisms of resistance within the 
Psyche. Eventually, as soon as the discussion exploring 
the hypothesis about the Unconscious as the possible 
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source of revolt is exhausted and reaches a dead end, 
Butler reintroduces the question of the “body” as the 
possible location and substance of resistance, inviting 
us “to return to the problem of the bodies in Foucault” 
(Butler 1997, 89).
By searching for that which is outside the Foucauldian 
“soul,” outside the Subject inherently articulated by the 
mechanisms of Power – that “mere position within the 
Lacanian symbolic” – as the possible locus of resistance 
(for the “I”), Butler is also attempting to locate that thing 
which “glues the bundle [called Subject] together” (Brai-
dotti 2002, 5). It seems that by looking for that topos of 
critique (directed at the Order-of-Power) outside all of 
that which is essentially a mere form of the process of 
subjection, Butler implies that the location of resistance 
is de facto a location of resistance to ceaseless transfor-
mation. Subjection inasmuch as subject-formation is al-
ways already unstoppable subject-transformation. Trans-
formativity, subjective change is a process unavoidably 
taking place inside the confines of a power-formation. It 
is a process (auto-)generated by the Order of Power. 
In brief, if the transformation takes place through sub-
ject formation, it is inextricably implicated in the proc-
esses of Enactment-of-Order, in the processes of Disci-
plining in accordance with the Norm. Hence, the locus of 
opposition to the Norm, the locus of Resistance is out-
side transformativity, outside the continuous change – it 
is in fact a static stance. Static in the double sense of the 
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word: “not moving,” but an adjective derivative from the 
ancient Athenian political concept of stasis meaning a 
rebellion or a civil war in the polis, suspension of the Po-
lis, of the Order-in-Power (Loraux, 2001). Stasis, mean-
ing both stillness and revolution (στάσις), is a pause in 
the Normality of the functioning of the State. 
The locus of resistance is, therefore, an instance of po-
tentiality for situating oneself with a radical, immanent 
detachment from the ceaseless auto-generated proc-
esses of subjection (of “being a Subject”). Thus, it is situ-
ating beyond the instance of transformability. The latter, 
by definition, belongs to the domain of the Subject; the 
instance of paused transformation, or of paused subjec-
tion, can take place at the level of the Subject as its own 
Negative, as a crack within the subject formation. What 
matters is that it is an instance of resistance to transfor-
mation (inasmuch as a process of subjection), to change 
(inasmuch as generated by Norm-in-Power), resistance 
to movement – it’s a stance of stability, of continuity 
within the same Self although endlessly involved in the 
processes of (self-)transmutation. It is a topos of virginity 
as far as subjection is concerned, a topos of self-identity 
– the topos of sameness is potentially also the topos of
emergence of any resistance to any oppressions of Norm
effectuated through any form of subjectivity. This topos
of resistance can be but that “thing” called by Braidotti 
the “glue” for the non-unitary Subject. It is an instance
of continuity and persistence, it is the critical stance re-
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sisting the processes of subjection and identification in 
order to survive as the Body but also as the Self free of 
repressions imposed by the Power-of-Discipline. 
The implicated link between resistance and continuity 
(of the “I”) that I see in PLP is affirmed by Butler herself 
in UG when she writes “[…] the possibility of my 
persistence as an ‘I’ depends upon my being able to do 
something with what is done with me” (Butler 2004, 3). 
UG is a book which insists on the tasks of survival for the 
Self. Still it neither “undoes” the concept of subjectivity 
as conceived in PLP nor the argument concerning the 
topology of the resistance and continuity as proposed 
by the same book. 
5. Hiatus in Repetition
According to Butler’s close reading of Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault’s conception of the “Subject” – being 
but an “instrument of power” – can hardly allow any in-
terpretation of its constitution in terms of ambivalence, 
one that would render it also an active instance and an 
agency of resistance (apart from its being a sheer prod-
uct of subjection). It is for this reason that Butler invites 
us once again to “return to the problem of bodies in 
Foucault” (Butler 1997, 89). What follows immediately 
is an interrogation of the possibility for the Body to be 
the topos of resistance par excellence. Struggling with 
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what seems to be an aporia established by the body/
soul opposition in Foucault, Butler asks: “Has it come 
to the paradoxical point where Foucault wants to claim 
that the soul is the exterior form, and the body interior 
space (Butler 1997, 89)?
Archaic oppositions of the type “soul as the exterior 
form” versus “body as interior space” are not the basis 
upon which Foucault’s philosophy operates. The idea 
about the double sense of Power, about its simultane-
ously subjugating and liberating effects, and also about 
the double-facetted process of subjection as the form in 
which Power operates, would be irreconcilable with an 
archaic position of the sort. The ambivalence of Power 
(and hence of its agency) in the sense of its endless po-
tentiality for transmutation from overpowering force 
(of repression) into one of empowerment is implied 
throughout Foucault’s opus. In fact it is an opus dedi-
cated to this message.
Therefore, the hypothetical reading according to which 
Foucault’s philosophy leaves no possibility for resistance 
– proposed by Butler merely hypothetically, for the sake
of analysis – should be dismissed; not only because of its
anachronistic overtones, but also because it would indeed
leave neither space nor potentiality of resistance/critique
which would itself be in downright contradiction with the
entire emancipatory project of Foucault.
Moreover, a reading according to which the possibil-
ity for resistance would be outside the boundaries of 
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Selfhood, outside the “soul,” would find itself in utter 
disagreement with the concept of the “Self” from The 
History of Sexuality, vol. III: The Care of the Self (HS-III). 
Foucault’s “soul” is neither reduced nor reducible to 
imprisonment and constraint; it is also an instance of 
liberation and pleasure, the Self (le soi, le moi) should 
be the produce of practices of self-cultivation (“souci de 
soi”), insists Foucault in HS-III. Butler’s radical readings 
of Foucault in PLP – radicalizing the concepts and rhe-
torical means for the purposes of a heuristic reading – 
serve to unravel the complexity of Foucault’s writing by 
bringing to the fore the instances of impasse present in 
it. This radicalization by way of reading Foucault to the 
letter is necessary, because of the problematic (=symp-
tomatic) explicitness in his insisting on the imprisoning 
effects of the “soul” at the expense of the symptomatic 
implicitness – or lack of explicitness – in elaboration of 
its liberating potentials. 
In direct relation to the latter, Butler recurrently re-
turns to the question of the Body as the Site of Revolt 
par excellence, only to conclude that “[…] there is no 
body outside of power, for the materiality of the body 
– indeed, materiality itself – is produced by and in di-
rect relation to the investment of power” (Butler 1997,
90-91).
The logic inherent in Butler’s interpretative search for
the location of resistance in Foucault would be the fol-
lowing: resistance can be located only outside the Power 
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formations (inhabiting the Subject) and, hence, outside 
the Subject as well; since it is proven that even the Body 
is also invaded by power and discourse, resistance is not 
to be found there (in the body) either. Butler’s reading is 
a symptomatology intended to reveal the great aporia 
of Foucault – a point of frustration which is also the fo-
cus of greatest potentiality, the most fertile grain in his 
thought. 
To support the latter claim, let us remember that 
Foucault himself explicitly states that there are possi-
bilities for resistance, a multitude of them, and that they 
are to be located in the instance of Power itself, through 
inversions of its articulations, through subversion of its 
institutions and instruments of the Order of Normality 
and Normativity. In History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The 
Will to Knowledge, Foucault writes that there can be “no 
single locus of great Refusal, no soul of Revolt.” Instead, 
one can talk of “multiple possibilities of resistance ena-
bled by power itself” (Foucault 1998, 95-96). 
The ambivalence of Power is invested in and through 
the Subject and induces in the latter a creation of a dou-
ble-facetted constitution. The Subject is always already 
the agency of both Norm/ativity and of Revolt, i.e., of Re-
sistance. Similar to the Moebius strip, the single-bound-
ary topos of Power takes a curve creating a reverse, or 
rather an oblique, of the same. This “double nature” of 
Power is what constitutes the double nature of the Sub-
ject, rendering it both disciplined/disciplining as well as 
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revolutionary: “[…] in its resignifications, the law itself 
is transmuted into that which opposes and exceeds its 
original purposes,” says Butler (1997, 99). In fact, outside 
the vicious circle of pursuing – or rather merely testing 
– the argument about the body as the site of resistance
par excellence, Butler proposes her own thesis about
the origin of resistance in the Foucauldian Subject: it is
in the constant reiteration of the Norm (1997, 93). The
constant reiteration undermines the solidity, the Norm’s
status of a given – it is as if in the hiatus of re-iteration,
the Subject of critique and resistance arises. Hiatus is a
pause, it is a stasis.
Butler’s interpretation of Foucault seeks to explicate 
what Foucault himself is not explicit about: the process-
es of transmutation of one aspect (“expression,” articu-
lation into the Symbolic) of Power into the other, from 
disciplining and repressive into revolutionary. It is an 
interpretation, operating with the conceptual and meth-
odological tools of (Lacanian) psychoanalysis, according 
to which the origin of the transmutation is the ceaseless 
process of reiterations of the Law (or the Norm; Butler 
establishes a parallel, or rather an equation, between 
the disciplining force of Power and the Lacanian Law, 
see: Butler 1997, 86, 88-89, 98-99 et al.).
Re-iteration is always already re-signification. Even 
when re-signifying the Same, the very act of bringing 
in(-to-Power) signification, moreover from the position 
of an agency of power – from the stance of “having the 
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
72
authorization,” that of “being a Subject”,  to re-inscribe 
the Norm (or “the Law”) – renders the always already 
same Law always already different. The Subject inces-
santly differs in the Name of the Law – by way of constant 
re-signification of the “raw material” of the undisciplined 
phantasmatic – and through this process the Subject it-
self becomes different, shifted on the signifying chain. 
This interpretation echoes epistemologies other than 
just Lacanian psychoanalysis, such as Deleuze’s epistem-
ic project of “difference and repetition,” or Nietzsche’s 
conception of the “eternal return” or Spinoza’s thesis 
about the Subject’s radical embeddedness in its envi-
ronment (in “Nature,” which includes human individuals 
and their societal network as its immanent part).
Let us consider the following, one rare explicit 
reference to the location of resistance made by 
Foucault:
[…] there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul 
of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, 
each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, 
necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, 
savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still 
others that are quick to compromise, interested or 
sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the 
strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean 
that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with 
respect to the basic domination an underside that is in 
the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat. 
(Foucault 1998, 95-96)
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In the quoted passage we do not find anything refer-
ring – either directly or indirectly – to the rules of struc-
ture or of inner organization of Power in the form of the 
Subject. He writes of a multiplicity (and unpredictability) 
of possibilities for resistance in terms of and from the 
perspective of the Social, within a society or a culture. 
Evidently Foucault is referring to the locations, possible 
manifestations of resistance on and in the Social Body 
(and “Soul”).
There is one definition concerning resistance (i.e., its 
location) that we find in this passage: resistance can “ex-
ist” only in “the strategic field of power relations.” And 
in the context of the quoted passage it seems to belong 
to the topology of the Social. Nonetheless, we should 
investigate more closely the proposed definition of the 
location of resistance and see if it is applicable to the 
interrogation of the potentiality for resistance of/within 
the Subject itself. Since, it remains a question how the 
“transmutation” of Power takes place on the “territory” 
of the Subject, of the Individual; what are the structural 
changes, or the changes in terms of “inner organization” 
of the Subject or in terms of the possible modalities of 
subject-constitution that take place? So, the question 
is not only how the Subject posits itself within the Net-
work of Power relations – not just in actuality or real/
ity, but also on the level of the “Symbolic” – i.e., how it 
re-situates itself with respect to the Law, but also what 
prompts this re-situating. In other words, what reversal 
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on the level of the Self must take place for the revolu-
tionary repositioning to take place?
In reference to “where” the resistance can take place 
on the level of the Individual – of the Subject and its 
body – Foucault writes about “focuses of resistance […] 
inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments 
in life, certain types of behaviour.” (Foucault 1998, 95-
96) There is reference to both “body” and “moments of
life, certain types of behaviour” (“body” and “soul”) as
the possible locations of resistance. Hence, according to
Foucault, resistance can take place both within the (dis-
ciplined) soul, as well as in and through the (disciplined)
body. And also, as we could see from the previously quot-
ed paragraph, resistance, that “odd term in relations of
power,” (Foucault 1998, 96) according to Foucault’s own
words, is possible. Why Foucault chooses to elaborate
extensively on the disciplining effects of power/soul and
not on the liberating ones is another question that we
are not going to open here.
Resistance or critique of the Norm implies – or rather, 
takes the form of – also a change within the subject-for-
mation, it implies trans-formation of the Subject or of the 
Self; and paradoxically so: since it is understood as also 
the stance of resistance to change, to transformation (al-
ways already imposed by the Order-of-Power). If we em-
brace the interpretation according to which resistance is 
persistence as the same, that revolution consists in resist-
ing change as always already imposed by the Norm, we 
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are obliged to imagine the trans-formation of the Subject 
into a revolutionary agency, as one of a radically different 
status in terms of immanence. It takes place at an instance 
that is able to enunciate its radical independence vis-à-vis 
the Order/World/Norm, to claim its right to survive as it-
self, to defend its individual, solitary truth, and to circum-
scribe itself as its inalienable self. Hence, one inescapably 
imagines a site or instance (or substance?) of continuity 
upon which transformation takes place. 
The transformation process implies that a certain 
“Same” undergoes a process of becoming “different to 
itself,” a process of “dis-identification” and “re-identifi-
cation” to which one is continuously subjected. And it is 
not “one” in a merely grammatical sense of the word but 
also mathematically. Hence, it is “one” also in the onto-
logical sense of the word. A certain instance of Selfhood 
has to remain identical to itself or has to persevere as 
some sort of continuity, so that the subject-trans-forma-
tion is experienced as one’s own. An instance of continu-
ity is needed so that it functions as the instance from 
which the possession of subject transformations can be 
claimed. And the latter is valid also for the changes that 
are neither enunciated nor recognized by the “revolu-
tionary Subject,” it applies also to the imperceptible and 
uninterrupted processes of Subject-trans-formation im-
posed by the Norm-in-Power (or the Power-in-Form).
In order to be able to say “I have been many Subjects,” 
or “I have found myself in many subjects-formations,” or 
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“I have lived and died as a number of subjects,” there is 
an instance which enunciates the multiplicity as a proc-
ess of transformation contained within a unity and on 
the basis of continuity. As far as the issue of subject-
transformation is concerned, it seems that the notions 
of unity and continuity coincide in meaning and in status 
(in terms of structure or rather in constitution of “self-
hood”). Only a certain instance of oneness can act as an 
instance of continuity, and the latter is indispensable in 
order to be able to speak of a transformation and multi-
ple possibilities for subject-formations of a self. (Other-
wise the reference to multiplicity would mean no more 
than mere plurality of dispersed subject-formations; and 
there could hardly be any possibility for reference to 
trans-formation of the Subject.) 
In my view, it is for reasons of establishing identity 
between continuity and unity – and thereby implying 
that it is the instance of stability that furnishes site for 
resistance – that in PLP Butler keeps returning to the 
Body as the possible site of resistance. Foucault claims 
that the Self is always already dissociated while always 
already “adopting the illusion of a substantial unity.” Fur-
thermore, he claims that the Self or the Subject is cre-
ated through the process of destruction of the body (the 
Body is called “that volume in perpetual disintegration,” 
inflicted by Language, i.e., by Norm/ativity) (Foucault 
1977, 147-148). Thus, when Butler is investigating the 
possibility for the body to be the site of resistance, it 
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means that she is also searching for that focal point of 
potentiality within the body to resist destruction and 
disintegration. Once again resistance is inextricable from 
persistence, from unity and continuity. 
6. Grief and Survival: Death invested in Life
Memory, that sequential instance of cathexis to a 
lived experience or to an internalized object of love/
hate, is yet another form of continuity enabling the Self 
or the Subject to know of its transformations, of the sub-
jective deaths and births it has been through. Mourning 
and grief is a theme that gains significant importance in 
Butler’s later works, more specifically in Precarious Life 
(PL) and UG, and it is to the latter that we will focus at 
this conclusive point of our analysis. 
Both mourning and grief is the labour of memory. It is 
memory’s continuous production and its own reproduc-
tion. In UG, Butler insists on the right to realness, and 
she reiterates at many places in the text that it is through 
the recognized reality of one’s grief that access is gained 
to the right to realness (Butler 2004, 27). Realness is an 
instance that Butler closely links to the experiences of 
grief, hence of memory, hence to a form of continuity 
and unity that is the only work that memory perpetually 
executes. She calls upon reclaiming the right of realness 
of all whose lives have been rendered unintelligible, dis-
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cursively non-existent, who have been reduced to bare 
life. She calls upon resistance, revolt striving to furnish 
re-inscription into the linguistic world of the experienc-
es of those reduced to bare life, those deprived of the 
right to a personal narrative (Butler 2004, 25-27). This is 
a claim that, once again, invokes resistance in order to 
insure persistence – through inscription in History, which 
is the “knowable reality” (27) that Butler demands for 
the discursively nonexistent “loves and losses” (ibid.).
The hard labour of ceaselessly insuring one’s persist-
ence, one’s survival, through the relay of one’s memorial 
continuity and preserved (to say the least, bodily) unity 
– taking the state of mourning/grieving as the paradigm
of this labour, self-consumed work of mournful cathexis
– is one that takes place at the heart of one’s radical soli-
tude. Assuming the task of ensuring one’s own survival,
facing the devastation brought upon by the violence of
the loss of an object-love, is a form of labour whereby
one is investing oneself entirely into realizing one’s own
survival. One is exposed to one’s own self, submerged in
the love (care) for oneself (and/or for the object of libidi-
nal cathexis) actualized through the relentless work of
surviving, of protecting oneself from the pervasive forc-
es of the “outside world” (the World of Norm), forces of
disintegration (destruction of the body and dissociation
of the Self).
Butler, however, warns that contrary to the opinion 
of many that grieving is a solitary state, it is rather one 
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pertaining to the constitutive sociality of the Self (Butler 
2004, 19). Still the behaviour that the grieving or mourn-
ing one demonstrates is that of recoiling from the world, 
“loss of interest in the outside world” (Freud 2000, 284), 
and of the relentless work and enduring posture of self-
circumscription or, in Freud’s words, “circumscription 
in the ego […] expression of an exclusive devotion to 
mourning […]” (ibid.). 
The grieving one does not show any interest in the 
outside world (Freud 2000, 285), in what is known or 
recognizable as life, and suffers serious impoverishment 
or withdrawal of the ego-libido (Freud 2000, 290). This 
death – revocation of life – is necessary in order for the 
work of mourning to be successfully completed and upon 
achieving the state of hypercathexis to be able to liberate 
oneself from the cathectic links to the object-love (Freud 
2000, 284). This submergence into an all-flooding death 
(of the object-love, of the libido, of the outside world) 
is necessary for the recovery to begin and for ensuring, 
making possible the survival of the grieving one. Grief is 
a struggle, and it is clearly a revolt (cf. Freud 2000, 287) 
against the menaces of destruction of libido, life, of the 
ego, which issues into a either successful or unsuccessful 
achieving of its primary goal of – the survival. 
In Homer’s Iliad Achilles’ wrath is one of mourning, 
one stemming immediately out of grieving over Patro-
clus’s death. His mourning takes and maintains the form 
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of mēnis – “bitter wrath” (Iliad, 18.318-23). In Mothers 
in Mourning (1998), Nicole Loraux compares Achilles’ 
grief, his (psychological) state and (cultural) articulation 
mourning to that of a mother mourning over her dead 
child reaching its climax of intensity, of expression when 
mourning a lost daughter. It is mourning which revolts 
against the irrevocability of the loss, anger against the 
annihilation of the loved one and the severing of the 
cord of love. Mēnis, probably even etymologically, is 
linked to memory, to defiance to forget, to defiance of 
memory preserving love against the violent reality of 
death. Nicole Loraux describes Achilles’ mēnis and that 
of a mourning mother as: 
[…] black like a child of the night, it is terrible and it lasts. 
It is repetitive and endless, all the more so since never to 
have end is precisely the motivating force of mēnis. Thus 
a motionless “always” (aeí) establishes itself, ready to 
vie endlessly with the political meaning of aeí that tells, 
on the contrary, of a continuity in the service of the city, 
a continuity that nothing must break. (Loraux 1998, 44)
The “political meaning” of aeí in the name of “con-
tinuity in the service of the city” refers to the rite of la-
menting always and traditionally performed by women, 
the purpose of which was the preservation of the collec-
tive memory, of the place of the dead one in the collec-
tive memory. Demonstration of violent feeling of grief, 
expressing a pathos so strong that could guarantee one’s 
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lasting place in the collective memory, was the charac-
teristics of female lamentation that could be considered 
a rendition of mourning qua mēnis. Ritual lamentation 
is excessive, yet, it is an excessiveness that has been 
prescribed by the city, normalized and given the above 
mentioned political sense.
Returning to the individual, solitary cases of ma-
ternal mourning, to the stories of Demeter, Niobe or 
Clytemnestra, the black night of the endless mēnis of un-
controlled and uncontrollable excess – it is a furious, an-
gry, painful, relentlessly mournful remembering. It defies 
annihilation, revolts against Death through the labour of 
preservation of the traces of life nesting in the mnemae 
of love.2 Loraux argues that this tendency toward infinite 
intensity in grieving, toward intensity that necessarily 
produces infinity, that this unyielding mournful wrath is 
characteristic of a mother’s grief over a lost daughter. The 
paradigmatic example of this structural law of the west-
ern imaginary and symbolic order is, according to Loraux, 
Demeter’s mourning of the loss of Persephone. Quite sim-
ilar is the grief of Clytemnestra over Iphigenia as well as 
of Hecuba over Polyxena. The cord of intimacy between 
the mother and the child is severed by the fact that the 
son’s function in the symbolic order (the “civilization”) is 
to re-produce and re-present it. The daughter is that spot 
of negativity, of the necessary dialectical negation of the 
meaning of the symbolic order, of the non- that the order 
necessitates as part of itself in order to maintain itself. 
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Or in Loraux’s own words:
[...] let us bear in mind that the daughter could be 
designated as ōdís, a word that refers to the act of 
childbirth, in its length and in its pain, just before the 
separation between mother and child is accomplished; 
the son could be said to be the lókheuma, the finished 
product of childbirth, already separate from the mother, 
already ready to be “civilized” by paternal recognition. 
(Loraux 1998, 52)   
Freud admits the necessary presence of revolt in 
grief, while Nicole Loraux intensifies this point by in-
sisting that anger or revolt is the kernel of the state of 
mourning and grief. If mourning is labouring for self-
preservation of the Ego, and of its mnemic constitution 
through objects of love, and if mourning is inevitably 
linked with revolt, then, consequently, the radical stance 
of self-preservation – that the mourning is – is unavoid-
ably invested with revolt. In the radically solitary work 
of self-preservation, of keeping one’s Ego alive, of sheer 
labouring of survival we find revolt (=resistance) nesting 
in its very substratum.
Going back to Butler’s claims that being rendered 
“unreal,” not being inscribed in the Language of the Polis 
is perhaps the harshest form of oppression and exclu-
sion, the point about the aspect of sociality in grief is 
certainly one of high relevance. I am embracing it con-
vinced that it is not in contradiction with the point I am 
trying to make here about the radical solitude in the la-
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bour of survival of the grieving one. Indeed, from the 
pits of deepest mournful solitude one reaches for the 
Other, and in this openness for the Other, in this expo-
sure desiring the invasion of the Other that will disturb 
the disturbing solidity of the solitary Self, one is vulner-
able, dependent on the Other.
I believe that it is precisely this self-enclosure into 
oneself that takes a radical form whenever survival is 
threatened that creates the urgent need for sociality, 
rendering the grieving one dependent on or grievingly 
yearning for the Other. As the exit from the Uncanny 
that such self-envelopment creates, as the Farmakon 
curing of the inevitability of being-within-oneself by way 
of transforming it into the opposite. After all, it is the 
precariousness of the hard labour of survival that al-
ways alerts its agent to seek for the help of the Other. 
It alerts the agent to revolt against the outside world, 
against the norm, against the violence. And it does so 
primarily through the mournful solitary work of the 
Ego’s circumscription; as soon as the libido-detachment 
is accomplished (Freud 2000, 284), the “passionate at-






The Concept of Life and Its Political Meaning 
in Spinoza, Agamben, and Butler
1. A Spinozian Intro:
The Hubristic Essence of Humanity
By virtue of expression intrinsic to it, Spinozian co-
natus of self-preservation can be defined as intensive 
whereas the latter, i.e., intensity, is defined by infinity 
(Deleuze 1990). In accordance with the immanence that 
defines it (the conatus of infinity), self-preservation is 
transgressive or hubristic. Namely, if human “appetite” 
consists in the necessary tendency toward an infinite 
power of existence, and if infinity bears the mark of – or 
gives mark to, i.e., defines – immortality (or godlike ex-
istence), we can conclude that human essence is hubris-
tic. It is an inherent tendency of the finite being, always 
already participating in the Infinity, to endlessly increase 
its Desire (Spinoza’s “conscious emotion”) for perfection 
of life, that is, for a life that offers as complete and as 
undisturbed as possible state of pleasure. 
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In a Spinozian universe, perfection is achieved within 
a community of human (and other living) beings. Per-
fection or the state of total pleasure depends on our 
constitutive interrelatedness with the others. Imagin-
ing the others suffer affects our own wellbeing, our own 
state of being-in-pleasure, explains Spinoza (E III, 30p). 
Imagination, according to Spinoza, has a formative role 
in relation to mind whereas the latter always already 
integrates emotion (Lloyd 1996, 53-58). Therefore, the 
human individual wishes to “exclude the existence” – in 
and through imagination – of whatever affects the oth-
ers with sadness (Lloyd 1996, 76). Striving toward the 
“exclusion of existence” of what brings about pain and 
sadness in one’s life, always already inextricable from 
the lives of all living beings, is immanent to human es-
sence – immanent to the “appetite” for preserving (in) 
life (Spinoza E III 29p, 30, 30p). 
Consequently, one could infer that opposition to (or 
critique of) all that corrupts life with negativity is imma-
nent to Spinoza’s conatus (of self-preservation). Concern 
with the opposition between Good and Bad, positioning 
oneself in terms of this opposition seem to be constitutive 
of self-preservation, and vice versa. Critique is at the heart 
of self-preservation. Revolt seems to stem from the pure-
ly experiential, almost pre-linguistic stance of sheer self-
preserving, from the mute stance of merely surviving. 
Inferring one further implication of this thesis, one 
might say that the need to maintain life as little as pos-
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sible corrupt by pain urges the individual to introduce 
change in society. Namely, in order to be able to increase 
his/her power of activity, the individual seeks to intro-
duce beneficial, life-increasing change in the organized 
network of interpersonal relations. 
This logic of inference is valid only with reference to 
the active and conscious emotions, i.e., to desire/s. Pas-
sions are passive (Spinoza E III 56). Passions, the in Spi-
nozian sense of the word, are re-active emotions lacking 
in imagination and reason in order to introduce change 
(E III 49p, 56, 58). Passive emotions are not desires for 
any sort of change except re-active reversals – products 
of ressentiment. In fact, in a Spinozian universe, passions 
are no desires at all. Desire, in the Spinozian sense of 
the word, is a conscious and active emotion (Spinoza E 
III 9, 49, 49p, 58p, 1def. 1def.exp., “General Definition of 
the Emotions”). Passions are contrary to active emotions 
(Spinoza E IV 23, 23p, 24, 24p, 33, 33p, et alibi). They 
are the product of being passively subjected to external 
inflictions of either pleasure or pain (E III 57p, “General 
Definition of the Emotions”). 
The possibility of infinite excess of “appetite” gives rise 
to a vision of an immanently hubristic Humanity. Still, in 
Spinoza’s hypothetical world of absolute freedom, in his 
utopia of active (conscious) emotions, conflict would be 
impossible. What everyone strives for, accompanied by 
desires formed by “adequate ideas” (E II, def. 4), is well-
being. The “good” is something immanently originating 
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from the infinite power of being that is given as potenti-
ality to the finite beings. “Good” is never external, never 
something possessed by an external entity or body that 
one would strive to acquire by way of dispossessing of it 
that other body. This is a necessary implication of Spino-
za’s thesis about the “true nature” of any finite being as 
a modal essence participating in the attributes of infinite 
Nature or God. Whereas, as far as the good/evil opposi-
tion is concerned, according to Spinoza, it does not ex-
ist in itself. Good and evil are always already relationally 
determined.  
In what follows, then, I shall mean by “good” that, which 
we certainly know to be a means of approaching more 
nearly to the type of human nature, which we have 
set before ourselves; by “bad,” that which we certainly 
know to be hindrance to us in approaching the said type. 
(Spinoza, E IV Preface)
However, there are two things that Spinoza claims are 
good and bad per se: 
Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain 
in itself is bad. Proof. – Pleasure is emotion, whereby the 
body’s power of activity is increased or helped; pain is 
emotion, whereby the body’s power of activity is dimin-
ished or checked, therefore pleasure in itself is good, &c. 
Q.E.D. (E IV, 41)
Being subjects to passions (E IV, 4c), to the re-active 
emotions of passivity (E III, def.3nb) resulting in a less-
ened power of existence, finite beings of mankind can 
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be the source of evil or bad (all that which is not benefi-
cial to our own or our neighbor’s being). The latter may 
contain potentiality for a world to come according to 
the Hobbesian vision (Spinoza E IV 34, 34p, 34n). Hence 
a Form-of-Control is required, based on reason, claims 
Spinoza (E IV, 35, 35p, 35c1, 35c2, 35n).
The Form that suspends the possibility of a chaotic, 
violent world ruled by fluxes of passion, in Spinoza’s 
view, is the State (E IV, 37 n2). Institutionally imposed 
norms, values as well as threats of punishment, accom-
panied by means of enforcement are the “invention” of 
moderation, of control over the possibility not of excess 
of intensity of life – since no such danger exists – but of 
passions. Accordingly, Spinoza calls upon respecting the 
laws of the State and invokes the necessity of normaliza-
tion (E IV, 37, 40). 
Still, I would argue, this is a formal claim. In other 
words, Spinoza insists on the necessity of a form of con-
trol over the passions of humanity, and that form is called 
a “State.” Yet, there is no reason to think that the latter 
implies that each state is – or that the concrete state of 
the concrete epoch in which Spinoza lived was – ideal. 
Spinoza’s ethic is “ordine geometrico demonstrata.” His 
discourse is abstract and the terminology is formal (or 
generic) and so is the claim about the State (just as all 
the other statements referring to other instances of the 
palpably societal human life). His advocating respect for 
the “State” is simply arguing for the structural or formal 
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necessity of the instance of the Law (E IV, 37 n2, E IV, 40) 
and/or for an organized society of enforced laws.
In this respect, proposition 40 of the Part IV of his 
Ethics could be read in a double sense, as both a formal 
enunciation about the necessity of Law that introduces 
and sustains harmony among individuals and a poten-
tially revolutionary call:
Whatsoever conduces to man’s social life, or causes men 
to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatso-
ever brings discord into a State is bad. 
If a State is organized in a way which introduces a 
considerable lack of harmony, disproportion of pleasure 
and pain, an asymmetric extent of pain to a part of it 
causing imbalance and, hence, pain to the entire struc-
ture of society – then, one is called upon to re-evaluate 
all values, called upon introducing fundamental change 
into society.
2. Sheer Life:
Political Sovereignty in a Pre-Linguistic World
In Homo Sacer (1998), Giorgio Agamben proposes 
a genealogy of the concept of political sovereignty, 
namely of the one pertaining to the European 
civilization. Beginning with Roman Antiquity, Agamben’s 
genealogical account of the European cultural invention 
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Namely, his analysis, more specifically in Homo Sacer, 
shows that sovereignty is based upon the founding act 
of sacrifice of “bare life.” This is the primal sacrificial 
its physicality and voiceless labor of staying-in-life, has 
to be sacrificially killed in order to be transformed into 
an eikon
In every case, sacred life cannot dwell in the city of men: 
for the surviving devotee, the imaginary funeral func-
gives the individual back to normal life; for the emperor, 
the double funeral makes it possible to fasten onto the 
sacred life, which must be gathered and divinized in the 
apotheosis; for homo sacer, finally, we are confronted 
with a residual and irreducible bare life, which must be 
excluded and exposed to a death that no rite and no sac-
rifice can redeem. (Agamben 100 ,1998)
Indeed the “irreducible bare life which must be ex-
cluded and exposed to death” cannot be redeemed by 
any rite or sacrifice. Bare life is precisely what has been 
sacrificed in the name of the Symbolic. It is the neces-
sary subject to sacrifice so that the World is estab-
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lished. The “bare life” of a homo sacer or of the medieval 
king is the sacrificial animal, the organism, the body that 
ought to be sacrificed in order for the political universe 
to come into being. It is the Real that must be annihi-
lated for the Sign to arrive in its place. In order for the 
Signifier-of-Sovereignty to be produced, the bare life of 
the political subject that embodies the Sovereignty has 
to be sacrificed: it may be the embodied life of a king 
or of the citizen/s (= “the nation”). As Agamben shows, 
from Roman Antiquity – and, referring to the institution 
of pharmakon, I would say from the Greek Antiquity – to 
the globalized European invention of the modern nation-
state, political sovereignty is realized only on the basis of 
derealization of the embodied life of its subjects. Life as 
body, life as the pulsating bloody mess that the human 
animal’s organism is has to be annulled for in that void 
left behind by the departing Real the Signifier of Sover-
eignty to emerge. The latter is the Signifier that will en-
able the transformation of bare Life into pure (political) 
Meaning. In order for human life to possess meaning, 
life at its most radical – as bare life or nothing-but-life – 
must be effaced. The process of effacement, however, 
always already fails to be executed without a remainder. 
The remainder that always eludes the process of signi-
fication is bare life – precisely that which should have 
been saturated with meaning in the first place.
The political (of the European Civilization) has been 
but an incessant process of signi-fication of life in its 
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radical immanence (life-in-its-aspect-of the Real) – an 
endless process of an always already failed process of 
taming the uncanny of Life by way of Meaning. Today, it 
is clear that the Political is about controlling, exploiting – 
transcending the “biological.” 
The fact is that one and the same affirmation of bare 
life leads in, in bourgeois democracy, to a primacy of the 
private over the public and of individual liberties over 
collective obligations and yet becomes, in totalitarian 
states, the decisive political criterion and the exemplary 
realm of sovereign decisions. And only because biologi-
cal life and its needs had become the politically decisive 
fact is it possible to understand the otherwise incompre-
hensible rapidity with which twentieth-century parlia-
mentary democracies were able to turn into totalitarian 
states and with which this century’s totalitarian states 
were able to be converted, almost without interruption, 
into parliamentary democracies. In both cases, these 
transformations were produced in a context in which for 
quite some time politics had already turned into biopoli-
tics, and in which the only real question to be decided 
was which form of organization would be best suited to 
the task of assuring the care, control, and use of bare 
life. (Agamben 1998, 121-122)
In Antiquity, both Roman and Greek, it has been life in 
its bareness – as the body, the animal, or the “biological” 
– that had to be sacrificed (sacrificially killed) for the
political order to emerge. In Ancient Greece, the purpose
of the blood sacrifice, the hiereia () is precisely the
maintenance of the polis. It is to the Olympic gods that
94
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
the hiereia are offered (Burkert 1983, passim; Burkert 
1977, passim). And the Olympic gods represent, install 
and maintain order. The enagisma (), on the 
other hand, the offerings of wine, honey, water, dried 
fruits and crops, is always intended for the dead and 
the infernal goods (Alexiou 2002, 9-10, 16, 32; Mouliner 
1950, 209, 210, 73, 111, 80-81, 109). The hiereia always 
yields into a holocaustos () – burning of the 
sacrificed, dead animal that can be, in the mythology, 
also human. This is a clean, unpolluted and non-polluting 
sacrifice – it brings in the light or reason, the logos and 
the polis. This is a sacrifice of annihilation, effacement, 
burning to the ashes of the bloody mess of the biological 
life. Upon the plane of pure meaning that is left behind 
after the incineration of the sacrificially killed embodied 
life, Logos that equals Polis is built (Vernant 1982, 50). 
The enagisma, the offerings in liquids and food to the 
dead and to the gods of death, normally performed by 
women, is related to burial and mourning rituals that are 
by definition related to pollution and defilement (Alex-
iou 2002, 10). The term enagisma () is derived 
from the word agos () which means defilement 
that is owe-provoking, a negative taboo, moral pollu-
tion that is the result of crime (Liddell-Scott 1968; Parker 
1983, 5, 18, 322-23). The opposite meaning contained 
in the word hagnos () – sacred and pure – is de-
rived from the word agos (); and so is enagisma, 
a word which means moral, god-observing practice of 
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due sacrifice to the (chthonic) divine powers (Mouliner 
1950, 9, 16).
Clearly there is ambivalence in the notion of sacred 
which is contained precisely in the word hagnos (). 
The ambivalence in question consists in the fact that 
hagnos () is derived from the agos () or ha-
gos () which refers to a specific type of defilement 
and transgression. The latter relates to being in touch 
with a dead body or being in touch with those affected 
by mourning, to giving birth or being in touch with mem-
bers of a household where a birth took place, to violat-
ing temples and to braking of the great taboos of incest, 
murder or parricide. In other words, the defilement of 
(h)agos is related to the transgression of the boundaries
that define civilization, stepping across the lines of exclu-
sion of everything that destabilizes sense and order (i.e.,
the established normality).
(H)agos is, in fact, about transgressing the boundar-
ies of reason, of Law, of the translucent Transcendental 
– stepping across the threshold of Meaning and Order.
Chaos is provoked by the blurring of boundaries that are
guaranteed by the observance of taboos. Destabilization
of the boundaries that ground the Law and the Symbolic
Order takes place as the result of closeness to or being in
touch with the “biological” – or of the Real – of Life in oc-
casions of funeral, wedding and birth. The rites – i.e., the
practices of inscription into the Symbolic – of marking
and making sense of the three types of events have vir-
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tually the same structure and terminology to name the 
components of the structure (Rehm 1994, 22ff). For ex-
ample, the word kêdeia means both funeral and alliance 
(through marriage) and parenthood, whereas kêdeuô 
means to tend a bride or a corpse but also to establish 
an alliance through marriage (Alexiou 2002, 10). Funer-
al, wedding and birth are instances of direct encounter 
with that which always already escapes symbolization – 
which provokes owe and disgust at the same time, which 
is on the border of violence and the bloody brutality of 
beginning and end of life. 
The un-symbolizable is that which participates directly 
in the Uncanny, in the Real; the Glance at this “World-
beyond-Imagination,” in which there is no Language, no 
Sign or Eikon, inspires a paralyzing owe. It is that stance 
of staring into the bare eye of full reality. It is the blinding 
gaze into the Real – the instance where signification fails, 
a topos that can be inhabited only by gods. That is why in 
Greek (vase) painting Dionysus or the Gorgon or a person 
devoid of reason (i.e. a drunk person) is always presented 
en-face whereas the normal representation is always in 
profile (Vernant 1990; Vernant 1995). This realm beyond 
the reach of mortals and a territory upon which the light 
of reason is never cast, this place that is a non-place, in 
Greek religion, is usually the place of the dead, of the 
chthonic gods and of the god of transgression Dionysus. 
And it is to these divine powers that the enagismata are 
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offered, while the blood sacrifices, i.e., the hiereiea, re-
main reserved for the Olympic gods. The latter also stand 
in awe in the face of this domain of the divine. The center 
of the world in Greek Antiquity is, as Burkert reminds us, 
the Omphalos Stone in Delphi – and this is a place of liba-
tions, i.e., of enagismata offerings (Burkert 1977, 125).
Agamben is puzzled by the double sense of the notion 
of “sacer” in the case of the Roman religious-political in-
stitution of “homo sacer” (Agamben 1998, 71-74). Homo 
sacer is a man marked by the pollution of transgressing 
the boundaries of humanity as stipulated by the divine 
authority: through committing a crime that implies a vio-
lation of a taboo (such as a murder), he has stepped into 
a territory that can only belong to the gods. He is defiled 
by the sacred that is the inaccessible, the unutterable 
and the unthinkable. Transgression of the boundaries 
of human and defilement by coming into contact with 
the realm of the divine is the highest form of crime and 
pollution, since the sacred is the adyton or abaton, the 
inaccessible, and the arrheton, the unutterable (Burkert 
1977, 403). The one who acquires the status of “homo 
sacer” has been polluted by the crime of stepping into 
the agos – into the topos beyond reason, the impossible 
place beyond Language, since he/she has committed an 
unutterable crime and an act permitted only to the im-
mortals. In other words, he/she has stepped into the ter-
ritory of the sacred. 
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Coming into the prohibited direct contact – i.e., 
through crime – with the sacred provokes destabiliza-
tion of the boundaries between mortal and immortal. 
The marvel of blurring the boundaries between the 
two worlds is in itself an owe-provoking manifestation 
of the sacred (that is, its incursion into the world of the 
mortals). This sort of instantiation of the sacred is called 
agos. Enagisma is a term derived from agos. Let us re-
mind ourselves, it refers to a ritual offering consecrated 
to the chthonic gods and to the dead. Apart from the li-
bations traditionally offered to the dead and to the gods 
related to death and resurrection, to some chthonic gods 
other offerings were submitted as well. For example, at 
the crossroads of Athens women left sweepings from the 
house of all sorts of refuse as to Hekate (Alexiou 2002, 
16). That which lies at the border between “clean” and 
“dirty,” between orderly and disorderly, that whose ex-
clusion represents an act of delineation between sense 
and beyond-sense is what women used to submit as 
enagisma to the goddess of black magic – Hekate. Li-
bations or enagismata to the dead and to the chthonic 
divinities were acts of ritual sacrifice which were by defi-
nition performed by women, whereas the blood sacri-
fice offered to the Olympians was performed by men 
exclusively (Burkert 1983, Parker 1983, Alexiou 2002).   
 The agos relates to the abyss of the divine – to that 
black hole of the unthinkable that devours the mor-
tals. Agos is the point at which even the logos-bringing 
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gods of Olympus stop in owe; Aeschylus’ Orestia speaks 
about the exclusive authority the pre-Olympic divinities 
had over transgressions of agos such as e.g. matricide 
(and of the political struggle of the Olympians to gain a 
share of this authority). Through committing a murder, 
incest or a parricide one does not become a mere crimi-
nal, one becomes an incarnation of defilement beyond 
words. Homo sacer is somebody defiled by agos. He is 
polluted. Hence he cannot be offered as a sacrifice to 
the gods. On the other hand, he is sacred: he bears the 
traces of agos upon himself; moreover, he has become 
himself the trace of it.
Murdering a homo sacer is beyond punishment be-
cause the one who would kill a sacred person would him-
self already be polluted by the agos. But also because his 
life on the earth is a bare life, a human life stripped of 
humanity. His soul has been invaded by the agos. It has 
undergone a monstrous transformation – it is no longer 
a human psyche. Through the violation of the sacred, 
just like Oedipus in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus, the 
homo sacer has already been consecrated to the gods; 
the sacred he has come to bear as a constitutive part 
of himself is the agos. Therefore, he cannot be subject 
to hiereia, to a blood sacrifice offered to the Olympians. 
As a living agos among the living, as the instantiation of 
that-which-is-beyond-human-reason wandering under 
the sun that illuminates the polis, he has no other role 
than to be the flux (an enagisma) of dehumanized hu-
100
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
man suffering offered to the gods. Through the act of 
consecration of the agos, the transgressor has been 
transformed into a redeemer, a cure of human souls – a 
pharmakon (Sophocles, O.C. 21:12).
Apart from the role of a pharmakon invaded by agos, 
homo sacer is a wounded body and a wounded soul 
stripped of human form. He is a wandering, wounded 
and vulnerable bare life devoid of humanity.  
3. Vulnerability Preconditioning Humanity
In Precarious Life (2006) and in Undoing Gender 
(2004), Judith Butler tackles the question of the mute 
suffering of the ones whose lives, whose “loves and loss-
es” have been rendered “unreal” (Butler 2004, 27; 2006, 
36). The silent suffering and the ensuing sense of dere-
alization is the result of the fact that these are people 
precluded from “universally” legible mediation of their 
experiences. They do not have access to the linguistic 
means of the globally dominant discourses that would 
render their personal narratives universally communica-
ble. These human losses have suffered de-realization by 
the dominant discourses within which they do not suc-
ceed to gain meaning, claims Butler (2004, 25, 27). The 
loves and the losses for which it remains impossible to 
provide articulation within the universally communicable 
discourses are the loves and losses of the not-completely-
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universally-human experiences, these are anomalous lives 
of love and suffering (cf. Butler 2006, 33-34); the latter rep-
resents a topos inhabited by a variety of embodied lives 
that disrupt and elude what institutes itself as the Normal, 
a diverse group of “abnormal” embodied agencies that in-
clude queer people as well as the countless and nameless 
Palestinian victims (Butler 2006, 35-36). 
The structural laws of the “intelligible discourses” 
render these losses meaningless, since they cannot be 
named – and, hence, ascribed value – in a legible way of 
the universally (i.e., globally) dominant discourses, that 
is, the discourses of normality. The “intelligible” is that 
which is thought and thinkable according to the glob-
ally dominant model of Normativity. This means that the 
“intelligible” and the “normal” can also be “sensitive to 
the cultural difference” since the dominant norm can 
decide to integrate within itself “the respect for differ-
ence.” Still the grief for the killed Palestinians cannot be 
named because the ones who speak from the instance 
of the dominant discourses, on behalf of the universally 
understandable cannot name the victims. The sound of 
these names is unrecognizable, indiscernible – these 
are names that “one forgets,” these names are difficult 
(hard) to pronounce by those who can speak on behalf 
of all of us. These are hardly “real names.” 
The sense of living a life that is deprived of meaning 
even in its most ecstatic and most dramatic moments, of 
being absent from “What-Makes-Sense” even when one 
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is at the peak of a lifetime accomplishment or in the pit 
of a life’s most serious downfall is an experience of be-
ing deprived of reality. Meaningless is unreal in the ines-
capably eikonically constituted reality. These losses and 
grief are not represented, they are not talked of, and it is 
impossible to publicly mourn them, claims Butler (2006, 
37-39) – they are not inscribed into the collective narra-
tive. They have no place in the imaginable reality. They
are banned access from the reality that can be imagined
and talked of. By not naming them they have been ren-
dered unreal. The oppression is not only political. At this
point it becomes ontological.
In order to gain access to reality one ought to gain ac-
cess to the “universally” (dominantly and normatively) 
legible discourses. One’s voicing about one’s pain, grief 
and loss ought to acquire legibility within the existing 
normal/normative discourses in order render meaningful 
and legitimize one’s dissonant (“subaltern”) narrative. 
In the Chapter titled “Violence, Mourning, Politics” of 
Precarious Life, Judith Butler writes: 
So when we say that every infant is surely vulnerable, 
that is clearly true; but it is true, in part, precisely be-
cause our utterance enacts the very recognition of vul-
nerability and so shows the importance of recognition 
itself […] This framework, by which norms of recognition 
are essential to the constitution of vulnerability as a pre-
condition of the “human,” is important precisely for this 
reason, namely, that we need and want those norms to 
be in place, that we struggle for their establishment, and 
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that we value their continuing and expanded operation. 
(Butler 2006, 43) 
Recognition is always already an operation of Lan-
guage: it is an operation of the eikon, of the sign (visual 
or verbal/textual). It is the result of signification assign-
ing significance. According to the quoted paragraph, 
one’s vulnerability and one’s wound, one’s grief and loss 
ought to gain access into the widely and dominantly leg-
ible discourse/s in order to obtain legitimacy to be con-
sidered as such. In fact, in order to acquire the status of 
a vulnerable being one has to translate one’s own vul-
nerability into a language that is spoken by those who 
constitute the field of reality – i.e., what is recognized 
as reality which is the (Normative) World of Normality. 
In other words, reality is constituted upon an act of rec-
ognition. This is a point that Butler clearly makes in the 
paragraph just quoted.
Yet, there is another enunciation present in the cited 
paragraph that I am particularly interested in exploring. 
It is a statement which is obviously irrelevant for the the-
sis advanced by Butler, yet one worthwhile tackling for 
the point I am attempting to prove here. In the begin-
ning of the citation there is a reference to what is consid-
ered a commonsensical self-evident truth, i.e., certain 
“goes without saying.” And it is precisely the status of 
a “goes-without-saying-true-hence-not-sufficiently-rele-
vant-for-a-theoretical-investigation” which provokes the 
question of how the quality of self-evidence of a certain 
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truth is established, legitimized and stabilized (but also 
destabilized). The self-evident truth which Butler states 
is the following: “So when we say that every infant is 
surely vulnerable, that is clearly true.” And she continues 
by claiming that “it is true, in part, precisely because our 
utterance enacts the very recognition of vulnerability 
and so shows the importance of recognition itself.” 
So it is “clearly true.” It seems so self-evident that it does 
not deserve theoretical interrogation. “In part,” however, 
it is true also because of the enactment of recognition 
through language. It seems that, in our age of post-mo-
dernity, this “in part” has always been more important 
or more worthwhile politico-theoretical exploration than 
the “clearly true.” The “clearly true,” the “goes without 
saying” has been assigned the status of a commonsensi-
cal presupposition, residing within the realm of the moral 
constitution of the theorizing subject and its truthfulness 
is guaranteed and apofatically (de)legitimized by the mor-
al subject of theorizing. In this way, the commonsensical 
truth is rendered “untheorizable.” However, this absence 
of recognition of theoretical relevance to a discursive phe-
nomenon that formatively participates in the discourses 
that are subject to theorizing is telling. The commonsensi-
cal “clearly true” constitutes an important element of an 
argument, it is a statement (i.e., a discursive category), 
and yet it remains discursively irrelevant, or rather, theo-
retically insignificant. It is utterly absent from the domain 
of contemporary post-structuralist theory.
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The commonsensical self-evidence does not receive 
the recognition of relevance in a way that would pro-
duce a theoretical narrative (of it). It is a form of dis-
course that gains no recognition by and within theory. 
It is theoretically unrecognizable, and illegible. Within 
the horizon of theoretical reality today, it is de-realized. 
The commonsensical “clearly true” is always and by defi-
nition absent from the political theory of the so-called 
post-modern era. It is theoretically illegible. It is outside 
the theoretical discourses on subjection and political 
subjectivity that situate themselves beyond modernity 
in both the temporal and epistemic sense. It has no ac-
cess to the theoretical recognized and recognizable real-
ity, or it does not have the status of a theoretical real. 
I would like to tackle this problem of theoretical de-
realization, and in this respect, attempt to interrogate 
the contents of that “clearly true” as something that 
may have relevance to a theoretical investigation into 
the theme of the political subject formation and its as-
pects of responsibility and solidarity. What seems to be 
“clearly true,” according to the cited passage by Butler, 
is not only the mere physical fact about children’s vul-
nerability, but also that vulnerability means something, 
contains a certain signification, that it is a function of a 
discursive structure. Evidently, it is the discursive, linguis-
tic rendition of vulnerability that needs to be recognized 
in order to gain reality. What needs to be recognized in 
order to be realized is “what it means to be vulnerable” 
106
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
and not the mere fact of physical vulnerability itself. The 
bare fact of vulnerability devoid of meaning (language) 
is not what preconditions humanity. The discursive cate-
gory of vulnerability, the sign and signification that “vul-
nerability” represents is what needs recognition in order 
to precondition the “human.” This is my proposition for 
summarization of Butler’s main argument in the chapter 
“Violence, Mourning, Politics” of Precarious Life.
Building on this discourse advanced by Butler, I would 
like to take the discussion a step further and raise the 
question of whether bare life itself, that pre-discursive 
phenomenon of life exposed to the threat of violence 
can have a political meaning and/or value. Can we at-
tribute political and ethical value to life and vulnerability 
of life prior to its attaining the status of a sign/signifier, 
prior to acquiring a meaning, prior to becoming “what 
life and vulnerability means”? 
The Spinozian initiation of this article could show 
us that sheer life, the Being-as-Nature reduced to its 
determination-in-the-last-instance (Laruelle 2000, 10) 
that is the mute labor of self-preservation can contain 
the foundation of the ethical constitution of the self. Let 
us recall that in Spinoza’s Ethics pain and pleasure ap-
pear as the names of a decreased and an increased level 
of “presence of life,” respectively (E IV, 41). Let us recall 
that according to Spinoza the pain that is suffered by oth-
ers always already acquires presence in our personal life 
since it inevitably appears on the cognitive level of our 
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existence (E III, 30p). We know of somebody’s state of 
pain, and by knowing of it we are invaded by it. Because 
one cannot ever abstract oneself from one’s human – as 
well as non-human – surroundings, because one is al-
ways already inextricably constituted by all that which 
participates in the overall natura naturans (Deleuze, 
1990), one is always already afflicted by the pain present 
in the others (Lloyd 1996, 76). 
This affliction initially takes place on the cognitive/
mental level; however, it is almost simultaneously trans-
muted into a bodily sensation. This is the inevitable – 
and logically necessary – result of the immanence of life 
which represents a link of uninterrupted continuity be-
tween the bodily and the mental (II 13n). It is apparent 
that in Spinoza’s Ethics it is the body which possesses 
the status of the determination in the last instance and 
the identity in the last instance of (individual) life: the 
“adequate ideas,” and the active emotions that are the 
product of Reason, are adequate inasmuch as they con-
tribute to a higher power of activity or “presence of life.” 
The locus par excellence of experiencing and/or of ex-
pressing presence of life is but the body. Since the mind 
and the ideas are determined in the last instance by the 
body and represent nothing but its “modifications” (Spi-
noza II 13, 13p). Moreover:
Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human 
mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists (II. 
xi.). Further, if there were any other object of the idea 
108
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
constituting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can 
exist from which some effect does not follow (I. xxxvi.) 
there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, 
which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); 
but (I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object 
of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. 
(Spinoza II 13p)
The experience/expression of an increased presence 
of life or “power of activity” takes place in the form of a 
sensation – and an achieved state – of pleasure (Spinoza, 
E 3 1, 1p, 3, 9p, 9n, 10, 56). Adequate ideas are in service 
of the state of an ever increased experience of pleasure 
(taking place through the body), whereas the latter is the 
expression of the increased power of activity or intensity 
of life (Spinoza E 3 11, 11p, 11n, 15p, 20, 37p). 
Expounding on these ideas, or perhaps merely refor-
mulating statements that can be found in the text of Spi-
noza’s Ethics itself, I would like to propose a hypothesis 
about “the Organic” (about “Life”) as the determination-
in-the-last-instance of political responsibility. The lat-
ter will be conceived also as the kernel of the “ethical” 
or the origin and the immanent law of the “care of the 
Other.” Spinoza’s inference about the immanence of the 
ethical is based on his “selfish premise” that one does 
not wish the harm of the other simply because, by virtue 
of being aware of it (imagining it), one is him/herself af-
fected by it as well. However, there is another premise 
from which the inference about the ethical as imbedded 
in the conatus of self-preservation or of preserving (in) 
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life departs. It is the Spinozian thesis about the individu-
al’s constitutive interrelatedness with and inextricability 
from the rest of the World (=Nature). The essence of the 
individual is but an expression of and participation in the 
attributes of God or Nature. Individualism in the sense 
of self’s radical autonomy is impossible in the Spinozian 
context: one does not have to “invent” ways of and rea-
sons for the Self’s desire to reach the other, to establish 
a relation of care. The “care of the Other” is immanent 
to Life, to any individual’s life, as the Other is immanent-
ly present in the life of any individual self.
Without subscribing to the entire Spinozian “cosmol-
ogy,” and also putting the thesis about the constitutive 
interrelatedness with the world into parentheses as 
something that could have the status of the direct mo-
tive for ethical acting, let us consider the possibility that 
Life in its pre-linguistic sense of the Conatus, life in its 
aspect of ceaseless auto-regeneration, is the origin of 
ethical and political responsibility. How can the pre-dis-
cursive be the origin of discursivity par excellence (the 
Political is) immanently containing the laws of its consti-
tution? What makes this heterogeneity of origin and the 
identity-in-the-last instance of the Political plausible? 
Before tackling these questions let us investigate wheth-
er the pre-discursive source of the ethical can be identi-
fied as the experienced (or, putting it in Spinozian vein, 
legitimized through body) interconnectedness with the 
World. Or, whether it can and should be determined in 
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its last instance as something else. At this point I would 
like to revisit and reinvestigate Butler’s thesis about vul-
nerability as that “precondition of the human.” 
In her pursuit for that which is the foundation of 
human solidarity, of the human rights, of political and 
ontological equality, of human equality, of the Care-
for-the-Other, Judith Butler raises the questions of the 
“precondition of the human” and of its “recognition” 
(2006, 43). Evidently, in order to establish solidarity with 
the Other, in order to establish empathy with and politi-
cal responsibility toward the “human condition” of the 
Other, this Other has to be recognized as “human.” The 
“human” is always already a discursive category since it 
is the product of the linguistic operation of recognition. 
Yet a category heterogeneous to that of discursivity is 
what “preconditions the human” – it is the instance of 
vulnerability, the experience of potential or actual pain. 
Even when experienced and categorized as “mental,” 
“emotional” or “psychological” in its identity-in-the-last-
instance, pain is a bodily category. When the perplexities 
of the troubled, humiliated soul that has been subjected 
to violence are experienced as pain, one inevitably rec-
ognizes that an immediate transposition of the psychic 
experience onto the bodily plane has taken place. When 
the sufferings of the “soul” become painful we know 
this through the “body.” Pain can be recognized as pain 
but through the body. The dichotomy between the two 
terms is highly problematic and, therefore, the opposi-
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tion between “body” and “soul” is ad hoc. So I will try to 
go beyond the falsity of this opposition and argue that 
it is life-in-its-last-instance, i.e., the category of the Or-
ganic, which is the bearer-in-the-last-instance of the un-
adulterated experience of pain and vulnerability. 
Leaving aside the question about the body-soul dual-
ism, and the dilemma of which of the two opposed terms 
represents the topos proper of pain, the instance of vul-
nerability and pain is still defined, by its determination 
in the last instance, as heterogeneous to the discursive, 
to language, to signification. Namely, pain – both in its 
actuality of being wounded and the potentiality of vul-
nerability – is the instance of the purely experiential, of 
the experiential par excellence. It is an event. It is what 
happens in spite of any discourse, utterly regardless of 
the Language. It is the taking-place-of-the-Real. It is the 
tuché that thrusts into the automaton. Thus, if vulner-
ability preconditions the human and provides the basis 
for its recognition, it needs to be said that, paradoxically, 
it is the kernel of the lived (echoing François Laruelle’s 
notion of le vécu), i.e., of the Real which serves as the 
foundation of the discursive operation par excellence, 
that of recognition.
Pain is pre-discursive. It is the unadulterated lived 
(le vécu) put in Francois Laruelle’s terms (1995, 225), or 
the instance of the “evental” put in Alain Badiou’s terms 
(2005, 173-177), or the kernel of the Real prior to sym-
bolization (signification) put in Lacanian terms (1998, 53-
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54). In Spinozian terms, it is life at its most radical: the 
bodily experiences of pain and/or pleasure are the im-
mediacy of life pulsating with intensity. Nonetheless, the 
“bodily” is not the material as opposed to the psychic 
(mental, rational, ideal, etc.) since there is no such oppo-
sition in Spinoza’s philosophical universe. Nature is but 
the expression of the divine essence, and the attributes 
of cogitatio and extensio are the two chief attributes of 
the Being which shows itself with at least the two faces: 
that of Nature and that of God. Matter and idea are not 
two opposed categories in Spinoza. Highest category of 
God (or Nature) is the Being, and it is not split between 
matter and idea. Moreover, “matter” and “idea” are not 
among the categories in which Spinoza thinks the Be-
ing. The analogous pair of categories, that of cogitatio 
and extentio, is the binary of attributes which neither 
exclude nor oppose each other, but are rather mutually 
complementary. Within this framework of thinking, the 
Body is not a “material” category or one belonging to 
the attribute of “extension” exclusively. 
The Body is “life” in its identity in the last instance, 
in its radical immanence, entailing expression through 
both attributes equally (extension and cogitation). The 
mental, which is always accomplished through the emo-
tional, is the reflection of the fundamental, defining state 
of one’s existence – the one taking place on the level of 
the body (Spinoza E 5, 14). The body is the location par 
excellence of pain and vulnerability, i.e., the instance of 
113
SHEER LIFE REVOLTING
the radical identity of life. The body is the topos of the 
radical (pre- or/and meta-discursive) knowledge about 
a possible threat to the survival of an “I.” This particular 
cognitive process taking place at the level of the Body in 
the form of an absolute state of alert is, by definition, au-
tomatically accompanied by total mobilization – again, 
taking place primarily through the body – toward stay-
ing-in-life, making one’s own survival (as both body and 
soul) possible.
That instance of pre-discursiveness which is the Pain, 
i.e., vulnerability, participates in a formative way in the
per definitionem discursive phenomenon of recognition
(of the “human”). In fact, it is the condition of that “dis-
cursive category” called humanity.  The thesis about vul-
nerability as the condition of the “human” implies the
formative heterogeneity of humanity inasmuch as it is
the experiential/evental instance of vulnerability which
makes possible the discursive constitution of humanity.
At the root of the “human” lies the organic instance of
vulnerability and pain, at the root of the “human” we
find the body that suffers. At the root of the Human is
that which is beyond (or rather, behind) Humanity – the
Body, the organism subjected to pain and confronting
the irrevocable call for self-preservation, always already
immersed in the struggle for survival.
Drawing on the Spinozian “selfish thesis” about any 
individual’s compulsion toward avoiding pain including 
the one experienced by the others that would make it-
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self present cognitively, I would say that solidarity and 
political responsibility toward the suffering of the others 
originates from our ability to identify with the pain of 
the other body. We are able to identify with the body 
helplessly exposed to a possibility of affliction by pain, 
with body’s vulnerability. In fact, the less we can recog-
nize the other as human, the less “human” he or she is, 
such as a child or an old helpless woman or man, the 
more we are able to revolt against the violence brought 
upon him or her. The less we see a Subject in control 
of the potentiality of violent threat against its body the 
more we are called upon acting toward its protection: 
the level of vulnerability is proportional with the ab-
sence of a masterful subject of humanity. 
The less discursive competence they have the more we 
see them as vulnerable that we are compelled to protect. 
The less they are what is discursively constituted as hu-
man, the more we feel called upon acting humanely. The 
less they are human the more they meet human solidar-
ity. I would claim that recognition of the Other’s humanity 
inasmuch as a discursive category is not only unnecessary 
for establishing solidarity but also redundant and even an 
obstacle to it. It is life to life, individualized through bod-
ies, that establishes solidarity and not the products of an 




A Possibility for a New Political Universal 
1. Identifying with Suffering stripped of Humanity
Judith Butler makes one of the most inventive and 
potentially revolutionary claims in political theory today 
by arguing that grief can be a resource for politics. 
According to Butler, grief offers the possibility to identify 
with the “suffering itself” that the Other undergoes. Let 
us consider the following lines from Precarious Life:
Is there something to be gained in the political domain 
by maintaining grief as part of the framework within 
which we think our international ties? […] To grieve, 
and to make grief itself into a resource for politics, is 
not to be resigned to inaction, but it may be understood 
as the slow process by which we develop a point of 
identification with suffering itself. (Butler 2006, 30)
“Identification with suffering itself” could constitute 
political solidarity which is established independently 
from and beyond the Discursive. In other words, if we 
identify with the “suffering itself” we are identifying with 
the purely “evental,” i.e., with the sheer experience (of 
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subjection to pain) which is a pre-linguistic category. The 
“suffering itself” is but a taking-place of pain and/or of 
trauma. Put in Laruellean parlance, it is the “lived” par-
excellence. Thus it is the Real in the Laruellian as well as 
in the Lacanian sense of the word. Resorting to Lacan’s 
terminology, it can be said that the “suffering itself” is 
the Tuché (the incident and the accident, the Trauma) 
which interrupts the endless chain of “making sense,” 
which produces rupture into the Automaton, i.e., into 
the Signifying Chain (Lacan 1998, 53-54).  
The most potent idea contained in this claim is that 
there is possibility of identification beyond the Discursive, 
an identification with the Other which is pre-linguistic. 
The potency (or the revolutionary potential) of this idea 
consists in the fact that it enables inclusion unlimited 
by the inclusiveness of the category of Human. The site 
and the agency of this process of identification is the 
body, since, according to Butler, it is through the body 
that the suffering and the sense of vulnerable exposure 
primarily take place. Butler’s argument seems to be that 
bodily suffering and vulnerability are the generic notions 
from which one could, for instance, infer the psychic 
suffering and vulnerability. Or rather, the presupposition 
about the categorical primacy of the physical suffering 
and vulnerability over their psychic renditions appears 




Let us return to the issue of grief, to the moments in 
which one undergoes something outside one’s control 
and finds that one is beside oneself, not at one with 
oneself. Perhaps we can say that grief contains the 
possibility of apprehending a mode of dispossession 
that is fundamental to who I am. This possibility does not 
dispute the fact of my autonomy, but it does qualify that 
claim through recourse to the fundamental sociality of 
embodied life, the ways in which we are, from the start 
and by virtue of being a bodily being, already given over, 
beyond ourselves, implicated in lives that are notour 
own. (Butler 2006, 28)
Grief is a state of sheer suffering, albeit not exclusively 
physical. Nevertheless, it is precisely this complex tran-
scendental-real and psychic-physical purely experiential 
state which signals that the identity-in-the-last-instance 
of suffering is physical. Namely, as Butler writes, grief is 
a state that unravels “a mode of dispossession that is 
fundamental.” The primacy of this dispossessed mode of 
existence consists in the fact that “prior to the processes 
of individuation” (Butler 2006, 31) one is always already 
an embodied life, which implies that “by virtue of being 
a bodily being” (Butler 2006, 28) we are “already given 
over, beyond ourselves, implicated in lives that are not 
our own” (ibid.).
This mode of dispossession takes place on the plane 
of the Real; it is an imprint of the Real and into the Real 
of pre-linguistic subjection to Trauma. It is “prior to 
118
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
individuation,” it is pre-subjective, pre-reflexive – it is 
(in) the Real. One is always already vulnerably exposed 
to the potential violence (or Trauma in any form) in 
its sheer brutality, prior to any making sense. And it is 
with this primordial instance of vulnerability – with “the 
suffering itself” – we are called upon identifying. In spite 
of the fact that the means of identification are always 
already transcendental (in Laruellian sense of the word), 
i.e., the product of mediation by means of cognition (of
imagination and of reflection), what we identify with is an
instance which does not require discursive recognition.
Bodily suffering, a body in utter helplessness facing a 
threat of brutal violence, is an instance we can identify 
with without any need of conceptual frame that would 
enable valorization or “making sense” of it, i.e., without 
the category of humanity. What we share in the “common 
human suffering” is the suffering itself, not humanity. 
Humanity is a restrictive category: it is the product of 
signification. Or in Larueallian parlance, it is a category 
of the Transcendental. It is significance, in the double 
sense of the word: it signifies and also it is significant (it 
is on the top of the signifying hierarchy). 
There is a discourse of humanity – or rather humanity 
is always already the product of a discourse – and it 
“establishes the limits of human intelligibility:”
It is not simply, then, that there is a ‘discourse’ of dehu-
manization that produces these effects, but rather that 
there is a limit to discourse that establishes the limits of 
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human intelligibility. It is not just that a death is poorly 
marked, but that it is unmarkable. Such a death van-
ishes, not into explicit discourse, but in the ellipses by 
which public discourse proceeds. (Butler 2006, 35)   
Concurring with Butler, and building on her other ar-
guments in the chapter “Violence, Mourning, Politics” of 
Precarious Life (2006), I would like to explore the possi-
bility of expanding the discursive category of “humanity” 
by means of identification with the “suffering itself.” Or 
in different words, let us explore the possibility of iden-
tification with suffering itself (with grief as suffering) as 
the means of expanding inclusiveness of the notion of 
“humanity.”  
2. The Broken Figure of Humanity: Jesus and Oedipus
2.1. Jesus: Rereading Donna Haraway 
Postmodernist, poststructuralist, and deconstructivist 
critique of the category of Humanity (or of the “Man”) as 
a term of impossible monolithitism, has left us with the 
fragmented notion of humanity inviting infinite inclu-
siveness. We have learned that, just like any other dis-
cursive phenomenon, the notion of Humanity is histori-
cally and culturally conditioned. In other words, there is 
a hegemonic notion of humanity and it is one which is 
still white and male. 
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In an essay entitled “Ecce Homo: Ain’t I (Ar’n’t) I a 
Woman, and the Inappropriated Others: Human in a 
Posthumanist Landscape” (1992), Donna Haraway has 
taken this point to its farthest by demonstrating that Hu-
manity is a notion constituted by the perennial split and 
opposition of two transcendental categories: Technol-
ogy (=Culture, Mind) and the Organic (=Nature, Body). 
This binary is one of asymmetry and hierarchy whereby 
the latter term is always already dominated, controlled 
and prescribed by the former: this is the chief argument 
of the entire opus of Haraway, and the philosophical 
core of the Manifesto for Cyborgs (1985). What Donna 
Haraway calls upon in these two texts is embracing this 
radical constructedness and the constitutive split as our 
true “nature,” i.e., as that which defines the “Human” 
as Cyborg. Consequently, we are called upon embracing 
our radical fragmentedness since this universal topos of 
Cyborg is inhabited by a multitude of cultural, social, and 
gendered positions (1985). This multitude of positions is 
founded upon the constitutive split between Technology 
(Culture or Civilization) and the Organic (Body or Nature) 
and formed by the tension between the two terms of the 
binary (Technology/Organic). The multitude of gendered 
cultural positions is endlessly diverse. The underlying 
constitutive split, however, is universally shared. Let us 
call it a “universal” that draws together the endless frac-
tal web of particularities. 
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The universal which signifies the split between Lan-
guage (Culture, Technology) and the Body (Organic, Ani-
mal) refers to the problematic raised by Butler with the 
opening of the question about the possibility of identifica-
tion with the bodily suffering itself vis-à-vis that of discur-
sive identification with the notion of Humanity. Namely, 
the central thesis in Butler’s “Violence, Mourning, Politics” 
of Precarious Life (2006) is that the identification with the 
bodily suffering of the others can bring about greater soli-
darity among people of different communities and in fact 
expand inclusiveness of the category of humanity. By way 
of identifying with suffering, in its radical, i.e., physical ren-
dition, the universal “humanity” is more firmly grounded. 
Identification with the body exposed to (a threat of) pain 
enables the stability of the universal category of “Human-
ity” without excluding the reality of an endless socio-cul-
tural and gendered web of particularities.
In “Ecce Homo: Ain’t I (Ar’n’t) I a Woman, and the 
Inappropriated Others: Human in a Posthumanist Land-
scape,” Dona Haraway attempts to establish a universal 
category of humanity which would be inherently inclu-
sive. Similarly to Judith Butler, she argues that it is the 
identification with sheer suffering that makes the uni-
versal of Humanity possible. And this universality is not 
undermined by the socio-cultural, racial, and gendered 
particularities, but rather enabled and, in its inherent in-
clusiveness, conditioned by them.
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My focus is the figure of a broken humanity, signifying 
– in ambiguity, contradiction, stolen symbolism, and
unending chains of noninnocent translations – a possible
hope. (Haraway 1992, 87)
The figure of broken humanity is the figure of human 
universality and it is one to be constructed by “intercul-
tural and multicultural feminist theory” in terms of “post-
colonial, nongeneric, and irredeemably specific figures 
of critical subjectivity, consciousness and humanity – not 
in the sacred image of the same, but in the self-critical 
practice of ‘difference,’ of the ‘I’ and we that is/are never 
identical to itself.” (Haraway 1992, 87) This “critical prac-
tice of difference” should take place not only on the level 
of the Discursive, but also on the level of the Bodily – the 
generic human figures should be “dismembered,” writes 
Haraway, as both discursive and bodily categories.
“We,” in these very particular discursive worlds, have 
no routes to connection and to noncosmic, nongeneric, 
nonoriginal wholeness than through the radical dis-
membering and dis-placing of our names and our 
bodies. So, how can humanity have a figure outside the 
narratives of humanism; what language should such a 
figure speak? (Haraway 1992, 88)
The figures of humanity outside the narratives of hu-
manism, the figures that can serve as “routes of connec-
tion” to a wholeness of the human multitude which is 
“nongeneric and nonoriginal” occupy temporarily and 
successively the place of the empty master signifier of 
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Humanity. They are the “dismembered and displaced 
names and bodies,” they are the broken figures of “the 
suffering servants” and their “mutants.” Haraway suggests 
Jesus and Sojourner Truth as the two paradigmatic figures 
of broken humanity, the two paradigmatic figures of suf-
fering servants. Both Jesus and Sojourner Truth are trick-
sters, figures of mime, mockery and masquerade. They 
are never original, never generic, never monolithic figures 
of unequivocal and fixed meaning, but rather always al-
ready guised, always already miming a different figure of 
humanity in an endless metonymic chain of irony.
The suffering servant figure has been fundamental in 
twentieth-century liberation theology and Christian 
Marxism. The guises of the suffering servant never cease. 
[…] Jesus appears as a mime in many layers; crowned with 
thorns and in a purple cloak, he is in the mock disguise 
of a king before his wrongful execution as a criminal. As 
a criminal, he is counterfeit for a scapegoat, indeed, the 
scapegoat of salvation history (Haraway 1992, 90).
To always already mime an identity in its fullness is to 
imply a fundamental disbelief in the possibility of iden-
titary fullness, to express doubt in the possibility for the 
master-signifier to be filled-up by a lived reality, i.e. for 
the discursive category of identity to equal the Real (or 
the Larueallian Lived). To mime an identity by way of 
irony and self-irony is to express the sense of failure to 
achieve a normalized and normalizing identity in its full-
ness, to express and to affirm the unavoidability of such 
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failure. Jesus is a mocking, carnivalesque figure of a king 
signifying the “impossible king,” the impossibility of king-
hood, the underlying remainder of a broken subject as the 
common human condition and the reality in which one 
finds oneself unavoidably even when performing the cul-
tural role of a “king” or a masterful subject. 
The brutal irony of wearing a crown of thorns, the 
cruel mocking with the symbol of the subject position 
of ultimate mastery, is the painful grin in Jesus’ mime of 
kinghood which tells the story of suffering and vulnera-
bility as the universal human position. The farce of Jesus’ 
suffering known as the “Passion” tells of the experience 
of pain and vulnerability as the only universal in the in-
tra- and inter-subjective human condition.
The ridicule of suffering as the “Truth” of the common 
human condition speaks of the impossibility of truth in 
the sense of fullness of meaning reflecting the Real in its 
totality, or rather of the impossibility of establishing an 
equation between the Truth and the Real. It speaks of the 
porosity of truth, of the elusive character of meaning, of 
the illusive nature of knowledge, of the spectral character 
of Language and Discourse (or, in Laruellian parlance, the 
Transcendental). Yet the bodily reaction of pain and laugh-
ter this farce provokes is the symptom of the Real – it is the 
signal that the narrative has touched the traumatic spot of 
sheer experience (of pain) or of the Lived (of pain).  
To mime an identity is not necessarily a strategically 
conceptualized subversive act of auto-irony. It is also a 
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direct result of an ontological impossibility. And it is a 
poetic act, i.e., the result of a process of sublimation. 
The void underlying our identity which exposes but our 
physical vulnerability is elevated to a meaning, to a truth 
– the Truth of that sheer negativity inhabited by our vul-
nerable bodies. It is a tragic truth. The truth that every
tragedy prompts is the one of our radically ambivalent
existence, and the reaction to it is always physical, con-
sisting in the simultaneity of weeping and laughter.
Ancient farce, comedy and tragedy all tell us of the funda-
mental lack of essence, of that grounding absence of sense, 
of the founding ontological inconsistency produced by the 
fact that it is always two contradictory instances that simul-
taneously determine the courses of our lives: one which is 
always already beyond our power (the Gods) and one which 
is by definition in our power (one’s Ethos). The two con-
tradicting instances issue into a single one endowed with 
radical ambivalence – a person’s “Fate.” Jean-Pierre Vernant 
(1990) explains that the tragic mode of existence should be 
understood in the double sense of Heraclitus’ fragment 119 
“Man’s character is his daimon.” According to Vernant, it 
does not merely mean that the “daimon” (gods’ will) comes 
down to the person’s character, i.e., that it is only one’s char-
acter or ethos which decides one’s fate but also that one’s 
character or ethos is formed by instances beyond one’s con-
trol and one’s ability to understand them. 
The instances always already beyond the Subject’s 
control are what would be called in a Greek tragedy the 
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“laws prescribed by the Gods,” and they are what we 
would call today the rules of Normality; our failure to 
understand them and to observe them, our failure to be 
normalized is what causes our tragic fall. Our failure to 
control and to understand the void upon which our sub-
jectivities are founded – or rather, out of which they are 
born – is what makes us always already tragically fallen. 
In the last instance, we are always already broken sub-
jects, fallen bodies exposed in our vulnerability. 
The spectral and elusive character of normality unrav-
els the Subject’s empty form, or rather – it unravels the 
Subject as a sheer gesture and pure posture of striving to 
achieve fullness of meaning, completion of the self-im-
posed task of one’s existence making sense, of filling up 
this void posture with signification. The Sisyphus’ work 
of attaining normality, of achieving subjectivity which is 
prescribed by Normality as not only required, but also 
desired, is marked by the absence of that towards which 
we strive – fullness of meaning of our existences. When 
a life “has a meaning,” when one’s existence “makes 
sense” – “happiness” is achieved. Happiness is about 
having a “meaningful” life, having a “fulfilled” life – filled 
by a sense of meaning. By way of seeing through the 
spectrality of the “Gods’ will” and of one’s subject posi-
tion in the World “ruled by the Gods” (=Normality), one 
faces the void, the lack of sense, and the only thing one 
can see at this moment is – himself or herself as a vul-
nerable, exposed, helpless body.
127
SOLIDARITY IN SUFFERING
2.2. Oedipus-The Pharmakon: Rereading Sophocles
homeless body, exposed to the threat of the “Outside,” 
i.e., unsheltered by a polis but rather under ceaseless and 
brutal menace by it, is that of Oedipus as the paradoxical 
figure of the transgressor who has become a “saint” (or,
in the terminology of classical Greece, a hero), a hubrist
against – hubris. It is the image of Oedipus the pharma-
kon (or “the homo sacer”) depicted by Sophocles in Oe-
dipus at Colonus (406-407 BC).  
The figure of the self-blinded, ragged, old, and ban-
ished Oedipus, deprived of not only his polis and home, 
but of any dwelling in the only thinkable world (that of 
Oedipus is defiled by treading the threshold of the full-
ness of reality or the Real itself. The greatest and most 
disturbing miasma he bears, however, is that of having 
looked into the Real itself, into the primordial trauma 
-
at the spectrality of all that represents normality, of all 
that seems to represent the substance of any and all 
conceivable worlds of humanity and sees it proven to 
In other words, normality, the only thinkable World 
(or the symbolic order) is a spectral product – that of 
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a sign, product of human judgment and signification. 
It is the product of human ruse (intelligence) which is 
there only to invent ways of avoiding and evading direct 
encounter with the only stable, substantial “out-there” 
there is –  the brutal, traumatizing Real (or in Laruellian 
parlance: the Lived). Looking into the Real of his own 
sheer trauma, of his own groundless existence, gazing at 
the spectral foundations of the only livable human life is 
what renders Oedipus blind.
Treading into the domain of the fullness of being – 
the domain belonging exclusively to the Daimon, never 
to a mortal – is what causes a tragic fall. He or she 
becomes defiled, stained, invaded by the miasma of 
such transgression. It is believed that the miasma can 
spread endlessly, contaminate everyone that comes in 
touch with it (Parker 1983). Hence, the hubrist must be 
expelled from the polis. In this way, paradoxically, he or 
she becomes the source of purification, a pharmakon. 
The case of Oedipus is one of radical transformation from 
source of defilement into source of purity. Immediately 
before his death, upon which he will undergo a process 
of heroization (a form of apotheosis), he arrives at 
Colonus and with Apollo’s blessing enters and seats 
down for some rest in the forbidden space of the shrine 
of the Erinyes (or the Eumenides) – the abaton into 
which no mortal can set foot. His stain of contact with 
the domain of the Unthinkable accessible only to the 
Immortal (i.e., his direct encounter with the Real) has 
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already turned from defilement into sacredness. The 
abaton, the inaccessible space is accessible to Oedipus. 
In the very opening scene of the tragedy through a 
dialogue between Oedipus and an Athenian we learn that 
Oedipus feels no fear of punishment by the Goddesses 
for whom this inaccessible space is reserved: 
STRANGER
First quit that seat, then question me at large:
The spot thou treadest on is holy ground.
OEDIPUS
What is the site, to what god dedicate?
STRANGER
Inviolable, untrod; goddesses,
Dread brood of Earth and Darkness, here abide.
OEDIPUS
Tell me the awful name I should invoke?
STRANGER
The Gracious Ones, All-seeing, so our folk
Call them, but elsewhere other names are rife.
OEDIPUS
Then may they show their suppliant grace, for I
From this your sanctuary will ne’er depart.
(Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus, 36-45)1
1. Ξένος 
πρὶν νῦν τὰ πλείον᾽ ἱστορεῖν, ἐκ τῆσδ᾽ ἕδρας 
ἔξελθ᾽· ἔχεις γὰρ χῶρον οὐχ ἁγνὸν πατεῖν.
Οἰδίπους 
τίς δ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ ὁ χῶρος; τοῦ θεῶν νομίζεται; 
Ξένος 
ἄθικτος οὐδ᾽ οἰκητός· αἱ γὰρ ἔμφοβοι 
θεαί σφ᾽ ἔχουσι, Γῆς τε καὶ Σκότου κόραι.
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Oedipus is no longer a hubrist who dares violate the 
holy space of the Furies – it is following God’s advice 
(Apollo’s prophecy) that he dears set foot in it. Stepping 
into the holy space reserved for the Erinyes is precisely 
the condition for his apotheosis, or rather, inauguration 
into the status of a demigod, a hero. 
The broken figure of Oedipus-the Pharmakon is quite 
similar to that of the “broken figure of humanity” the 
Christ is. The pure suffering Oedipus-the Pharmakon (of 
Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus) is made of and condi-
tioned by inaugurates him as the universal figure of hu-
manity in a similar way to that of the Christ as analyzed 
by Donna Haraway, and also, in a quite similar way, by 
Slavoj Žižek.  Both Oedipus and Christ are the incarnation 
and the impossible symbolization of the Real (underlying 
and repetitively begetting human existence) of pure pain 
and of the universal human state of always already being 
(tragically) “fallen.”  
They are the tragic sublime, or – in Žižekian parlance 
– products of “downward synthesis” (or the “Christian
sublime”) which enables a glimpse into the Real itself
precisely by way of the minimal, radical representation
of the unrepresentable Real or the Lived.
Οἰδίπους
τίνων τὸ σεμνὸν ὄνομ᾽ ἂν εὐξαίμην κλύων; 
Ξένος 
τὰς πάνθ᾽ ὁρώσας Εὐμενίδας ὅ γ᾽ ἐνθάδ᾽ ἂν 
εἴποι λεώς νιν· ἄλλα δ᾽ ἀλλαχοῦ καλά. 
Οἰδίπους 
ἀλλ᾽ ἵλεῳ μὲν τὸν ἱκέτην δεξαίατο· 




Christ was the “son of a man,” a ragged, miserable 
creature crucified between two common brigands; and 
it is against the background of this utterly wretched 
character of his earthly appearance that his divine 
essence shines through all the more powerfully. In the 
late Victorian age, the same mechanism was responsible 
for the ideological impact of the tragic figure of the 
“elephant-man,” as the subtitle of one of the books 
about him suggests ( A Study in Human Dignity): it was 
the very monstrous and nauseating distortion of his 
body which rendered visible the simple dignity of his 
inner spiritual life […] Therein consists the “Christian 
Sublime”: in this wretched “little piece of the real” lies 
the necessary counterpart (form of appearance) of pure 
spirituality. (Žižek, 1998, 49)
In spite of the impossibility of access to the Real in 
its immediacy, symbolization (or in Laruelle’s language: 
Thought) unstoppably takes place and its sense is to 
incessantly strive to mediate the Real. Thought or Lan-
guage is touched by the Real – or rather, touches upon 
the Real – precisely when a concept is radical, when it is 
minimal, descriptive of the Real and conditioned by its 
syntax (Laruelle 2000, 47). The “tragic sublime,” whose 
paradigmatic figures are both Oedipus and Christ, is a 
radical one, residing on a minimum of transcendental 
and correlating with the Real the suffering is.  
The apotheosis (the event of his heroization) of the 
“greatest sinner of them all,” Oedipus, has remained 
one of the greatest enigmas for the modern – and Chris-
tian – interpreters of the Greek tragedy. Sophocles does 
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not make a slightest attempt to explain this transforma-
tion. As if this was something which needed no inter-
pretation for his contemporaries, for those who had the 
competence of direct practitioners of the cultural codes 
of the culture to which they belonged, that of classi-
cal Athens. Orestes had to seek from the Erinyes (or in 
Latin: the Furies) absolving of the guilt and punishment 
(which consisted precisely in the insufferable feeling of 
guilt – a state of madness) they brought upon him after 
the matricide he had committed against Clytemnestra. 
Quite differently to Orestes, Oedipus is welcomed by 
the Erinyes – it seems even invited by them – into their 
sanctuary and allowed access to its impenetrable zone 
filled with secret and sacred knowledge belonging only 
to them. The Erinyes are chtonic goddesses of the pre-
Olympian (pre-rational, pre-political) race of divinities. 
Their horrible powers have been subjected to “political 
control” – by a “political contract” made between them 
and the Olympians – and they have, thus, gained a new, 
euphemistic name, that of Eumenides. The powers and 
the category of knowledge, the direct insight into the 
horrible black truth of all finite and infinite existence, 
the Erinyes possess is denied even to the Gods of the 
Pantheon. Yet again, the Erinyes, who persecute most 
severely – through a form of insufferable madness con-
sisting in relentless sense of guilt – precisely for incest 
and parricide, graciously embrace Oedipus’s divinization. 
It seems that they even preside over it, and by welcom-
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ing him into their abaton, they initiate him into the ter-
rible truth of all mortal and immortal existence, a truth, 
a theoria insufferable to all others except themselves 
and their hero Oedipus.  
From Aeschylus’ Eumenides we know that the Erinyes 
are a chtonic, collective female divinity, possessing im-
mediate insight into the truths and powers which con-
cern the underworld or rather, the netherworld (since 
in Ancient Greece death is departure into nothingness, 
into deprivation of existence – engulfment by the Void). 
From the same tragedy we also find out that the Erinyes’ 
role, prior to their “domestication” undertaken by the 
Olympians and presided by Athena, was to defend the 
Mother’s primordial primacy in signification and power – 
in short, the Mother’s right to symbolic primacy – versus 
the usurpation of the status of symbolic primacy perpet-
uated by the Father. At the trial of Orestes in Aeschylus’ 
Eumenides the accusers, the Erinyes, and the defender 
of Orestes in this case of matricide, Appolo, debate over 
the right of the mother to claim parenthood, as well as 
over the basic worth of a mother’s life and death: 
CHORUS LEADER 
 You plead to set him free. But think of this—
  will this man, who shed his mother’s blood, 
 who spilled it on the ground, return back home, 
 to live in Argos in his father’s house? 
 Where are the public altars he can use, 




 I’ll speak to that, as well. Make sure you note 
 how right my answer is. That word mother— 
 we give it to the one who bears the child. 
 However, she’s no parent, just a nurse 
 to that new life embedded in her.
 The parent is the one who plants the seed, 
 the father. Like a stranger for a stranger,         
 she preserves the growing life, unless 
 god injures it. And I can offer proof 
 for what I say—a man can have a child 
 without a mother. Here’s our witness, 
 here—Athena, child of Olympian Zeus
(Aeschylus Eumenides, 830-847)
The inauguration of the Name of the Father as the one 
which presides Symbolization, and the transformation 
of the Erinyes into Eumenides, as the pledge of this 
transformation of the Law, is realized by a political, 
democratic vote of the gods of the Pantheon and is won 
by just one vote more in its favor, that of Athena the 
daughter of Zeus born without a mother.
ATHENA 
It’s now my task to give my final verdict. 
And I award my ballot to Orestes. 
No mother gave me birth—that’s why 
in everything but marriage I support 
the man with all my heart, a true child 
of my father Zeus. Thus, that woman’s death 
I won’t consider more significant.
She killed her husband, guardian of their home.
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If the votes are equal, Orestes wins. 
Now, members of the jury, do your job. 
Shake the ballots from the urns—and quickly.
 (Aeschylus Eumenides, 934-944)2
After loosing their case in this unprecedented trial, the 
Erinyes have been domesticated and persuaded – by Ath-
ena’s words of reason, appealing to respect toward the 
goddess of Persuasion (Aeschylus Eumenides, 1101) – to 
collaborate with the Olympians: the Erinyes, the children 
of the Night, the horrible avengers of parricide, the have 
been renamed into Eumenides, the gracious ones.  
The Erinyes are the daimons of the naught, the void 
of signification, of the blinding or paralyzing gaze into 
the “Head of the Medusa” the encounter with the Real 
is (or the fullness of being the Mother represents), and 
the unparalleled martyr of the “Erinyan truth” is indeed 
Oedipus.
The Messenger (the Angelos) describes the apotheosis 
of Oedipus: 
After brief space we looked again, and lo
The man was gone, evanished from our eyes;
Only the king we saw with upraised hand
Shading his eyes as from some awful sight,
That no man might endure to look upon.
A moment later, and we saw him bend
In prayer to Earth and prayer to Heaven at once.
But by what doom the stranger met his end
No man save Theseus knoweth.  For there fell
2. Translation by Ian Johnston. 
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No fiery bold that reft him in that hour,
Nor whirlwind from the sea, but he was taken.
It was a messenger from heaven, or else
Some gentle, painless cleaving of earth’s base;
For without wailing or disease or pain
He passed away--and end most marvelous
(Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus)3
The “awful sight that no man might endure to look 
upon” is the sight that has blinded Oedipus. It is a sight 
whose witness he has become for all humanity. He is the 
martyr of this divine truth. Ragged, humiliated bagger 
once a king, Oedipus – just like Christ - that mockery of 
a kinghood, has become the broken figure of humanity,” 
one which in its sheer suffering visible in the fallen body 
and soul can serve the basis for universal humanity.
3. Solidarity of the Bodies in Pain
 The vision of Humanity in its Cyborgian aspect, the 
awareness of the presence of technology and the role 
it plays in what is construed and understood as Human 
today, poignantly exposes our animal physicality in its 
vulnerability and helplessness. Subjectivity is always al-
ready mediation, i.e., language; and technology is a lin-
guistic product. The Technology/Body dichotomy radi-
calizes – or rather renders visible in its radicality – the 
hierarchy between the two terms. The body is constantly 
3. Translation F. Storr
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disciplined, reduced to a material with which and upon 
which technology works. This implies that technology 
or discourse (our linguistic “Self”) is what exhausts the 
meaning of the term Humanity, it is what re-presents Hu-
manity: the sovereign right to act upon the bodies, the 
organisms, to act upon the animal in a masterful, domi-
neering, subjugating fashion. The primacy of culture over 
the body works like any cultural supremacy – it is a form 
of colonization. In Primate Visions (1989), Dona Haraway 
writes of science’s orientalization of the animal.
Simian orientalism means that western primatology 
has been about the construction of the self from the 
raw material of the other, the appropriation of nature 
in the production of culture, the ripening of the human 
from the soil of the animal, the clarity of white from the 
obscurity of color, the issue of man from the body of 
woman, the elaboration of gender from the resource of 
sex, the emergence of mind by the activation of body. 
To effect these transformative operations, simian “orien-
talist” discourse must first construct the terms: animal, 
nature, body, primitive, female. (Haraway 1989, 11)
Scientific discourse is highly political and it exercises 
brutal domination, humiliation, reduction of the animal 
or of the body – of the Organic – to mere material of no 
value in itself: the value is always added through scientif-
ic labor. It is either the body’s or the animal’s function in 
“Nature” as a scientific representation – a concept – or 
its use in Technology that adds value, that which makes 
it valuable, i.e. which makes sense out of the senseless 
138
THE LIVED REVOLUTION
bodies or makes them worth protecting.  Linguistic com-
petence brings forth the indispensable minimum – or 
the identity in the last instance – of a possibility to re-
volt against the subjugation, to demand recognition and 
aspire for emancipation is always already a discursive 
act. The animal, both human and non-human, is onto-
logically deprived of the potentiality of recognition and 
of achieving its own liberation. The body or the animal 
can produce a sheer gesture, pure act of revolt – it can 
produce a speechless revolution, brutal and bodily. And 
it will exhaust itself in that brutal bodily revolt, without 
bringing the necessary recognition. 
Making a parallel between orientalism and “sim-
ian orientalism,” Haraway quotes Marx when he writes 
about the people of the Orient: “They cannot represent 
themselves; they must be represented.” (Haraway 1989, 
144) Indeed, the human and the nonhuman animal can-
not represent themselves and they must be represent-
ed. Is it possible to re-present the animal or the body in
fidelity to its animality and physicality, in fidelity to the
Real and the Lived? François Laruelle’s non-philosophical
theory, the thinking in terms of the Real and by means
of radical concepts provides an epistemological stance
which makes the Thought in fidelity to the Animal-Body
possible.
As elaborated in more detail in the first chapter, con-
curring with Laruelle, I will maintain that Thought cannot 
reflect the Real but rather describe it (1989, 50; 2000, 
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47). If we take the Real to be a Symptom, an Occurrence, 
an Event, a sheer experience, we are, claiming, together 
with Lacan that the Real is Trauma, i.e. that the Real is al-
ways already the Tuché painfully interrupting the Autom-
aton of pleasure (Lacan 1998, 54-55). Thus, what can be 
described is a set of symptoms – always already actualized 
as sheer experience, taking place in the form of trauma 
– and their interrelations. Also when producing pleasure,
the sheer experience or the sheer Evental introduces – or
rather introduces itself as – Trauma. It thrusts into the Au-
tomaton of Signification, it brings destabilization into the
Signifying Chain – it produces Uncertainty.
Thinking in fidelity to the Body is theorizing against 
the epistemic backdrop that consists of correlating in the 
last instance with the instances of trauma that a body 
undergoes. This implies that legitimization of knowledge 
is sought from the reality of sheer experience. Yet again, 
reality is cognitively mediated. It is described by means 
of Language: it can never be directly made present in – 
or reflected into and by – Thought without a remainder. 
The description is carried out in terms of transcenden-
tal minimum, by means of radical concepts. Radicality 
consists in the transcendental impoverishment of the 
concepts and their tendency to descriptively “follow the 
syntax of the Real.” 
The traumatic node, the incursion of the Real into the 
Signifying Chain, the taking place of sheer experience, 
the opening up of the void of Event devoid of Language 
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serves as the symptom of reality – of the fact that a 
discourse re-presents the Lived. Politics is about re-pre-
senting subject-positions that are assumed to be “au-
thentic,” i.e. coupled by an experience. In other words, 
any political representation claims to represent not only 
identities and ideas but also the experience and the lived 
(the “sufferings”) behind the identity in order to justify 
an advocated political idea. Moreover, any political proj-
ect assumes to be corroborated by “the truth” about the 
human experience, and to be legitimized by it. 
Just as in psychoanalysis, also in political analysis the 
Symptom of the Real is the proof or the signal that a cer-
tain claim is true (relevant, legitimate and correctly re-
presenting the interests of an identity). Hence, a symp-
tomatic map of occurrences of the Real, a cartography of 
suffering is an epistemic necessity: it enables the Politi-
cal Subject to circumvent arbitrareity of her/his claims 
that the political option s/he advocates re-presents the 
life’s needs of a social group or a society. Any political 
discourse claims to know and address “what people go 
through:” all political discourse resorts to the instance 
of the lived, of the experienced and the suffered as the 
ultimate instance of legitimization of its fundamental 
claims. 
Apart from being a Symptom (of the Real), apart from 
being an instance beyond the Political (even though ulti-
mately of highest relevance for it), Pain can be “cloned” 
(Laruelle) into a “radical concept,” into a transcenden-
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tal minimum that is a political term (Laruelle). The Real 
operates according to its own syntax which cannot be 
reflected in totality by the Language into a transcen-
dental construct, ideational product, into a “truth” or a 
discourse. Yet a concept can be cloned from the Real, ar-
gues François Laruelle. A concept which correlates with 
the Real, which is determined in the last instance by the 
syntax of the Real rather than by the Transcendental (a 
doctrine, a system of ideas, a theory), a concept which 
is “affected by immanence” is one “cloned” from the 
Real (Laruelle 2000, 47). According to Laruelle’s non-
philosophical terminology, let us reiterate, the concept 
cloned from the Real is termed a radical concept. 
Pain is one of the instances of the Real par excellence: 
it is a sheer taking-place or a pure experience, utter event 
regardless of whether one pertaining to the body or to 
the soul. Pain is by definition a pre-linguistic instance 
even when inflicted by a linguistic occurrence such as 
an injurious speech act (Butler, 1997). The experience of 
pain is sheer bodily passivity, subjection to Trauma: in its 
last instance, it is but that which is suffered and always 
already via the body.  Pain is a term that is “cloned” from 
the Real both in its colloquial as well as in its theoreti-
cal use: it is transcendentally minimal and descriptive, 
referring to the memory of an experienced pain as the 
ultimate instance of legitimization of its meaning. It is a 
term that is always already invoked in any political dis-
course as an instance of ultimate legitimization. 
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However, in the context of “Philosophy” such tran-
scendentally impoverished or rudimentary notion 
does not hold the status of a politically meaningful 
term. In Laruelle’s terminology “philosophy” is virtu-
ally all thought which does not rely on the co-relation 
with the Real as its ultimate instance of legitimization 
but rather on its auto-legitimizing discursive laws, on 
its auto-reflexive wishful thinking; or simply, that is the 
product of “auto-reflection,” of “mirroring” of Thought 
into Thought, of Thought’s “auto-fetishization” (Laruelle 
1989, 17). In Laruellian vain, we could say that we can 
subsume under the notion of “philosophy” all and any 
political theory of today. 
According to Laruelle, this is also valid of the past po-
litical thought as well, since all political theory, science, 
ideology and utopia has always already been a “philoso-
phy”, a speculation pretending to re-present the real/ity. 
The Real is always already substituted by an idea of it, a 
concept, an “essence,” a “transcendental” – duplication 
of thought is created whereby Thought thinks Thought. 
Also when the Real is declared to be unthinkable, un-re-
presentable, when it is assigned the status of that which 
is beyond thought as it has been done in the era of the 
so-called postmodernism, the situation changes only in 
some peripheral way: there is no longer pretension to 
re-present the Real, but the Thought continues to dupli-
cate itself, Thought thinks Thought. Autofetishization of 
Thought continues in an absolute form.  
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“Pain” or “suffering” are terms which are “affected by 
immanence” (Laruelle 2000, 47), that is, they work as di-
rect invocation of (the memory of) an experience (of pain 
or suffering).  Identification with the pain or the suffering 
itself of the Other can serve a basis of political solidarity, 
one that is far more inclusive than the discursive category 
of “humanity.” In Precarious Life, Judith Butler argues that 
“humanity” is constituted through recognition which is a 
purely linguistic act and that in order to maximally expand 
the category of “humanity” vulnerability should be postu-
lated as its precondition (2006, 43). In order to radicalize 
this position with which I concur, I will argue that solidar-
ity with (a body) suffering (in) pain beyond and regardless 
of the “procedure” of recognition as human can serve the 
basis of political solidarity endowed with a great force for 
political mobilization. The acts of recognition and interpel-
lation are product of humanist rationalism that obstructs, 
contains, frustrates the life-force of the radical sense of 
solidarity and the urge toward action a solidarity with (a 
body in) pain can instill.
4. The Political Action of Solidarity in Suffering
Overcoming the hierarchy between “Body” and 
“Soul,” Nature and Culture, Biology and Technology can 
bring about radical sense of solidarity, unconditioned by 
processes of valorization (recognition). Yet, it inevitably 
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issues into action that is product of the Language, i.e. an 
action which is political. Moreover, it originates from an 
instance that is heterogeneous – one that is sheer experi-
ence only in the last instance, yet at the same time un-
avoidably mediated by language. That purely experiential 
and virtually physical action of co-suffering immediately 
translates itself into the linguistic re-action of “identifying 
with the other.” “Identification with” becomes “solidarity 
with.” The latter is a sense of being called upon to act; it is 
the source of political action. Out of the “Void” or out of 
the “Event” a process of “truth-generation” commences 
(Badiou 2005, 173 ff). It is the “truth” of the necessity for 
solidarity, of a sense of community, of revolt against vio-
lence (in all its forms, primarily repression and affliction of 
pain) and of elevating this sense of solidarity into an ideal, 
into a utopia, that will create and participate in a political 
worldview and set of beliefs. 
Solidarity-with-the-suffering (bodies) is a radical po-
litical stance not only because the term of “suffering” 
or “pain” is a radical concept in the Laruellian sense of 
the word, but also because it motivates action which is 
radical itself, that is, almost pre-linguistic. In Spinozian 
words, it is the political action toward the very rudimen-
tary, primitive or radical goal of “increasing power of ac-
tivity” or “presence of life” versus suffering of pain as 
“diminishing power of activity.”  The suffering or the di-
minishing power of activity in others is made present in 
our own mind and body through “imagination,” argues 
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Spinoza, and in that way we “suffer-with” – we experi-
ence pain (E III, 30p). Departing from these Spinozian 
premises, we can infer that revolting against pain in the 
others, against the diminishing presence of Life experi-
enced by others, is egotistically motivated.  According to 
a different Spinozian logic of inference, however, based 
on the presupposition that every living being partici-
pates in the Being, in Life or Nature (that is God), and is, 
hence, constitutively interrelated with the others, with 
everything that lives, we can conclude that one revolts 
in the name of Life itself rather than in the name of her/
his finite existence.
Continuing in this Spinozian vain of thinking, we can say 
that solidarity with the others and revolt against the pain 
brought upon them stems from two simultaneous and 
at first glance contradicting sources: from the “egotistic” 
stance of self-preservation as well as from the “altruistic” 
sense of being affected by the pain that the others suffer 
in a way which makes the concern for our finite being ir-
relevant (vis-à-vis the experience of unacceptability of the 
“diminishing power of activity” of Life itself). 
Our existence is conditioned by the Others, by their 
recognition regardless of whether linguistic or merely 
bodily (by way of touch, care for our physical survival). 
Judith Butler shows how this inter-conditioning, this dy-
namic of mutual conditioning between the Individual 
Self and the Other, originates from the sense and the 
fact of our bodily vulnerability. 
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The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the 
skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of the others, 
but also to touch, and to violence, and bodies put us at 
risk of becoming the agency and instrument of all these 
as well. Although we struggle over our own bodies, the 
very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever 
only our own. The body has its invariably public dimen-
sion. Constituted as a social phenomenon in the public 
sphere, my body is and is not mine. Given over from 
the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, is 
formed within the crucible of social life; only later, and 
with some uncertainty, do I lay claim to my body as my 
own, if, in fact, I ever do.  (Butler 2006, 26)
We are constituted by the act of recognition by the 
Other which is pre-linguistic since our status of vulner-
ably exposed bodies is a state that always already pre-
cedes the constitution or the assertion of the Subject 
(Butler 2006, 28).
Nevertheless, the sense of being exposed to potential 
violence, the sense of physical vulnerability, that very “un-
certainty” of whether we can claim our own body is what 
brings us back to ourselves, reduces us to the Real of our 
urge for survival, to the experience of a sheer sense of ne-
cessity to protect ourselves against the threat of physical 
annihilation or affliction by pain. And in this radical sur-
vivalist mode we sense our constitutive dependence on 
others – on the Other’s touch that has enabled us to stay 
in life. I mourn the loss of the other because by losing him 
I loose a constitutive part of myself, I loose myself.
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[…] we can say that grief contains the possibility of ap-
prehending a mode of dispossession that is fundamental 
to who I am. This possibility does not dispute the fact 
of my autonomy, but it does qualify that claim through 
recourse to the fundamental sociality of embodied life, 
the ways in which we are, from the start and by virtue 
of being a bodily being, already given over, beyond our-
selves, implicated in lives that are not our own. (Butler 
2006, 28) 
We are fundamentally always already given over to 
the others, constitutively always already beyond our-
selves. Identifying with the sheer suffering of the others, 
with the bodies in pain always already “beyond them-
selves,” always already exposed to threat of violence, 
is what enables solidarity beyond what is recognized 
or recognizable as “human.” The identification with the 
experience of suffering itself (of a body stripped of the 
masterful Subject) awakens the infantile sense of revolt 
against the betrayal of trust in the touch of the Other 
(Body) that our “pre-individual” Self desires endlessly. 
Our “pre-individual Self” aspires to instill certainty of (our 
own) survival in an absolute way. Putting it in Spinozian-
Deleuzian words, our desire that Life’s power of activity 
infinitely increases is infinite (Deleuze 1992). Precisely 
because of the infinity of this desire our pre-individual 
self demands that the non-violence of the Other’s touch 
is universally guarantied, that it is guarantied in an abso-
lute way and proven infinitely certain.
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The human animal is convoked to become “immortal” 
at the moment when it establishes a relation of fidel-
ity to a truth, claims Badiou in his Ethics (2001, 40). The 
“subject” is co-constituted simultaneously with the pro-
cess of a generation of a truth about an event which has 
already destabilized the world as we knew it.  The “sub-
ject” is the product of the process of truth generation 
and is sustained by its fidelity to the truth that consti-
tutes it, explains Badiou (2001, 44-48). And this process 
constitutes the human animal as “immortal.”
[…] Man is to be identified by his affirmative thought, by 
the singular truths of which he is capable, bythe Immor-
tal which makes of him the most resilient [résistant] and 
most paradoxical of animals. (Badiou 2001, 16)
The process of transformation from a mortal to an 
immortal animal – an animal that participates in immor-
tality – as part of the process of truth generation is ex-
plained via Spinoza. Adopting Spinoza’s definition of hu-
man essence as “perseverance in being,” Badiou claims 
that whereas the mortal human animal perseveres in 
mere conservation of life, the immortal animal the sub-
ject of truth has become perseveres in fidelity to fidelity 
(Badiou 2001, 47). It is about “perseverance in being of 
what he is,” about perseverance in fidelity to a truth by 
way of which he participates in eternity (Badiou 2001, 
45). Fidelity to a truth inscribes the human animal in an 




The ‘some-one’ thus caught up in what attests that he 
belongs to the truth-process as one of its foundation-
points is simultaneously himself, nothing other than 
himself, a multiple singularity recognizable among all 
others, and in excess of himself, because the uncertain 
course [tracé aléatoire] of fidelity passes through him, 
transfixes his singular body and inscribes him, from with-
in time, in an instant of eternity (Badiou 2001, 45)
The infinity of desire as the essence of the human 
animal according to Spinoza and the immortality as that 
which defines the human animal of truth according to 
Badiou, are the instances that enable transcendence of 
the confines of our finite selves and render solidarity 
possible. 
The pure experience of infinite desire that the non-
threatening nature of the Other’s touch is infinitely 
guarantied is always already inevitably translated 
into language and checked by “Reason.” The purely 
experiential (the Event) is necessarily mediated, 
transposed via and into language. Thinking in terms 
of radical concepts or in terms that correlate with 
the Real (Laruelle) enables fidelity to the sheer, pre-
linguistic experiential and suspends the dictate of the 
Transcendental (any discursive/political “Cosmology”). 
Vulnerability as the precondition of human solidarity 
is one of those radical concepts that succumb to the 
authority of the Real rather than to a Hegemony of Ideas 
as the instance of legitimization of its political relevance. 
It is a concept producing thought-force (Laruelle), i.e., 
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as secondary to it.
Fidelity to the Real of suffering cannot be reflected into 
the Language without a remainder, as the Real cannot be 
mirrored by the World in Laruellian sense of the word, 
(Laruelle 1989). The experience is inevitably mediated by 
language. Nonetheless the World of Discourse, i.e. Lacan’s 
(and the Aristotelian) Automaton, is inevitably rendered 
porous by the cracks produced by incidental thrusts of the 
Tuché (the Incident, a sheer taking place, the Event or the 
Real) into the Automaton of the signifying chain (Lacan 
unpredictability or rather the unpredictable changes that 
on the level of the Discursive can be the points of origin 
Badiou agree on one thing – that the Real is “impossible 
in its immediacy;” nonetheless they also seem to say that 




[…] the Real happens to us (we encounter it) as impossible, 
as “the impossible thing” that turns our symbolic 
universe upside down and leads to the reconfiguration 
of this universe. (Zupančič 2000, 234)
Evocation of an experience of pain, in a process of 
identification with the Other’s suffering – rather than 
identification with the value of his/her life as “human” – 
can be the origin of solidarity transcending limitations of 
recognition of a “love and loss worth mourning” (Butler 
2004, 27; 2006, 36). Dwelling in the purely “evental” or 
the Real is impossible: we live in the World-of-Language; 
correlating with the “impossible Real” of suffering, un-
dergoing the experience of co-suffering, having the 
sense of solidarity in pain can lead to radical “reconfigu-
ration of this universe.” (Zupančič 2000, 234)
Solidarity will always take place in this inescapable 
World of the Word, and its agency is inescapably the 
Subject. And it will always be called upon in the name of 
a certain political (or ethical) truth. And this World of the 
Word, this “transcendental universe” is not an “illusion,” 
not a “mirage” compared to the purely experiential 
or – the Real. On the contrary, in the last instance, it is 
always already “affected by the Real” and its purpose is 
to enable us to deal with the Trauma the Real is. And the 
modes of “dealing” with the Trauma, the truths of the 
Real (of suffering) are not arbitrary – they are produced 
in fidelity to the experienced and incessantly strive to 
mediate it (as truthfully as possible). The question of the 
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“accuracy” of the mediation is a different one that we will 
leave aside since it is not an object of this investigation.
There is an uninterrupted continuity in the process of 
the Real’s self-translation into the Language, or rather in 
the automatism of the auto-generated and inescapable 
course of mediation of the Real into/by the Language. 
The Real and the Transcendental, the suffered experi-
ence and the political truth we attempt to generate of 
it interchange incessantly forming an endless Moebius 
strip.    
Politically correlating with the Real (of suffering) is 
about suspending the hierarchy between the “Tran-
scendental” (the Language) and the purely experiential 
(the Real), about abolishing the supremacy of “Soul” or 
“Mind” over the “Body.” Let us reaffirm that the purely 
experiential, the “evental” or the Real does not come 
down to the “bodily:”  rather, it can be located beyond 
the Body/Soul dichotomy. Correlating with the Real of 
the Suffering Body serves the transcendence of this 
asymmetrical dichotomy and enables solidarity beyond 
the procedure of recognition of what counts as human 
(Butler 2004; 2006). 
The body is the location-in-the-last-instance of the 
suffering itself. Bodily suffering is suffering at its most 
radical precisely because of the Body’s helplessness, its 
exposedness to touch and to violence when devoid of 
that instance of mastering (of both the Linguistic and the 
Physical) called the Subject. And this primal sense of ex-
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posure, sense of primordial helplessness of the body is 
an experience that can be recognized by any-body, pos-
sibly even as “the precondition of humanity” without 
the procedure of valorization of what counts as a human 
being, a “human life worth living” (and mourning). Iden-
tification with the instance of suffering experienced by 
the Other that takes place beyond the procedure of rec-
ognition which assigns it the status of “human” (which is 
a category of exclusivity) can serve the basis of solidarity 
stripped of any dialectics of hierarchy enabling inclusion 





Violence: The Indispensible Condition
of the Law (and of the Political)
1. Introduction
Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology (first published in 
1922) brings to light the violent precondition of any 
law or political contract: the act of introduction of a 
law, i.e., of inauguration of any self-organizing principle 
of a society, carried out by the bearer of sovereignty, 
is “pre-legal.” It is the result of pure Will (pure Desire, 
the Real or Unilateral Difference) taking place prior 
to any form of social accord which is, in its determi-
nation in the last instance, a discursive instance. The 
inauguration of a law is an act of violence and its origin 
is the pre-discursive domain of sovereignty. In its last 
instance, any political order and any legal system does 
not come to being from a certain rational or discursive 
principle, but rather from the Real-of-Sovereignty. 
Amidst the discursiveness of the Political stands the 
bearer of sovereignty as a void, i.e., as a stance of pure 
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Power devoid of Discourse, as the sheer experience of 
unilateral assertion of Will. All Law stems from a cer-
tain “Because I said so.” The latter is a statement that 
is meager in terms of discursive contents, an apophasis 
which consists in the mere performative act (by recourse 
to discursive means) of power. It is but a sheer expres-
sion of “unilateral difference” (Deleuze, 1993) which dis-
penses with logical explication, with any desire to make 
sense. It works as Badiou’s “void:” fidelity to this purely 
experiential instance, fidelity to that sheer experience 
of an entirely new event is the source of or the cause 
for generation of an entirely new political truth, of an 
entirely new law conditioning a new political situation 
(Badiou 2005, 173ff).
In his Critique of Violence, Walter Benjamin explains 
not only that the Law is enabled and engendered by vio-
lence, but also continuously sustained by it. He distin-
guishes between pure (or divine) violence and violence 
as means, insisting that the latter is always either law-
making or law-preserving. 
All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-
preserving. (Benjamin 1999, 287) 
Violence is the “kernel of the Real” of all and any law. 
Hence, it is the Real of any political system and all politi-
cal life, since the Political is but a derivative of the more 
radical concept of the Law. We conceive of the Law as 
the Norm/ativity which enables a societal organization 
whereas we refer to the Political in the sense of the 
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ruling Logos which sustains the Norm/ativity. (The lat-
ter is historically conditioned and so is the content of 
the Logos. Still, I understand both terms as universals, 
although in purely categorical and formal sense). The 
Law is a radical term, in Laruellian sense of the word, 
because it is transcendentally minimal and descriptive 
of the Real as lived. Namely, it renders the experience, 
the lived of the Law thinkable in that “transcendentally 
impoverished” sense, by describing it as an event of a 
barred flow of desire (producing a secondary experience 
of a particular type of a frustration) by way of introduc-
ing an instance of the Transcendental (the Law itself) as 
its limit. It is a very rudimentary concept describing an 
occurrence on the border between the Real (the lived) 
preceding Thought and the Language. It is, hence, radi-
cal – minimally transcendental and descriptive of the 
workings of the Real.1
Antagonism is indeed the “kernel of the Real” of the 
Political, as Žižek maintains (Žižek 2006, 259-260), and 
it does not consist only in the partisan politics or in 
the opposition between different political discourses; 
on the radical level it consists in the grounding act of 
Violence engendering the Law and the Political itself. 
This grounding gesture of violence is made of the sheer 
taking place of the decision (to introduce or maintain a 
certain law, i.e., a certain political logos), in the political 
will or desire that only a posteriori develops a discourse 
around itself.   
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The pure assertion of will or the unilateral act of 
manifestation of power aiming at introducing a rule or 
a norm which is always assigned the status of universal, 
i.e., which is always the Law, works – let us resort to La-
canian parlance – as the Thrust of the Real into the Au-
tomaton of the pleasure principle (the endless signifying
chain). Thus it works as trauma, i.e., as the Trauma par
excellence the Real is. The birth of the Law is the work-
ing of Violence in the radical sense of the word (in the
minimally transcendental identity-in-the-last-instance of
the notion of “violence”).
A radical concept, according to François Laruelle, is 
one that represents determination-in-last-instance cor-
relating with the Real or the Lived (experience) rather 
than with a theory which, in its last instance, is part 
of “philosophy.” Philosophy is but “auto-fetishism” 
and “self-sufficiency” of reflection (Laruelle 1989, 17). 
Thought is but an occurrence of the Transcendental, 
and its Subject is inevitably mediated by way of the 
Transcendental or language. A radical concept is, thus, 
a transcendental instance since it is the product of 
Thought. Nonetheless, it is transcendentally “impover-
ished.” Let us recall, a radical concept is one which is 
minimally transcendental and is, therefore, fundamen-
tally descriptive of an experienced or empirical real-
ity, one that follows “the syntax of the Real” (Laruelle 
2000, 47). Such is our use of the term violence here: it 
is determined in the last instance by the effect of trau-
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ma, i.e., in its last instance, it is descriptive of the lived 
(of) Trauma.
[…] “trauma” designates a shocking encounter which, 
precisely, DISTURBS this immersion into one’s life-world, 
a violent intrusion of something which doesn’t fit in. 
(Žižek 2001, 47)
It is this disturbance of one’s life-world, “intrusion of 
something which doesn’t fit in” bringing in a sense of 
trauma, that we will call violence here.
And we will claim, along with Benjamin, that all violence 
“as means” is either lawmaking or law-preserving. Such 
is the determination-in-the-last-instance of sovereignty 
as well: as Schmitt has shown, it consists in the will of the 
sovereign and its form is an act of decision, an instance 
which is beyond legal justification and holds a status 
“analogous to that of the miracle” in theology (Schmitt 
1985, 36). This is the core of sovereignty and the pre-
legal source of Law. The violent, “pre-legal” contents of 
sovereignty and, hence, paradoxically, of the origin of 
the Law is most unequivocally and radically expressed in 
the state of exception. The latter is a situation in a state 
when all hitherto existing law is suspended in favor of 
the sovereign’s (or, that of the direct representatives of 
sovereignty) right to carry out decisions that have direct 
bearing on the lives of the citizens or the inhabitants of 
a country. This absence of law is legally established – the 
sovereign’s (or that of the subjects of sovereignty, of “the 
citizens’,” re-presented by the Parliament) suspension of 
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the legal system becomes a law. It is a certain “non-law,” 
or, put in Benjaminian vein, it is a state of lawmaking 
violence. The state of exception, and the suspension 
of law it entails, is habitually vindicated through the 
instance of “necessity,” explains Giorgio Agamben. 
A recurrent opinion posits the concept of necessity as 
the foundation of the state of exception. According to 
a tenaciously repeated Latin adage (a history of the 
adagia’s strategic function in legal literature has yet 
to be written), necessitas legem non habet, “necessity 
has no law” which is interpreted in two opposing ways: 
“necessity does not recognize any law” and “necessity 
creates its own law” (nécessité fait loi). In both cases, 
the theory of the state of exception is wholly reduced 
to the theory of the status necessitatis, so that a 
judgment concerning the existence of the latter resolves 
the question concerning the legitimacy of the former. 
(Agamben 2005, 24)
Necessity is yet another name for the intervention of 
the Real into the discursive automaton of a society. It is 
an event instilling the sense of a “must,” and the latter 
is a sheer experience, a lived trauma brought upon by 
(a) force to which one’s individual desire and intention
must succumb. It is the force of the unadulterated tak-
ing-place of an event (such as sovereign’s will, a war or a
natural disaster) of which only an a posteriori discursive
explication is developed and justification of the unavoid-
able lawmaking processes is produced. Necessity is ha-
bitually deemed to be induced by a threat, it is violence
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induced by violence. Unlike the philosophical meaning 
that could be ascribed to the term ananke in Antiquity 
which could also refer to events such as love, in modern 
legal terminologies necessity is always defined by the po-
tentiality or actuality of negative events, threatening with 
annihilation. The contemporary colloquial use of the term 
necessity, however, allows its positive connotations. Yet 
again, in the Western legal terminology since the Roman 
law (until nowadays), the figure of necessity par excel-
lence is the state of exception (Agamben 2005, 24-31) 
2. The idea of pure violence: in-itself and for the Law
In his Critique of Violence, Benjamin repeatedly af-
firms and demonstrates that all violence (“as means”) is 
either lawmaking or law-preserving. He claims that if the 
violence “[…] adds no claim to neither of these predi-
cates, it forfeits all validity.” (Benjamin 1999, 287)
A few pages further, Benjamin writes:
Lawmaking is power making, and, to that extent, an 
immediate manifestation of violence. (Benjamin 1999, 295)
In opposition to the violence which is always already 
lawmaking or law-preserving, Benjamin introduces di-
vine violence which is “law-destroying” rather than law-
making; it is “expiating” unlike the law-making violence 
which brings in “guilt and retribution”; it doesn’t threat-
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en but “strikes” and it is “lethal without spilling blood.” 
(Benjamin 1999, 297)   
In spite of the fact that the “pure” and “law-destroy-
ing” violence of expiation is defined as divine, according 
to Benjamin, a human rendition of it is possible and it 
is one that can bring about true revolutionary change 
toward a stateless society or a society which has under-
gone “the abolition of state power.” So Benjamin con-
cludes:
But if the existence of violence outside the law, as pure 
immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes the proof 
that revolutionary violence, the highest manifestation 
of unalloyed violence by man, is possible […] Divine vio-
lence, which is the sign and seal but never the means 
of sacred execution, may be called sovereign violence. 
(Benjamin 1999, 300)
Divine violence is “the sign and seal” of sovereignty 
as violence and it can be the source of revolutionary 
violence. According to Benjamin, this type of violence 
is different from the lawmaking or law-preserving type. 
In spite of the fact that I concur with the distinction, I 
would, nonetheless, argue that the violence which is 
used as means of either lawmaking or law-preserving is 
not different in its substance or in its determination-in-
the-last-instance from the pure, i.e., the divine violence. 
Substantially or in their determination-in-the-last in-
stance they are the same. Violence in the last instance 
can be defined but as violence. In the last instance, it is 
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the advent of pure force of (political) desire – it is always 
already pure or divine violence, which only via the in-
stance of linguistic mediation becomes enmeshed with 
the Law or political discourse.  
Benjamin has explained elsewhere that purity does 
not exist in itself, but is rather the result of a process of 
purification (Benjamin 1966, 206/138).2 A thing is pure 
relatively to something, and always already relatively to 
the human intellectual activity, i.e., to language (Benja-
min, ibid.). A concept can be “contaminated,” e.g. the 
idea of violence can “lose its purity” by virtue of defining 
it as mere means (of lawmaking/law-preserving), i.e., by 
way of defining it according to the Transcendental rather 
than the Real. In other words, a concept is “contaminat-
ed,” its purity is reduced or it is less radical when the 
determination in the last instance is a claim of a certain 
doctrine, a system of thought – or simply, the Thought 
– rather than a concept “affected by immanence” or by
the Real (cf. Laruelle 2000, 48).
A concept can be “purified,” i.e., seen in its purity or, 
put in Laruellian parlance, rendered radical, when it is 
determined-in-the-last-instance not relatively to other 
concept/s but by the event of the real that this concept 
is aiming at capturing or mediating. Benjamin’s “pure 
or divine violence” is a radical concept in the Laruel-
lian sense of the world, namely it is determined in the 
last instance by the advent of the Real, by the event of 
violence taking place stripped off any justification, any 
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“making-sense,” i.e., any mediation through language – 
any “lawmaking.”  
Radical concept is determined and shaped by its “syn-
tax of the Real,” while inevitably making use of the Tran-
scendental (Laruelle 2000, 47). The latter, being yet an-
other term for the (Laruellian) “Thought,” is descriptive 
of the workings of the Real, using concepts (products 
of the Transcendental) as unorganized material (chôra) 
without conforming to conceptual cosmologies (theo-
ries, systems, doctrines, discourses defined as schools of 
thought). This type of truth-generation is termed by Lar-
uelle as non-philosophical, a process in which Thought 
succumbs to the dictate of the Real (Laruelle 1989), a 
process which resorts to philosophy albeit by virtue of 
introducing that “non-,“ that epoché vis-à-vis philosophy 
as a whole. 
The radical concept is always the product of a “Vision-
in-One,” a thought which is non-relative to the Transcen-
dental and correlative only to the Real (Laruelle 1989, 
46; 1992, 93ff; 2000, 47ff). The Real is the lived and it al-
ways already precedes – or rather, is beyond (au delà) – 
language, maintains Laruelle (1995). It is thus the sheer 
experiential, or rather, the mere “taking place” one is 
exposed and subjected to. It is homologous to Alain Ba-
diou’s notion of the “evental.” Seen as the sheer “tak-
ing place,” seen as an event prior to any language of it, 
infinitesimally prior to any possibility of being rendered 
the “means” of the Law, violence appears in its purity. 
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Thus, a non-philosophical re-conceptualization of “pure 
violence” is the product of a “vision-in-one” which is at-
tuned to the singularity of the event rather than to its re-
lations to other concepts and frameworks of thought the 
concepts belong to and within which/in terms of which 
they are thought (philosophical or theoretical systems, 
schools of thought, doctrines). It is a concept which has 
been extracted from a philosophy, from a universe of 
thought and, thereupon, divested of its transcenden-
tal status determined within a particular framework of 
thought.  
At this point, it is interesting to note that Benjamin 
explains the property of conceptual purity in a way that 
is very similar to the Laruellian process of concept’s radi-
calization.  
It is a mistake to postulate anywhere a purity that ex-
ists in itself and needs only to be preserved […] In other 
words: the purity of every (finite) being is not dependent 
on itself […] For nature, human language is the condition 
of its purity that stands outside of it. (Benjamin, Briefe 2 
vols (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp), 1966, 206/138)3 
In fact, Benjamin claims that the property of purity 
(also as an ontological category) does not exist as an in 
itself, it is but a concept, an idea, which has been radical-
ized, “purified” from all that is not – put in Laruellese – 
its determination in the last instance.
[…] at the origin of the creature stands not purity [Reinheit] 
but purification [Reiningung]” (Benjamin 1999 Vol. II, 455)4
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Unlike the pure violence which is “divine” and “expiat-
ing,” which is the instance of violence itself taking place 
(the sheer advent of violence in the form of the Laru-
ellian “Lived”), the violence exercised by the state and 
its mechanisms of law enforcement, for the purposes of 
preserving (and/or making) laws, is always “degenerated 
violence,” maintains Benjamin. 
[…] the police intervene “for security reasons” in count-
less cases where no clear legal situation exists, when 
there are not merely, without the slightest relation to 
legal ends, accompanying the citizen as a brutal encum-
brance through a life regulated by ordinances, or simply 
supervising him […] its [police’s] power is formless, like 
its nowhere tangible, all pervasive, ghostly presence in 
the life of civilized states (287).
Within the Benjaminian universe of thought, law, 
and its enforcement through mechanisms of the state, 
is always already degeneration of violence since legal 
violence is “impure.” However, the “greatest conceiv-
able degeneration,” according to Benjamin, takes place 
in democracies.  
[…] it cannot finally be denied that their spirit is less dev-
astating where they [police] represent, in absolute monar-
chy, the power of a ruler in which legislative and executive 
supremacy are united, that in democracies where their 
existence, elevated by no such relation, bears witness to 
the greatest conceivable degeneration of violence (237).
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The level of degeneration is the “greatest conceiv-
able” since the institutions of a democratic state, in their 
attempt to claim that the violence they produce is not 
what it is (=violence), i.e., feigning it is not through vio-
lence that they rule, unavoidably transform it into its own 
reverse, the law. However, this re-version of violence is 
merely its per-version rendering violence invisible, mis-
representing it to be the opposite (law as the “non-vio-
lent way” of ruling a state). It is an endless chain of ever 
more elaborated legal mechanisms whose purpose is to 
present the violence with which a state is ruled, and its 
citizens controlled, as non-violence. The transmutation 
of violence into law is an endless, unstoppable chain of 
linguistic production which consists in covering the trails 
of the sheer violence that is always already there and 
at work under the guise of the Law. This process repre-
sents a ceaseless automatism of (auto)generating legal 
provisions, policies of institutions and prescriptions of 
procedures.
Moreover, the law is always already maintained by 
force, namely by a system of penalization which also 
executes physical violence over its subjects (including 
detention depriving the body of its freedom of move-
ment) and by the constant threat of punishment if not 
observed. Its power is all-invading through the unstop-
pably, exuberantly self-reproductive administration. The 
democratic legal system attempts to neutralize (render 
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it imperceptible and relative and, at the same time, con-
trol) the presence of violence inherent in it by way of 
transforming it into a legal and moral order we will call 
the Norm(ality), which acts as its proxy. The meanings 
of the legal and the moral collapse into the meaning of 
“normality” (as a unity of the practical, the moral, of 
preserving rights and improving state institutions’ ef-
ficiency – all at once) reflected into and by the admin-
istrative policies. Considering that violence is inbuilt in 
the Law, considering also that the administration of a 
country is also a manifestation and exemplification of its 
culture (that is, morals), the administrative procedures 
and styles  represent subtle yet omnipresent exercise of 
state violence by virtue of transforming it into a struc-
ture supposed to represent a commonsensical order 
(and normality).
The question which calls upon tackling at this mo-
ment in our discussion is whether the legal system and 
the administration can be “purified” from the presence 
of violence, and is this done by reclaiming, reaffirming 
and re-instituting pure violence. In other words, must we 
endorse pure violence in order to invent and establish an 
administration, a law and institutions that are purified 
from violence; is a revolution necessary and is it always 
the product of “divine violence”?
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3. Radical Politics and (Non-)Violence: If We Exclude
the Metaphysical Grounding Instance of Violence,
Radical Politics is Non-Violent
One can easily establish analogy between pure or di-
vine violence, on the one hand, and the Badiouan Void 
as well as the Laruellian/Lacanian Real, on the other. It is 
the Traumatic par excellence: the violence that has been 
“purified” from language is a sheer thrust of Tuché into 
the Automaton of the signifying chain (Lacan 1998), to 
put it in Lacanian parlance. Having defined the Lacanian 
Real as traumatic – moreover, as the Trauma itself – Žižek 
has demonstrated that it is not an abstract instance de-
prived of qualities. On the contrary, the Real is always 
already a status assumed by an occurrence that bears a 
specific name. For example, “antagonism” is the name 
of the kernel of the Real behind the “Political” pertaining 
to the contemporary democracies (Žižek 2006), whereas 
the repressed Real of the hegemonic political concept 
defining our contemporary era as neoliberal is called the 
“Capital” (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000). In other words, 
the Lacanian Real, as elaborated by Žižek, is always al-
ready an instance occupied by a certain substance. By 
the latter I mean an event, an occurrence resulting into 
a purely experiential instance – that is, a certain lived, 
put in Laruellian parlance. The lived that has not been 
mediated by language, in its last instance, is determined 
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as traumatic. The body in its helplessness, in its state of 
mere exposure to the Event prior to any subject’s as-
suming its always already masterful position, which is 
by definition linguistically exercised, is but traumatized. 
If the event one is subjected to is experienced as a mere 
“taking-place of the Violent-Itself,” one is faced with the 
intervention of the Real par excellence. Violence is the 
Real-in-itself. Affliction of pain (causing trauma) is the 
sole possible result of such event. In a political context, 
its purpose is to impose will and exercise power which 
is always already done through acts of linguistic media-
tion, i.e., acts of “giving meaning” to an event of force by 
recourse to the Law as its paradigmatic discursive form.
Pure violence is an instance of the Real – as it is also its 
“substance,” it’s what the Real as sheer trauma is “made 
of” – and as such it precedes the Law and all forms of the 
“political making sense.” The Law (in its widest, abstract 
sense, encompassing also the meaning of the Political) is 
product of the event of decision, of the violent, forceful, 
“unilateral affirmation of difference.” (Deleuze, 1993) 
The decision is a sheer event, a pre-linguistic moment of 
an “It is so because I say so” inasmuch as a sheer lived. 
And this is what sovereignty consists in. The act of de-
cision, the taking place of a force that carves into the 
void (the evental is) what is going to become a law is the 
“abyss of an empty call” (Žižek 2004, 120). The abyss is 




[…] the abyssal tautological authority (“it is so because I 
say so” of the Master) does not work only because of the 
sanctions (punishment/reward) it implicitly or explicitly 
evokes.  […] what seduces us into obeying it is the very 
feature that may appear to be an obstacle – the absence 
of a “why” […]  (Žižek, 2004, 120)
The Real of sovereign power, the Real of the deci-
sion that “something is to be so” precedes its symbolic 
rendition, its translation into a law and via the Law, its 
making sense carried out – instituted and sustained – by 
the Subject of the Law. Indeed, its initial making sense 
consists in the tautology of “it is so because I say so,” as 
Žižek puts it.  
[…] the Lacanian “Master-Signifier” designates precisely 
this hypnotic force of the symbolic injunction which re-
lies only on its own act of enunciation – it is here that we 
encounter “symbolic efficiency” at its purest. The three 
ways of legitimizing the exercise of authority (“authori-
tarian,” “totalitarian,” “liberal”) are nothing but three 
ways of covering up, of blinding us to the seductive pow-
er of the abyss of this empty call. (Žižek, 2004, 120)
The “empty call” or the “divine violence” is where-
from all and any law is generated. The sovereign Will 
mediates itself through Language, i.e., transforms itself 
into a law/the Law, only a posteriori, nonetheless nec-
essarily.  Living the Real-in-itself, at its purest, is impos-
sible – it would be a sheer destruction, an uninterrupted 
trauma (since all possible interruptions of trauma can be 
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but linguistic). Divine violence, just as every rendition of 
the Real, necessarily translates itself into language, and 
into its paradigmatic linguistic form – the Law. Divine (or 
pure) violence constitutes sovereignty and is also the or-
igin of the Law (as the Real unavoidably translates itself 
into language). This means that “divine violence” cannot 
be outside the Law since it is the Real which unavoid-
ably must be mediated through language. So, it is inex-
tricable from the Law not only as its means, but also as 
its divine origin. It is what any law is grounded upon and 
enabled by. It is the “kernel of the Real” of the Law. This 
implies that we cannot separate the Law and the Divine 
Violence ontologically, as the Language cannot do with-
out the “kernel of the Real” which produces it. The Real 
necessitates the Language, it necessitates its own me-
diation since, in itself, it is unbearable – the Real is sheer 
trauma. By way of auto-alienation of the Lived (Laruelle, 
1995) – analogous to the Hegelian self-negation – or as 
the result of the Real’s mediation through Language (or 
Thought, in Laruellian parlance), the fundamentally es-
tranged Subject is produced. 
Pure violence – or the violence in-the-Real – is indeed 
a “divine” instance, one that is certainly not accessible 
as such to the finite beings the humans are. By pretend-
ing to master this linguistic black hole (this void ), one 
can be but engulfed by the Real of the divine violence, 
paralyzed and rendered split from within, put in a schiz-
oid position. Such pretension can only be hubristic and, 
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hence, bring in tragic demise of a paradigmatically tragic 
character – that of the revolutionary subject carrying out 
divine justice. My contention here is not that the revolu-
tionary political change or a revolutionary subject is im-
possible. I will claim quite the contrary. I will, however, 
argue that the revolutionary stance is not determined in 
the last instance by the divine violence. It is rather deter-
mined by/as radical political positioning – one “affected 
by immanence.” (Laruelle 2000, 48) The latter implies 
that the grounding political concept is correlating with 
the Real, that it is conditioned by and shaped according 
to the “syntax of the Real.” (Laruelle 2000, 48) However, 
the Real in itself is inaccessible, uncontrollable and im-
possible to produce either an agency or an instrument 
–a “weapon” – of political struggle.  The political agency
is always the Subject, and it is one linguistically constitut-
ed; or, put in Laruellian parlance, constituted by Thought
whose agency is the “Stranger.” (Laruelle, 1995) The Real
of the divine violence can intervene into the discursive
world of the political struggle – it can be the thrust that
is the impetus for introducing a revolutionary political
stance. While the latter constantly correlates with the
Real, it is not the Real itself. It is rather a heterogeneous
occurrence, a hybrid which is the product of the inter-
secting between the Real and the Discourse.
Therefore, revolution is always already that which 
contains a certain form of violence inasmuch as it inces-
santly correlates with the Lived, with the purely evental 
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or experiential – with the Real which is always already 
traumatic. Revolution also strives to not only bring jus-
tice (strike as “divine violence”) but also establish new 
laws. It is hence law-making. The latter is, as Benjamin 
has shown, always already determined by violence. In-
troducing a law is an act of sovereignty which is consti-
tuted by the sheer event of a decision, the occurrence of 
determination and imposing of will. It is the fruit of an 
unadulterated exercise of power. Yet again, it does not 
take place in the form of divine or pure violence. Name-
ly, it immediately institutes – and, hence, participates 
in – the heterogeneous linguistico-experiential topos of 
the political by way of introducing the new Law, and the 
new horizon of that which is politically thinkable.
Any revolution aims at inaugurating new laws – it 
is about installing a new political order; therefore, it 
cannot be reduced to pure – or for that matter, divine 
– violence.
4. Pure Violence originating from Human vulnerability
rather than Divine Justice
If we adopt the position that any imposing of will, any 
winning of one will over another is a form of violence, 
it will be impossible to claim the possibility of a politics 
and, for that matter, a world without violence. Is the dif-
ference between a peaceful politics and aggressive, mili-
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tary politics only one in quantity – or level of intensity, 
on of degree – as far as the presence of violence is con-
cerned? Is it a difference in modality or is there, rather, a 
difference-in-the-last-instance? Is there an immanently 
non-violent politics? 
I believe that the latter is possible, although it does 
not imply that there could be a political order or a world 
which is entirely and in the absolute sense – “violence-
free.” Violence must exist in the event of a sovereign 
decision, i.e., of introducing, imposing and enforcing a 
certain political will. Yet again, this type of violence, in 
its last instance, is non-political. It is one of a transcen-
dental – or, perhaps, metaphysical – status, one which 
concerns the relationship established by the World-of-
the-Language and the Domain-Beyond-Language. It 
concerns the ontological abyss out of which a sovereign 
decision stems, namely – the fact that a political “mak-
ing-sense” and an introduction of a law are a posteriori 
with respect to the “taking-place” of a decision, to the 
enactment of force (will or power).  
Violence (its presence/absence or form) is not the 
political determination in the last instance of a politi-
cal order, regardless of whether violent or non-violent. 
Embracement or refusal of violence is not the “Thought-
Force” (Laruelle 2000) that drives a political logos and 
a system of laws. Yet again, there are violent and non-
violent political regimes, within which the instance of 
violence holds a specific position in relation to the Dis-
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cursive or to the political Logos, and to the Law. In a 
“non-violent” political world violence does not use the 
laws as its means. Reversely to Benjamin’s claims, I will 
argue that repressive regimes are determined in the last 
instance by the reducing of the laws to mere means of 
violence. (In other words, since violence is always already 
“divine,” and it is in fact the “divine violence” that is law-
making, the mark of a violent politics is the law function-
ing as “violence-producing,” rather than violence acting 
as “law-making.”) I will however concur with him that a 
degeneration takes place when one of the two (either 
violence or laws) is rendered means to the other – or 
simply, when the violence becomes something else than 
the inaccessible Real that has grounded the lawmaking 
and logos-making processes of the Political. 
Still, it is not merely the violence that degenerates 
when rendered means of the Law (or vice-versa), but 
another vital force that may be derived from that of vio-
lence or be of similar origin – the (anta-)agonism as that 
which defines politics. Political enmity as the interplay, 
as the competition and the dialectics between different 
and opposed political wills is a form of violence. And it 
is so in that aforementioned transcendental (or meta-
physical) sense – violence as a transcendentally minimal 
instance5 which acts as the force of sovereign decision. 
This force can be destructive, but is not so necessarily; 
namely, the Desire which is its determination in the last 
instance is life-bringing. The act (the event) of producing 
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a sovereign (political) decision is a gesture of a “unilat-
eral affirmation of difference” (Deleuze), it is life’s auto-
affirmation (in Spinozian-like infinite expansion). Thus, it 
is an enactment of sheer Will, an instance of violence, 
but one which precedes Language and Politics. The ut-
ter legalization of the dynamics established by opposed 
political wills, the suffocation by discursive control of the 
free and unpredictable circulation of the (anta)agonism 
which defines the Political is that which is endangered 
through relentless legalism. 
In Violence (2008) Žižek interprets Benjamin’s con-
cept of “divine violence” as explosion of “retaliatory 
destructive rage” (187), as “unjust, as an explosion of di-
vine caprice” (ibid.). Further on in the text, Žižek claims 
that the only human and political renditions of divine 
violence today would be forms of “violent explosion of 
resentment” ranging from “mob lynchings to organized 
revolutionary terror” (2008, 193). Let us recall that we 
have already established that the divine violence takes 
place as the pure Advent of the Real. Along the lines of a 
similar logic, Žižek equates the divine violence with the 
Badiouan “Event” (2008, 208). Consequently, when one 
unleashes pure violence, it is done in radical solitude – 
without the presence of the “Big Other;” or, in Žižek’s 
own words:
Divine violence should be thus conceived as divine in the 
precise sense of the old Latin motto vox populi, vox dei: 
not in the perverse sense of “we are doing it as mere 
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instruments of the People’s Will,” but as the heroic as-
sumption of the solitude of sovereign decision. It is a deci-
sion (to kill, to risk or lose one’s own life) made in absolute 
solitude, with no cover in the big Other. If it is extra-moral, 
it is not “immoral,” it does not give the agent license just 
to kill with some kind of angelic innocence. When those 
outside the structured social field strike “blindely,” de-
manding and enacting immediate justice/vengeance, this 
is divine violence. (Žižek 2008, 210)
Enacted in radical solitude, without the support of 
the “big Other,” pure violence, conceived as blind attack 
“demanding immediate justice,” seems indeed to be car-
ried out as divine. It is an inherently hubristic stance.
Namely, the revolutionary subject having the status 
of the “divine-justice-brining Subject,” adopts a godlike 
stance and perspective – s/he strikes as God would strike 
since there is no Law s/he fears. The revolutionary sub-
ject exercising divine violence is marked by the preten-
sion to directly represent the Law itself. Even if the latter 
means that there is no longer any law to be respected, 
the event of executing justice is a result of a decision (in 
Benjaminian or Schmittian sense) based upon a judg-
ment according to which something is unjust or wrong. 
Such decision is a gesture of “undoing a wrong” and it is 
enabled by the distinction between right and wrong. The 
act of discrimination between right and wrong, accom-
panied by an action of punishment, is in itself lawmaking 
and law-preserving. The justice and vengeance brining 
violence is never pure in the sense of being devoid of 
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any relation to the Law. The territory of “divine violence” 
as such – just as any instance of the Real – is impervious 
and it must be mediated through Language and, thus, 
by the Law.
I will argue that, if it is immediate justice or vengeance 
which is being executed by way of divine violence, the lat-
ter is not an event in the Badiouan sense as Žižek would 
have it.  Badiou’s “Event” is something which simply oc-
curs and one is never really in control of. If, contrary to 
this, the divine violence were indeed justice that is car-
ried out, it would not be something which merely hap-
pens to the subject-executor of justice. As justice made, 
the divine violence would the product of the Subject, its 
invention and its creation – not the unpredictable, stu-
pefying, beyond-sense, ungraspable occurrence of the 
“Void” (that the Badiouan Event is).
The Event, in Badou’s theory, always and by definition 
precedes the Subject. The latter is produced through the 
relation of fidelity with the former.6 Thus, pure violence 
happens to us, the “human animals.” It is not something 
we can carry out. It emerges as a “void” amidst a “situa-
tion,” and it commands a new “subjectivization,” accord-
ing to Badiou. Or, as an incursion of the Real, it radically 
destabilizes the Subject and generates fundamentally 
new subjective configurations.
Conceived as Badiouan event, pure or radical violence 
can be – let us resort to Žižek’s own words – but an “ex-
plosion” of anger, originating from the most rudimentary 
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survivalist stance: “I am striking against you in revolt, be-
cause I must stay in life!” It is the “explosion” of physical, 
bodily rebellion of the subjugated body against another, 
subjugating body. Its determination in the last instance 
can be defined as life-expansion not destruction (in the 
form of punishment) in spite of the inevitable presence 
of destructive effects.
Revolutionary violence stems from the conatus of 
survival, from the (Spinozian) appetite for life and de-
sire for pleasure. It is an incursion of one’s desire to af-
firm life and annihilate pain – revolutionary violence is 
an occurrence of the expansion of life, of the unstop-
pable appetite toward pleasure and/or an “increased 
level of life.” (Spinoza) Hence, revolutionary violence is 
but a rendition of the life force aspiring – putting it again 
in Spinozian terms – toward its infinity which consists 
in life’s relentlessly reaffirming life. It is a strike of force 
aiming against all that which introduces pain into life as 
an instance of immanent infinity (in spite of the fact that 
it is embodied by finite beings.) Infinity, understood as 
the mode of intensity not of temporality or spatiality, 
consists in incessant aspiration, appetite, in life endlessly 
feeding itself with life. Revolutionary violence as an ex-
pansion rather than destruction of life is an expression 
of the desire to “increase the level of life” (Spinoza) and 
acts against all that which threatens this immanently un-
stoppable tendency by becoming obstacle to the auto-
generative force life is.
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Revolutionary stance is one which is established in 
fidelity to the event. The latter is a pre-subjective expe-
rience, or rather – pure experience. It is the lived prior 
to its linguistic mediation. Its linguistic rendition is how-
ever inevitable, truth-generation as discursive process 
is unavoidable. Revolutionary discourse is one which is 
constantly checked by the sense of fidelity to the event, 
to the “truth” (=bearing witness of) the experience of 
the event represents. In its capacity of pure experience, 
fidelity to the event is an almost bodily knowledge – or 
rather, it is also bodily. It takes place beyond discourse, 
in a domain where the distinction between bodily and 
psychic does not apply – in the domain of the Real. The 
occurrence of the Uncanny, the thrust of the Real into 
a political situation happens at a point when political 
discourse is shocked by a “radical crisis” (symptom of 
the Real that can no longer be accommodated by the 
existing Symbolic) demanding radical political reversal. 
The thrust of the Real destabilizes the political subject 
and provokes in the human animal a sense of threat of 
physical annihilation. This experience is the source of 
unheard of and unexpected discursive reversals and for 
radical re-inventions of the political language. Such life-
expanding stance which is radically human (inherent in 




PS Questions about the “Transition” from the
Radical Lived to radical Revolutionary Concepts 
Laruelle, Badiou, and Žižek argue for a political 
thought that would correlate and succumb in the last 
instance to the authority of the lived, the event and the 
real rather than to a “transcendental universe.” All the 
three authors insist that albeit the correlation with the 
Real is necessary – at least for the generation of a revo-
lutionary political truth and event – it is always in (by 
way of and also for) the Language that the revolution 
takes place. 
The question they do not seem to attempt to answer 
is that of the transition from the mere correlating – an 
ontological positioning and epistemic posture – with the 
Real to a Thought which is affected by the immanence 
the Real or the Event is. The radicality of a concept – 
a foundation of a potentially revolutionary horizon of 
thought – is enabled precisely by its affectedness by im-
manence. Is there a possibility to check the factuality of 
affectedness by the Real, to provide confirmation that 
the concept we deem radical (potentially revolutionary) 
is indeed radical, one produced in a process of faithful 
correlating with the Real? If we could imagine the transi-
tion, if we could create the possibility and invent ways of 
thinking this process of transmutation of the Lived (the 
Real, the Event, the Pure Experience) into Thought, per-
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haps we could also conceive ways of providing confirma-
The Real is a void. It is “unthinkable” in itself. The Real 
or the Lived necessarily undergoes a process of auto-
as 
the Stranger (Laruelle). This, however, does not mean 
that the Real is unthinkable, impossible to be “touched” 
by Thought, described by it, i.e., mediated by the Lan-
guage. The Real cannot be thought in itself since this is 
a logical and ontological impossibility. Thought is me-
directly. To think the Real means to mediate it, i.e., to 
incessantly alienate it in order to correlate with it. And it 
and its “truthfulness” evaluated. Radical concepts are 
the product of the sovereignty of the thinking (and revo-
“follow the syntax of the Real” (Laruelle). 
-
fectedness by immanence, there can be, does not take 
place on the level of the Language. It is not the product 
-
re-structuring of the Symbolic order or the World (in 
Laruellian sense), the pure Lived of this Event can serve 
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as the confirmation of its radicality. Yet again, this confir-
mation is not linguistically rendered. It remains unthink-
able (in-itself.) The only domain in which we can experi-
ence “the proof” is the domain of the Experiential itself 
– the Event, the Lived, that is, the Real. To the Thought it
represents a void. And out of this void only a revolution
can be born.
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CHAPTER VI: THE ADDENDUM
The Project of Non-Marxism:
The Political as Thought-Force
1. Intro: François Laruelle’s Project of Non-Philosophy
The project of François Laruelle’s non-philosophy 
consists in producing an epistemic stance which situ-
ates itself beyond Dualism, in any of its forms, but first 
and foremost beyond that “primordial” dualistic split 
between the Thought and the Real. Abandoning the 
pretension to reflect – that is, to mirror – the Real by 
Thought is the precondition of the theoretical posture 
advocated by non-philosophy, one which goes beyond – 
or rather, does not go into introducing – the fundamen-
tal dualistic split (Thought/Real). On the other hand, to 
claim that the Thought always already fails to describe 
the Real is merely a “romantic, Nietzschean escape in 
advance into fiction” (Laruelle 1989, 231). It is an escape 
in advance from the failure that only the pretension to 
fully reflect the Real can bring about. Receding from any 
aspiration to think the Real, to speak of it, to mediate 
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it (i.e., create knowledge of it), declaring any such am-
bition as fundamentally unattainable, only unravels the 
hidden pretension of thought to establish absolute pos-
session over the Real/ity. This pretension is by definition 
philosophical, explains Laruelle (1989). The ambitions of 
science are less pretentious. Science tends to describe 
the “workings” of the Real without attempting to grasp 
its “substance” or its “essence” (Laruelle). The “In-Itself” 
of the “Out-There” is not of interest to the scientific 
mode of thinking. Laruelle proposes a non-philosophical 
mode of thinking which will consist of use of philosophi-
cal concepts, of “transcendental material” pertaining to 
philosophy (the questions inherent to it and the catego-
ries in which it thinks them) albeit adopting that stance 
of “non”- contained in the prefix. It is a “non-” to the pre-
tension to reflect the Real. And it is philosophy insofar as 
it correlates with the Real by way of the conceptual tools 
and desires (the transcendental material) inherent to (or 
rather, inherited from) Philosophy. 
Philosophie et non-philosophie (1989) represents a 
theoretical endeavor of systematic radical interrogation 
into the universal epistemic foundations of Philosophy. 
The universal category which is purely formal – non-
philosophy does not advocate universality of any philo-
sophical horizon of thought, but rather, proves that all or 
any philosophy is contingency – which is the grounding 
minimum of all (western) Philosophy, is based on a con-
stitutive split produced by the process of reflection as 
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its defining cognitive tool. Philosophy is trapped, claims 
Laruelle, in the vicious circle of “auto-mirroring.” One of 
the axioms the non-philosophical methodology of step-
ping out (the non-philosophical “Ausgang”) from the 
aporia of auto-reflexivity is based upon is the “Thought-
in-terms-of-the-One.” The latter is a concept which con-
sists in the epistemic procedure generated by a “posture 
of Thought” that correlates with the Real of the object 
of investigation rather than with other concepts, part of 
philosophical “uni-verses” (=doctrines). In this respect, 
non-philosophical interrogation (of philosophical phe-
nomena) resorts to copying (“cloning” as Laruelle would 
put it) the model of modern scientific thinking. 
Laruelle’s Théorie des identités (1992) departs from 
the presupposition that the object of non-philosophical 
investigation is always already of “transcendental mate-
rial,” that is, it is a concept, a creation of Thought. The 
ways in which one attempts to think a concept non-
philosophically is conditioned by its correlation to the 
Real, rather than by another concept participating in 
a multiple conceptual construct (a “discourse” or doc-
trine) and its position – placement, status, inter-concep-
tuality – within this (doctrinal) construct. One thinks the 
concept in correlation with the (or: its) Real behind the 
Transcendental (or the Language), and in this process 
it looks for that focal point within a concept of affect-
edness by immanence (Laruelle 1992, 92-93). Thought 
always already aspires to reflect – establish possession – 
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of the Real. Non-philosophy simultaneously affirms and 
suspends this aspiration, surrendering to the imminent 
touch by the Real. Non-philosophical theoria succumbs 
to the Real as its authority in the last instance (Laruelle 
1992, 93). 
The Real, on the other hand, is the elusive instance 
that each concept strives —while, in the last instance, 
always already fails — to discipline and reduce to 
meaning, to Language. The non-philosophical Real is 
close in meaning – yet not identical – to the Lacanian 
Real; it is rather the result of its (non-)Euclidean turn. 
Instead of declaring it “unthinkable,” Laruelle argues 
for a thought which always already correlates with the 
Real. While it always already fails to render it thinkable 
in its totality and reflect its identity-in-the-last instance 
without a remainder, the Thought which is non-phil-
osophically positioned describes the Real by virtue of 
admitting its radically different structure (vis-à-vis that 
of Thought), and the syntax the latter imposes which is 
immanently different from any syntax of the Language. 
In other words, the Real and the Thought never “speak 
the same language.” What Laruelle proposes is to at-
tempt to reflect the Real “without a mirror,” without 
the pretension that the Thought in its constitution 
could ever be the direct reflection of the Real and vice 
versa. However, Laruelle insists that Language can de-
scribe the Real “without reflecting it exactly or repro-
ducing it” (Laruelle 1989, 50). 
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-
philosophical research. The “real object” of research is 
a postulate: it is from the realm of the Transcendental. 
The “real object” of non-philosophical theory is concep-
the direct 
from the World (the “transcendental” Universe or the 
Discursivity in which we are all inevitably born and live in) 
contains “theorico-technico-experimental ingredients,” 
claims Laruelle (93 ,1992). The two objects, “the Real” and 
“the real object” of (non-philosophical) research, contain 
-
Laruelle, “is not epistemological […], but only of-the-last-
instance, that is to say, either transcendental or immanent 





losophy, i.e., philosophy bearing – and being determined 
by — the prefix “non.“  
It is important that the Thought correlates with the 
“Real” and it is this process that brings us to the “real 
object” of investigation. It is the result of acknowledg-
ing the Real as the identity-in-the-last instance of that 
which has been subjected to theoretical investigation, as 
that to which the cognition succumbs as to the ultimate 
authority. In sum, this posture of thought suspends re-
lationism, cancels the authority of a discourse to deter-
mine the status of the “real object” of investigation by 
the position it holds inside its own doctrinal universe, 
and renders the singular — elusive and undisciplined — 
reality the ultimate authority of Thought.
2. The Project of Non-Marxism
In Introduction au non-marxisme (2000) François 
Laruelle engages into the elaborate task of creating a 
methodology that will enable critical re-reading of Marx-
ian doctrine in a way which will bring forth its “source 
of immanence” and “power (of) thought.” At the same 
time, claims Laruelle, this sort of critical positioning is of 
the kind that makes possible the exact identification of 
the reasons for the “failure of Marxism.” What Laruelle 
argues for is a theoretical positioning that is, in its fun-
dament, a posture of thought succumbing to its source 
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of immanence (or rather, to its immanent source) — it 
is a thought of the immanent mode (de manière imma-
nente) (2000, 10). As the result of thought’s relentless 
attuning to the immanent, the latter being the intrinsic 
corrective of the possible detours of falsifications of the 
first, this is a mode of thinking which enables the most 
precise identification of the Doctrine’s failure. This is a 
simplifying summarization of one of the central argu-
ments of Laruelle’s Introduction au non-marxisme (INM), 
namely to establish a thought of immanence which will 
enable both a satisfactory explanation of “the failure” 
(l‘échec) of Marxism and rediscover the potentiality of 
its thought-force. The “failure” of Marxism that Laruelle 
seeks to explain is merely a symptom; and he explicitly 
refuses to open the question of whether this failure is 
“real” or “supposed,” whether this is a fact or not – he is 
interested only in exploring the universality of this symp-
tom (2000, 7). 
In order to arrive at the source of immanence of 
Marxism, and in that way establish a relation of fidelity 
to the revolutionary core of Marxian political vision, one 
has to first evacuate not only the Dialectics but also Ma-
terialism, and undertake afresh the elucidation of Marx-
ism’s Determination-in-the-last-instance (or la Détermi-
nation-en-dernière-instance), argues Laruelle (2000, 10). 
The formula of Determination-in-the-last-instance (la 
Détermination-en-dernière-instance, hereafter referred 
to as DDI), exists in the Marxist texts themselves, says 
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Laruelle (ibid.). The DDI of Marxism is also a DDI of the 
cause of Marxism’s failure. This is not an equation, but 
a claim that the ultimate and irrevocable reason for the 
failure of Marxism is inherently related to its “essence,” 
or rather to its source of immanence which is also its 
origin (in-the-Real, or at the juncture of the Real’s clon-
ing into a concept). According to Laruelle, there has to 
be a cause-in-the-last-instance of the failure (2000, 13), 
namely one that can be explained but by a determina-
tion-in-the last-instance of Marxism.
The determination-in-the-last-instance is dictated 
by and necessarily correlates with the source of im-
manence, whereas the latter, in the context of non-
philosophy and of non-Marxism, is always already the 
Real. This is neither the Lacanian Real nor that of philo-
sophical realism. Neither is it an equivalent to the Marx-
ian idea of praxis or matter nor to any other concept 
of the Real that originates from Philosophy. (According 
to Laruelle’s any concept of the Real other than that of 
the non-philosophy, or those referred to in science, is a 
philosophical one). The Real of non-philosophy is Real 
that is forclosed to Thought, but can still, as an instance 
of its immanence, “affect” it (or even dictate it by way of 
assuming the status of the “authority to which thought 
succumbs”). The non-philosophical notion of the Real 
is neither a materialist nor an idealist one. It cannot be 
grasped as (or: by) any form of transcendence. The Real 
of which Laruelle’s non-philosophy speaks is an instance 
193
THE PROJECT OF NON ARXISM
that is immanently and inalterably indifferent to either 
Thought or Language.  Nonetheless Thought is never in-
instance is to grasp (both as understand and posses) the 
philosophical thought sets up the goal of succumbing to 
the Real as the authority in the last instance.  
The Real and the Thought are unilaterally alien to 
one another. One cannot establish any form of reciproc-
ity between them. They do not establish any reciproc-
ity whatsoever. They do not even relate to one another 
— except unilaterally. The Real and the Thought do not 
-
different to the Thought. 
The non-philosophical Real is without ontology. 
Therefore it is in no way to be understood as “the Being.” 
Quite to the contrary, as a transcendental which has al-
ways already been circumscribed by Language, coiled 
of the word), the Being is one of the chief philosophi-
cal terms that the non-philosophy aims to dismantle 
(Laruelle 1989). The Real is quite simply a number or a 
“number” — it is “the One.” In its unilateral indifference 
to thought, to our World-of-discursivity (the Laruel-
lian Monde), it can be but a certain “something,” which 
purified from any imagined content, reduced to a for-
mal category, can be but a certain “one” to the Thought 
(as the effect of tuché in the automaton). Yet again, the 
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Thought is not indifferent to the Real: it is the workings 
of the Real that thinking and/or theory always already 
attempts to grasp, fixate and explain. And what non-phi-
losophy proposes is that the Thought attempts to unilat-
erally correlate with the Real, a mode of thinking which 
will respond to the symptoms of the latter without the 
pretension to encompass it in entirety and exhaust its 
“meaning” without a remainder; without the ambition 
to “integrate” it into the Universe of Thought explaining 
its “essence,” without the ambition for reciprocity (be-
tween Thought and the Real.)
The Real is, thus, “a” or “the” One, because it is un-
divided by a constitutive split that can be introduced, 
insists Laruelle, only through reflection, speculation, or 
simply — by the Thought. Non-philosophy conceives the 
Real as ultimately “untouched” by Thought and, hence, 
does not constitute it on the basis of a defining division 
consisting in its relation (of any kind) with the Thought. 
The Real of non-philosophy is lived, experienced while 
remaining within itself, foreclosed, without the need to 
alienate itself through representation, says Laruelle.
The identity of the real is lived, experienced, consumed 
while remaining in itself without the need to alienate it-
self through representation.1  
The method or the procedure of establishing deter-
mination-in-the-last-instance is an act of thought which 
rigorously observes the dictate of the experienced, lived, 
undivided identity (the Real) by striving to “clone” it into 
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a minimum o the transcendental (a concept). It radical-
izes the concept, by way of isolating it from the referen-
tial web with which the doctrine that has engendered 
it surrounds it. This process is enabled by a non-philo-
sophical procedure of turning philosophy into a deliber-
ate chaos or chôra of transcendental material, instead of 
an organized transcendental or philosophical universe, a 
cosmology (2000, 18). 
The non-philosophical principle of observance of the 
expressions of the Real through symptoms, the principle 
of refraining from any intervention of a “divisionist” kind 
by a thought that would attempt to constitute the Real, 
is made operative through the method of determination-
in-the-last-instance (DDI). DDI is a theoretical procedure 
that is the product of the non-philosophical Vision-in-One 
(2000, 37ff) and an act of “cloning” the Real. The latter 
is a unilateral gesture which renders the DDI essentially 
non-dualistic. But at the same time it is the product of the 
pure Dyad, that is, the two components of the binary are 
not “mixed” which is the characteristic of philosophy. It is 
pure since it admits, radicalizes the immanent division as 
well as the inevitability of the act of transcendence. Tran-
scendental operation is necessary for the process of think-
ing/theorizing, it is its determination in the last instance. 
Yet again, this does not mean that transcendental is the 
only possible “reality” for us and that we are inevitably 
deprived from any access to the Real – hence, that there is 
no “Real” for the (Laruellian) “Stranger,” just “discourse.” 
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The Lived determines the transcendental operation – the 
use of Language, Signification – unilaterally.
It is important to reiterate that, in non-philosophy, 
the Transcendental does not have the meaning it has in 
any philosophical system, including Kant’s. It is a radical-
ly descriptive concept, following the “syntax of the Real,” 
and it refers to the experience of Thought in the broad-
est and common-sense meaning of the word. Quite 
differently from the philosophical dyad, as interpreted 
in its universality by Laruelle, where immanence dupli-
cates itself by way of appearing as also “transcendental 
immanence” (presupposing that the a priori transcen-
dental ought to participate in the immanence),2 in the 
non-philosophical pure dyad the immanence remains 
implacably mute. In non-philosophy, the Thought cor-
relates with it, without any pretension to incorporate it 
into itself, by way of affirming its radically different sta-
tus (that of transcendence as tenaciously irreducible to 
immanence), attempting to merely describe immanence 
rather than “express” it. 
The determination in the last instance of everything 
is the Real. And while remaining enclosed in the world 
of “transcendence,” not only the determination in the 
last instance is affirmed but also the radicality, insur-
mountablity, the implacable dividedness between the 
two instances. It is only by virtue of admitting and af-
firming the constitutive gap between the Real and the 
Thought that the non-philosophical theoria can begin.  It 
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is around this void of the sheer act of admission, around 
the empty gesture of affirmation, or rather, out of the 
emptiness of this gesture that the thought in terms of 
the pure Dyad can emerge. Radical duality is the fruit 
of dualism which is intended, as gesture which is uni-
laterally (and inevitably) introduced on the part of the 
Thought. The Real remains immanently and inalterably 
indifferent to the workings of the Thought, and the 
non-philosophical thought “knows” this and, therefore, 
leaves it “unmixed” with itself. 
[...] this thought would not, could not be any longer a 
divided Identity such as the philosophical one. It would 
be, on one hand, by virtue of its real fundament or its 
essence, nothing-but-an-Identity, it would be rigorously 
identical to the real without passing through a division 
or a Dyad; and on the other hand, it would be a pure 
Dyad, a radical duality, not obtained through division 
and not re-mixed with the Identity. The first would have 
the latter as its fundament, issuing from it without being 
reciprocally determined by it.3
In order to arrive at that which determines Marxism in 
its last instance, the non-Marxist needs to transform Di-
alectic Materialism and Historic Materialism into a tran-
scendental material, to dismember that self-enclosed 
discursive organism and render it non-philosophical 
chôra. This procedure is necessary in order to bypass the 
Real’s determination by the Doctrine’s (that of Dialectic 
Materialism). Once the role of the Marxist “cosmology” 
in constituting the Real — or rather, its pretension to 
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constitute it, inevitably resulting into an establishing of 
an “amphibology” of the Real — has been cast aside, 
one can engage in a search for the DDI “in an immanent 
way,” de manière immanente (Laruelle 2000, 10). 
The immanent way of re-reading Marxism or its non-
Marxist re-appropriation consists in the search for the 
cause-in-the-last-instance of Marxism by way of using 
its transcendental material in accordance with the pre-
established goal of isolating the radical concepts.4 The 
non-Marxist resorts to Marx and to the Marxist “body of 
text” only in order to establish a symptomatology of the 
Real present in the text, to identify the points of affect-
edness by immanence on the body of transcendence. By 
way of identifying the radical concepts, it should arrive 
to its determination-in-the-last-instance. 
If it [non-Marxism] would seem to go back there [to 
Marxism], it would be more to its problems rather than 
to its texts, and to problems whose solution implies 
treating the texts as symptoms, by way of suspension of 
the philosophical authority. [...] It is impossible, even in 
Freud and in Marx, and even more so within a philoso-
phy, to find radical concepts of the Real and the univer-
sal — solely the unconscious and the productive forces, 
desire and labor. As soon as one arrives to this discovery, 
psychoanalysis and Marxism gain one utterly new sense 
— a transformation of their theories into simple mate-
rial [...] These sorts of disciplines require more than just 
a simple theoretical transformation — a discovery from 
within a “non-“ that would be the effect (of) the Real or 
its action.5   
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In an immanent manner, the non-philosopher traces 
the symptomatic manifestations of the Real and iden-
tifies the “sample” of transcendental material which 
is then disorganized for the purposes of revealing the 
underlying “radical concept” which has been “cloned” 
from the Real. The most radical concept the Marxist 
corpus provides is “productive forces” or “labor,” claims 
Laruelle. It is the closest to “cloning” the Real into the 
Transcendental. Labor is indeed the lived, the purely ex-
periential instance (of suffering, passion in the Spinozian 
sense, and vulnerability).    
The Real — at least for Marxism, which is a humanist 
hybrid of theory-science, but also for non-Marxism — is 
the Human-in-Human. The latter is a Laruellian term re-
ferring to that instance in the human which is only lived, 
experienced, and indifferent to the prescriptions of the 
Transcendental. It is the mute instance within which 
each of us, the “Humans,” lives and which is always al-
ready beyond the reach of Language. An entire “science 
of humans” — which is not a humanist science but rath-
er a radical subversion of it — is developed throughout 
the non-philosophical opus of François Laruelle. One of 
its most meticulous elaborations can be found in Théo-
rie des Étrangers,6 and one of the central arguments of 
Laruelle’s “science of humans” is that the kernel of “hu-
manity” is the Ego-in-Ego, an instance of the lived and of 
the “Joui” insofar as non-reflected experience.7 The Real 
which Marxism, as a humanist project par excellence, in-
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vokes and correlates with is but the instance of the Real 
of the Human — or, in Laruelle’s words, the Human-in-
Human.
What non-Marxism seeks to create knowledge (theo-
ry and/or science) of is one of the mode/s in which the 
Real of the Human(-in-Human) is affected by Capitalism 
as a concept which “affects” our lives with immanence, 
that is, in its status of the Real. In line with the new 
knowledge thus created, also new, non-Marxist ways of 
liberation from capitalist oppression and grounds for a 
new political utopia should be proposed. Or, in different 
words, non-Marxism is about establishing an immanent 
mode of thinking that will correspond with the imma-
nent aim of Marxism stemming directly from the most 
radical needs of the “Proletariat” or the “productive 
forces.” The formula of the immanent mode of re-think-
ing Marxism, the mode of non-Marxism, is proposed by 
Laruelle as follows: 
The “real” solution to the problem of the DDI as the ob-
ject and cause of its own theory should avoid Hegelian 
idealism better than it has been done by the materialism. 
Neither a cause in exteriority nor a dialectical identity of 
contraries, the Real is the cause by virtue of immanence 
and determines cognition of its own syntax, of its own 
causality, through a process that one would call “cloning.” 
[…]Suppose there is an object X to be cognized. Provided 
it is affected by immanence or susceptible to DDI, that is 
seen-in-One, it also can clone “itself” from the material 
that is its transcendence.8 (Laruelle 2000, 47)
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The object X is to be seen-in-One, as Real or in-its-
Real, and then “cloned” as concept/s, as the Transcen-
dental, by way of resorting to the transcendental mate-
rial at theoretician’s disposal. The process of cloning also 
implies an (auto)establishing of a unique syntax dictated 
by the Real itself of the object of cognition.   
3. The Real of the “Force de Travail:”
Marxism Determined in the Last Instance?
Determination-in-the-last instance of Marxism is to 
be looked for in its cause-in-the-last-instance: the Real 
of the (“Human-in-Human’s”) repression in the World 
of Capitalism. There is another real cause or cause-in-
Real and another source of immanence in the Marxist 
Project: the Real of the Marxian Desire to liberate the 
“productive forces” from the constraints and repression 
of Capitalism. The latter, however, is not the cause in 
the last instance, since it has been caused by the Real 
– or “affected by the immanence” – of the capitalist
repression.
When the DDI is the cause or the immanent object of 
its own theory, one would say that this theory is the 
force (of) thought, the theory of the force (of) thought 
is itself in-the-last instance […] Object to knowing, while 




The cause-in-the-last-instance is what determines in 
the last instance any Project of Transcendence, that is to 
say, any philosophy or any “philosophy-science.” The lat-
ter is a category under which falls Marxism (and for that 
matter, also psychoanalysis), claims Laruelle (2000). The 
DDI is what makes a certain philosophical, scientific or 
theoretical project unique. It is what defines (or rather, 
determines in the last instance) that project. DDI’s anal-
ogy in classical philosophical terminology would be dif-
ferentia specifica. The analogy is however only seeming, 
since DDI is opposite to the “second substance” – it is 
not a transcendental (not a definition) but an immanent 
(a determining real) determination. The Real, the cause 
in the last instance of any theory, “clones itself” as a 
radical concept. It is this radical concept and its auto-de-
velopment into a transcendental conceptual “tool-kit” 
incessantly corresponding with the Real, which is the 
force (of) thought or thought-force. Laruelle illustrates 
this point in the following way:
Let us suppose that the “labor force” is finally capable of 
its own “proletarian” theory, without the Hegelian ideal-
ism, or has become the restricted model of the universal 
instance of the force (of) thought.10 
“Labor force” (force de travail) is already a concept, 
but a radical one, correlating with the Real of the con-
dition of the “Proletariat” as labor force that is non-re-
flected, lived, experienced.11 Even the linguistic construct 
itself, the concept of “labor force,” is merely descriptive 
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of a real condition, consisting of a minimum of transcen-
dence. And it is precisely the method or style of descrip-
tiveness that Laruelle invokes as the non-Marxist and 
non-philosophical approach par excellence.12 The mini-
mally descriptive concept, the radical concept, the one 
in which the Real has “cloned itself,” is the causality in 
the last instance of a certain theory — its Determina-
tion-in-the-last-instance (DDI). 
Labor force is the DDI of Marxism, argues Laruelle, 
and the method of immanence of the process of devel-
oping or creating a theory guarantees that the DDI will 
condition that process, determine it, without becoming 
itself a mere constituent of the transcendental universe 
of non-Marxism. Indeed the radical concept is the prod-
uct of the Transcendental, it is a concept, but an impov-
erished one – minimally transcendental and “affected by 
immanence.” It will not enter into a process of its own 
rationalization by means of transcendence, the “lived” 
(le vécu) rather then the relating to a “philosophy” will 
be what grounds the radical concept as a DDI. In other 
words, it will remain on the plane of pure exposure to 
the immanence, and will continue to be that point in 
Language where the symptom (the Real) occurs. DDI is 
capable of its own cognition without co-participation in 
the process of (non-)philosophical truth generation. 
The identity of the DDI signifies that it is capable, without 
a philosophical operation, of its own cognition. The 
old problem of the possibility of cognition is resolved 
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not through appealing to a transcendental subject or 
fundament but through being forclosed of the Real 
to cognition, of every object to its cognition, being-
forclosed which does render possible yet determines 
cognition.13
The Thinking Subject takes upon itself the entire re-
sponsibility of observing the dictate of immanence and, 
in that process, the trajectory of symptoms produced by 
the pulsating Real will be the ultimate test of the cor-
responding of the first to the “needs” and laws of the 
latter. It is precisely in this sense that the DDI is both the 
instance which can provide the answer to Marxism’s fail-
ure as well as act as the source of its force (of-) thought 
or thought-force. The latter can surface only as the re-
sult of Marxism’s transformation by virtue of the non-
philosophical procedure, only as the fruit of the prefix 
of “non.” In this sense, one should assume that a theory 
or a vision of the “liberation” of the Proletariat (or of 
the productive forces) which has been created by way 
of applying an immanent mode of thinking, a theory de-
termined by the Real (of that which is subject to theoriz-
ing) and co-responding to the real conditions, would not 
have failed — as Marxism did, insists Laruelle (having in 
mind, I suppose, the collapse of the communist societies 
in Eastern Europe). 
Laruelle states explicitly that it is precisely the lay-
ers or the transcendental constructs of Materialism and 
Dialectics, assuming the “false” (i.e., “mixed” with the 
Real) status of determinations-in-the-last-instance, that 
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-
-
ism is determined by a purely transcendental instance 
-
transcendentally determined, product of a philosophical 
the World, the result of a philosophical decision (a Hege-
and Materialism has “mixed” itself with the Real — the 
assumed Real has ceased to determine Marx’s project 
been implanted inside of it. 
And indeed, according to Laruelle, Marxism has em-
real -
spond to a source of immanence rather than to philoso-
phy, and its departure point has been the radical con-
Ausgang) 
from philosophy in order to arrive to the Real (or pro-
duce theory which succumbs to praxis as its authority 
It is precisely in this respect that Laruelle insists that 
the statement that “Marxism has (most probably) failed 
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[…] Marxism has been evaluated or tested only on the 
basis of its passage to act or to the real of history and of 
society. But perhaps there is a failure which is more pro-
found, which unravels a transcendental illusion of which 
it is the sanction rather than an aborted realization [...] 
Theoretical failure or other-than-theoretical, that could 
not be measured according to purely theoretical crite-
ria? Without doubt. But that failure is also practical and 
other-than-practical, and moreover cannot be measures 
according to criteria allegedly purely practical. In effect, 
the only criterion of theory and of practice is the instance 
of the real insomuch as precisely it is not itself anymore 
a simple criterion but rather an immanence foreclosed 
to any theoretical or practical criterion, and moreover so 
as it is the cause-in-the-last-instance capable of deter-
mining a real practice and rigorous theory.14
There is something fundamentally defective both 
in the theory and in the practice. In fact, according to 
Laruelle’s non-philosophy, there can be no essential, no 
real difference between theory and practice in the sense 
these terms are used by the neo-Marxists. “Practice” 
is but an operationalization of a “theory.” Moreover, 
theory is always already transformed into “World” in 
Laruellian sense of the word (“le Monde,” as the discur-
sive universe we live in, a transcendental “cosmology” 
we inhabit), and this is done precisely through practices, 
which are mere acts of performativity (to use Butlerian 
parlance). In this context, theory and practice are indis-
tinguishable, or at least difficult to distinguish and false 
to postulate as opposed and exclusive of one other. 
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4. The Workings of the Transcendental over
the Real (of Human-in-Human):
Investigating the Transcendental Minimum of
non-Marxist “Force de Travail” and the “Poor” of
Negri and Hardt
The installment of communist systems of social or-
ganization in the countries of former Yugoslavia was a 
blatant example of implanting a purely Transcendental 
Construct upon the Real. Marxist Doctrine remained 
something virtually non-intelligible to the Proletariat. 
For the caste of Marxist scholars — which, apart from 
the scholars in the proper sense of the word also refers 
to the Party officials and the so-called “social-political 
workers” (the journalists, for example) — it has grown to 
be subject to their endless desire for scholasticism. 
The university student and the university professor 
in the former Yugoslavia could derive unending plea-
sure from the impossible bravura of extracting the un-
imaginable from Marxism: ways of its reconciliation with 
philosophies that were in utter divergence or even con-
tradiction with Marxism. These “reconciliations” had so 
often been examples of bizarre “para-rational” reason-
ing and served to satisfy a particular political demand of 
the party officials — to be open enough to the West and 
not to exercise complete censorship with respect to the 
liberal ideology and western culture. The form of censor-
ship that was unavoidable was to render the reception 
of whatever theory coming from the West — as Marxist 
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as possible. (Cf. Žižek’s Znak, označitelj, pismo, published 
in former Yugoslavia in Serbo-Croatian.) 15
The factory worker, however, the one who believed 
in the Ideology of the State (or the “ordinary” person 
adapted to the ruling regime) did not care or under-
stand much about Marx and Marxism. His or her belief 
was founded upon the unreserved admiration for the 
Leader of the State, Josip Broz-Tito, and upon the rever-
ent respect and fear of the Party and its mechanisms of 
Control and Subjugation (the Police, and especially the 
Secret Police). 
The normalization of the citizen in the former re-
gime (of the former state) of Yugoslavia was exercised 
though the severe mechanisms of external control (the 
Police and the Party) and though internalization of con-
trol (which was usually demonstrated through rituals 
of “self-critique” performed in front of the collective of 
co-workers or the so-called workers’ council). The first 
is nonetheless, in my view, more characteristic of the 
communist regime whereas the latter of the democratic 
one (the “liberal authoritarianism” Žižek writes about in 
On Belief, 121). Control and punishment in the “political 
imaginary” of the former communist regime came pri-
marily from outside the private, from outside the home 
— from the secret forms of control: from the secret po-
lice, secrete informers and secrete prisons. 
The channels of ideological normalization were those 
of clearly discernable and external instances of control 
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which had to remain veiled both visually (disguised: se-
cret police, informers posing as friends and neighbors, 
secret hearings) and by silence (secret prisons, hearings 
and repression that one recognized as such but never 
spoke of). Certainly, normalization is impossible without 
internalization and, hence, the sentencing of the “ver-
bal delict” (the very uttering of one’s thought which is 
ideologically inappropriate). On the other hand, the very 
existence of such punishment, the very fact of the State 
assuming the authority and “responsibility” of punish-
ment speaks of the control and normalization-in-the-
last-instance as external rather than internal. 
Hence, the ruling collective pathology has been the 
paranoia, in particular with respect to the Institutions (of 
the State; or any Institutions). The paranoid mistrust was 
extended also to the ideology. (This is why today, in the 
countries of the so-called transition from the communist 
to the democratic regime, “ideology” is a bad, almost 
insulting term.) One was trained to agree with the public 
discourse about the indisputable perfection and superi-
ority of Marxist ideology, one was expected to believe in 
it, but not necessarily to understand it. What mattered 
was to publicly agree with it. Control was external and 
belonged to the State. 
It is more than clear that in former Yugoslavia, Marxist 
theory did not correspond with the immanent needs of 
the Proletariat. It did not even speak the same language. 
Dialectical and Historical Materialism were indecipher-
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able to the ordinary representative of the Proletariat sa-
cred doctrines and their slogans worked as ritual-magical 
formulas. (One did not discern their exact meaning, but 
nonetheless “knew,” even without understanding why, 
that they contained the supreme and indisputable truth. 
Only the “social-political workers” such as the scholars 
and party officials could and were capable of interpret-
ing the doctrine’s meaning correctly.) Indeed it would 
be false to argue that Marxism in communist Yugoslavia 
ever correlated with its “source of immanence.” 
It was a violent attempt to implant a ghostly, purely 
Conceptual Organism (a Transcendental) upon the Real 
(of the Human-in-Human) by virtue of ignoring and ex-
cluding the relevance of the symptomatology of the lat-
ter. Marxism, or rather its Dialectical Materialism, as a 
doctrine was alien to the Proletariat, as the Transcen-
dental is alien to the Laruellian Real. It is precisely as the 
result of its failure to theorize and develop a “World” 
on the basis of the immanent mode of thinking, drawing 
legitimacy from its source of immanence, that Marxism 
and the communist system has failed in former Yugosla-
via. Immanence is the territory of the non-reflected, the 
lived and the experienced “without the need to alienate 
itself through representation” (Laruelle 1989, 57) and 
Marxist Doctrine of the Yugoslav Communist Party did 
not correlate adequately with the instance whose Truth 
it purported to be, the state of the Proletariat. Success-
ful correspondence with the source of immanence is the 
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one that will prove as such by means of the legitimizing 
symtomatology of the Real without the need to “alien-
ate itself through representation.” 
In this respect, it is worthwhile raising the question of 
whether the concept of “labor force” is sufficiently radical. 
Namely, does it correspond in an immanent mode with 
the Real of the Human-in-Human represented as Proletar-
iat? The possible correspondence in an immanent mode 
can be “tested” only by the symptomatology provided by 
the Real. When a concept is “affected by immanence,” it 
touches on a traumatic spot. Hence the confirming symp-
tom is the reaction of trauma, of pain, of a suffering – a 
passion, in its etymological sense. Even when the sensa-
tion is pleasure, in its rendition of the “Pure Lived,” of 
sheer Tuché devoid of any linguistic mediation, the Real 
takes place in the shape of trauma. Every instance of rep-
resentation or of the thinking process is self-alienating 
with respect to the Real, but the question is: Is this self-
alienation process an act of cloning (of the Real)? The im-
manent mode of thinking is accompanied by a legitimizing 
— although unilateral and, in the last instance, indifferent 
— response of the Real, but in a non-speculative and non-
reflected way. (Just as in a scientific experiment, the real 
which is being researched “responds” in a way that legiti-
mizes the original hypothesis of the researcher.) To return 
to the question: can those in whose name Marxism is pro-
fessed today communicate, in an immanent way, with the 
term “labor force” in the sense of the Proletariat?
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Following the main concern of the non-Marxist 
project, I would like to reformulate the question and 
ask whether “Proletariat” is a sufficiently radical term, 
sufficiently “impoverished” of philosophy. As Graham-
Gibson observe, capitalism is no longer a monolithic 
category, but a heteronymous global phenomenon in a 
need of different lexis (and, a non-Marxist would add, in 
a need of a different syntax of thought, as well) that can 
speak of the diversity of forms of capitalist exploitation 
enabling its adequate explanation and critique, but also 
political action against it. It should be able to explain and 
provide grounds for action against a wide range of forms 
of social subjugation and capitalist exploitation: from 
gendered poverty (or the ever increasing feminization of 
the “proletariat”) to the production of a “global prole-
tariat” (over 90% of the Third World population is the 
Proletariat to the First World). In The End of Capitalism 
(as we knew it): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy 
by Gibson-Graham, we read: 
Capitalism is an architecture or structure of power, which 
is conferred by ownership and by managerial or financial 
control. Capitalist exploitation is thus an aspect or effect of 
domination [...] Capitalism is the phallus or ‘master term’ 
within a system of social differentiation. Capitalist indus-
trialization grounds the distinction between core (the de-
veloped world) and periphery (the so-called Third World). 
It defines the household as the space of ‘consumption’ 
(of capitalist commodities) and of ‘reproduction’ (of the 
capitalist workforce) rather than a space of noncapitalist 
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production and consumption. [...] Complexly generated 
social processes of commodification, urbanization, inter-
nationalization, proletarization are viewed as aspects of 
capitalism’s self-realization. (1996, 8-9)
Bearing in mind this picture of capitalism’s “self-
realization,” it seems to me that “proletariat” is hardly a 
term radical enough to clone the Real, that is, the source 
of immanence of the (post- or non-) Marxist critique. 
The all-infusive character of contemporary capitalism, 
its mutation into bio-politics, the hybridism it establishes 
with democracy (through the concept of free market 
economy) and the traditional liberal values points to a 
Real or a Lived that cannot be cloned by the concept of 
the Proletariat. 
The subject-production in the post-industrial and neo-
liberal capitalism points to another, paradigmatic category 
of the repressed – it is one which is global, present in all 
social and cultural strata. It is the neo-liberal subjectivity 
of the capitalist auto-oppression through self-modeling 
by way of internalizing the Desire of Capital as one’s own, 
personal desire. Commodification is realized through 
the commodifying and commodified individual. Soul (in 
the Foucaultian sense), (post-)modern subjectivity, has 
claimed authority to represent and legitimize the needs 
of the “liberated” Body, i.e. the “material” concerns of 
the Self, and has, hence, become its most impenetrable 
and inescapable prison. It is the prison of capitalism 
which has convinced everyone that it is the only possible 
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world, an inescapability internalized by its subjects. The 
the oppressed. The classes, and hence, the proletariat is 
the mere result of the intricate and perpetual processes 
“Proletariat” and “class” are the product of the 
term has a meaning only in and for the Capitalist-World. 
and is, as a consequence of this, a term which “works” in 
favor of Capitalism as the World in Laruellian sense. 
Hence, it is not radically “uni-versal,” not sufficiently rid 
of the Transcendental of Capitalism – as well as that of 
Marxism – as non-Marxism requires. 
In a search for what non-Marxism would call a “radical 
concept,” rereading Marx’s Capital (volumes I and III) 
Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff,16 Gibson-Graham 
When individuals labor beyond what is necessary for their 
are appropriated by others (or themselves), and when 
we may recognize the processes of class. (17 ,1996)
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This is a sort of a descriptive formulation that non-
Marxism, i.e., non-philosophy, favors as a method. It 
represents a “transcendental minimum” that is neces-
sary to explicate — or provide a possibility of thinking/
theorizing — a certain Real. It has been enabled by the 
twofold act of dismantling the doctrinal organization it 
departs from and attuning solely to the “dictate” of its 
source of immanence — the Real(-of-the-Human-in-
Human) of labor. This is an attempt to “clone” the Real 
of a form of exploitation of the Human-in-Human that 
is immanently characteristic of Capitalism: the radical 
concept explaining the “form” of exploitation is “class,” 
whereas the radical concept correlating with the lived of 
exploitation (the Real of the Human-in-Human) is labor. 
In order for non-Marxism to become an operational 
theory capable of both explaining immanently the “hu-
man condition” in Capitalism and proposing courses 
of action that can introduce change, it is in a need of 
identifying another instance of the Real, the one which 
immanently fuels its theoretical desire. It is an instance 
of immanence which is structurally situated on the side 
of the thinking subject (or the Stranger). It is the desire 
(theoretical, or Truth-Desire) of the Thinker unilaterally 
positioned and parallel to the cause-in-the-last-instance. 
Namely, an immanent cause of the Marxist theoretical 
project is also the Real of the Marxist desire to explain 
the human subjugation by Capitalism and to intervene 
into its Real (or Reality) in order to change it. Hence, in 
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order to construct a theory which also “behaves” imma-
nently with respect to this second source of immanence, 
one is in a need of a more “adaptable” non-Marxist ap-
proach that can provide answers to the questions of the 
form/s of exploitation and subjugation, but also ground 
the political possibility of acting against it. Non-Marxism 
is, thus, a way of arriving to a revolutionary stance by 
way of getting rid of the doctrinal orthodoxy of Marxism, 
or rather of the doctrinal orthodoxy of “leftism,” i.e., of 
the “legible” (in Batlerian sense) discourses of critique 
of Capitalism. The radical consequence of such theoreti-
cal position would be that Marxism does not necessarily 
have to be the adequate response to Capitalism – not 
even the barred Marxism, that is, non-Marxism.
“Class” is yet another transcendentally conditioned 
concept — it communicates well with the Marxist doc-
trine but insufficiently successfully with its source of 
immanence, i.e., the Real of the Human-in-Human 
subjugated by Capitalism. Class is an economically de-
termined term and, as such, it is conditioned by a par-
ticular horizon of thought, a transcendental universe (a 
scientific doctrine) relying on sociology and its inherent 
positivism (in spite of all of its later revisions). It is un-
likely that a citizen of the Third World who culturally be-
longs to the “upper-middle class” while, according to the 
internationally adopted parameters, living in a state of 
poverty will experience a sense of belonging to the same 
class with a laborer from the First World who may, com-
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pared to him/her, culturally be “lower class” whereas, 
financially, “upper.” 
The notion of “class” is hardly operative for the con-
temporary political critique since it is one which implies 
the enlightenment logic of classification – it is the prod-
uct of the passion for classifying. Hence, besides its nor-
malizing and disciplining effect, the category of class (as 
engendered by Marxism) fails to explain the multiple and 
complex character of identity positions conditioned by 
capitalism. What this concept fails to do is name/clone 
the Real/the Lived of the “human condition” shared by 
the socially and culturally heterogeneous category of 
the oppressed of the contemporary global capitalism. 
The latter signals that we are in a need of a more radical 
concept, one transcendentally impoverished and purely 
descriptive of the Lived, one which is less constituted 
by a doctrine or the philosophy and which communi-
cates a meaning on the basis of its source of immanence 
(Laruelle). 
The radical term affected by the immanence of the 
lived is, again, labor. It implies the sheer state of Trauma, 
exposure to suffering (beyond the distinction between 
the physical and psychic) of the Body (which does not 
exclude the suffering “Soul”), an unending state of pre-
cariousness which is a purely experiential stance. Radical 
vulnerability is the lived of labor. Labor is a descriptive 
and transcendentally impoverished notion and can, 
hence, claim the status of a radical term.  
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Another term, closely related to “labor” is the “poor” 
(as conceived by Rancière as well as by Negri and Hardt 
in the Empire). This is one of the many terms that can 
be assigned the status of a DDI by virtue of their being 
radically descriptive of the experienced (the Lived) and 
emptied of any reference to a transcendental universe 
that may structurally condition and determine their 
meaning. According to my own vision of the theoretical 
potentials and of the potential force for political action 
of the non-Marxist stance, there can be a virtually end-
less number of non-philosophical theories-practices in 
immanent correspondence with the Real of their causes-
in-the-last-instance. In order to arrive at a thought-force 
or force-of-thought, one needs to depart from a radical 
term which is cloned from the Real of “the lived and the 
experienced without the need to alienate itself into rep-
resentation.” As mentioned above, one such term is the 
Poor. 
[…] the poor is almost always seen to have a prophetic 
capacity: not only is the poor in the world, but the poor 
itself is the very possibility of the world. Only the poor 
lives radically the actual and present being, in destitu-
tion and suffering, and thus only the poor has the ability 
to renew being. The divinity of the multitude of the poor 
does not point to any transcendence. On the contrary, 
here and only here in this world, in the existence of the 
poor, is the field of immanence presented, confirmed, 
consolidated, and opened. The poor is god on earth. 
(Hardt and Negri 2001, 157)
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Poor refers to a wide category of multiple forms of 
precariousness related to the instance of mere survival 
and vulnerable exposure to trauma. Survival is an instance 
situated beyond the dichotomy of the “material” and the 
“psychic” or the “ideal.” Belonging to the category of the 
“Poor” is grounded by that fundamental vulnerability 
which is experienced both on the bodily level as well as 
that of the Soul, whereby the source of this vulnerability 
is determined(in-the-last-instance) as Capitalism.  Terms 
that are radically descriptive, and their DDI lies in the 
Lived-of-Vulnerability, are also “gender,” “queer” and 
“race.” 
The determination in the last instance is universal 
“once each time” (chaque-fois-une-fois: Laruelle 1992, 
117). In other words, it is uni-versal in the formal 
sense and, also, it is singular: it is the DDI of a specific 
radical concept, and does not subsume (all) other 
forms of oppression and their respective radical terms 
under a singular, all-encompassing category. The DDI 
of oppression is one (uni-versal) not in the sense of 
totality but in the sense of radical singularity.  Instead of 
colonizing and absorbing the multiplicity of differences 
and identity positions, identification with and fidelity 
to a DDI is a fundamentally solitary stance.  The radical 
stance issues from the embracing of the unmitigated 
sense of the irreducible One.  
The more radical, purely descriptive and corresponding 
with the Real the term is, the less theoretical rigor there 
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is to it (to the term itself). Nonetheless, paradoxically, it is 
precisely the non-rigorousness of the radical term which 
should guarantee the rigor of the non-philosophical, 
scientific development of a theory. Descriptiveness of 
the non-reflected and non-reflecting “lived” (le vécu, on 
which Laruelle repeatedly insists throughout his work) 
is something which is, by definition, on the verge of 
the Poetic. By the very imperative — the axiom which 
prescribes — that the radical concept “clones” the Lived-
of-the-Real, it seems that the rigor itself of the theory 
is provided by the Poetic, as its point of departure. 
Following Vico, I would say that the bordering of the 
two types of languages, the “scientific” and the “poetic,” 
produces a form of discourse that could be called 
“monstrous.” Radical concepts produce “monstrous” 
discourses: “monstrosity” of political thought and 
action is that which can radically undermine capitalism 
as the only possible World and bring forth a completely 





1. When referring to Nietzsche’s works, the author-date sys-
tem is replaced by reference to a title, a section or frag-
ment, chapter and a section within a chapter.
2. Nicole Loraux explains that mourning for a female child
achieves a level of excessiveness which cannot be in anyway
inscribed into the polis, into the “civilized” – it is the oppo-
site of civilized. It belongs beyond the ordered, the cosmos, 
i.e., the world inasmuch as meaningful organization. The son
is designated by the word lókheuma referring to a born one
which is (always) already separated from the mother through
the civilizing gesture of paternal recognition. The daughter is
ōdís,“a word that refers to the act of childbirth, in its length
and in its pain, just before the separation between mother 
and child is accomplished […]” (Loraux 1998, 52).
CHAPTER V
1. According to Laruelle, it is precisely the radical dyad of
thought and the real conveying the unbridgeable fissure
between the two terms that, in its most fundamental im-
possibility, determines the possibility of thought. Laruelle
writes: “It is impossible, even in Freud and in Marx, and
even more so within a philosophy, to find radical concepts
of the Real and the uni-versal — solely the unconscious and
the productive forces, desire and labor. As soon as one ar-
rives to this discovery, psychoanalysis and Marxism gain one
utterly new sense — a transformation of their theories into 
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simple material [...] These sorts of disciplines require more 
than just a simple theoretical transformation — a discovery 
from within a ‘non-’ that would be the effect (of) the Real or 
its action;” or in the French original of the text: «Il est im-
possible, même dans Freud et dans Marx, à plus forte raison 
dans une philosophie, de trouver les concepts radicaux du 
Réel et de l’uni-versel — seulement l’inconscient et les for-
ces productives, le désir et le travail. Mais cette découverte 
faite, psychanalyse et marxisme en reçoivent après coup plus 
qu’un nouveau sens — une transformation de leurs théories 
comme simple matériau. […] De telles disciplines exigent plus 
qu’une refonte simplement théorique — une découverte en 
‘non’- qui soit un effet (du) Réel ou son agir. » (2000, 61)  
2. Benjamin, Briefe 2 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp), 
1966, 206/138, quoted in Agamben’s State of Exception 
(University of Chicago Press, 2005), 61.
3.  Quoted in Agamben’s State of Exception (University of Chi-
cago Press, 2005), 61.
4.  Idem.
5.  Radical concepts are descriptive of the Real, “affected by its 
immanence” and, hence, minimally determined by the trans-
cendental; or, put in Laruelle’s words, the radical concept is 
established according to the following procedure: « On dira 
que la représentation, dans la vision-en-Un, est un reflet non-
thétique ou non-positionnel (du) réel, qu’elle est descriptive, 
en dernière instance du moins, et non constitutive comme 
prétend l’être la philosophie.» (Laruelle 2000, 57)
6.  “I term subjectivization the emergence of an operator, con-
secutive to an interventional nomination. Subjectivization 
takes place in a form of a Two. It is directed toward the in-
tervention on the borders of the eventual site. But it is also 
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directed towards the situation through its coincidence with 
the rule of evaluation and proximity which founds the ge-
neric procedure. Subjectivization is interventional nomina-
tion from the standpoint of the situation, that is, the rule of 
the intra-situational effects of the supernumerary name’s 
entrance into circulation. It could be said that subjectiviza-
tion is a special count,  distinct from the count-as-one which 
orders presentation, just as it is from the state’s reduplica-
tion. What subjectivization counts is whatever is faithfully 
connected to the name of the event.” (Badiou 2005, 393)
CHAPTER VI
1. François Laruelle, Philosophie et non-philosophie (Liege-
Bruxelles: Pierre Mardaga, 1989), 57: « L’identité du réel se 
vit, s’éprouve, se consomme en restant en elle-même sans 
avoir besoin de s’aliéner dans une représentation. » (Trans-
lation from French: K.K.)
2.  Cf. Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 123: “For Laruelle, a philosophical 
decision is a dyad of immanence and transcendence, but one 
wherein immanence features twice, its internal structure sub-
divided between an empirical and a transcendental function. 
It is at once internal to the dyad as the empirical immanence 
of the datum coupled to the transcendence of the a priori fac-
tum, but also external as that supplement of transcendental 
immanence required for gluing empirical immanence and a 
priori transcendence together. Every decision divides imma-
nence between an empirical datum which it supposes as given 
through the a priori factum, and a transcendental immanence 
which it has to invoke as already given in order to guarantee 
the unity of a presupposed factum and a posited datum.”    
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3.  Ibid., 56 : « […] cette pensée ne serait pas, ne pourrait plus 
être alors une Identité divisée comme la philosophique. Ce 
serait d’une part, par son fondement réel ou son essence, 
rien-qu’une Identité, elle serait rigoureusement identique au 
réel sans passer par une division ou une Dyade ; et ce serait 
d’autre part une Dyade pure, une dualité radicale, elle aussi 
non obtenue par division et non re-mélangée avec l’Identité. 
Elle aurait son fondement en celle-ci, mais découlerait d’elle 
sans se déterminer reciprociquement avec elle. »  
4. Laruelle, Introduction au non-marxisme, 21: « Le problème d’un 
traitement nouveau du marxisme est d’isoler ce noyau d’une 
universalité seulement symptôme mais dont l’isolation soit aussi 
sa détermination en dernière instance, sa ‘radicalisation.’ » 
5.  Ibid., 61 : « S’il [non-Marxism] paraît y revenir [to Marxism], 
c’est à ses problèmes plutôt qu’a ses textes, et à des problè-
mes dont la solution implique de traiter les textes comme 
des symptômes, par le suspens de l’autorité philosophique. 
[…] Il est impossible, même dans Freud et dans Marx, à plus 
forte raison dans une philosophie, de trouver les concepts 
radicaux du Réel et de l’uni-versel — seulement l’inconscient 
et les forces productives, le désir et le travail. Mais cette dé-
couverte faite, psychanalyse et marxisme en reçoivent après 
coup plus qu’un nouveau sens — une transformation de leurs 
théories comme simple matériau. […] De telles disciplines 
exigent plus qu’une refonte simplement théorique — une 
découverte en ‘non’- qui soit un effet (du) Réel ou son agir. » 
6.  See: François Laruelle, Théorie des Etrangers, (Paris: Éditions 
Kimé), 1995; and also: François Laruelle, Théorie des 
identités. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992).
7.  The Real can be rendered as Language and mediated to and 
through the World only through an instance other than 
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that of the Real, and instance of Real’s self-alienation — the 
Stranger (l’Étranger); See: Laruelle, Théorie des Etrangers 
(Paris : Éditions Kimé, 1995), 74-82. 
8. « La solution ‘réelle’ à ce problème de la DDI comme objet 
et cause de sa propre théorie doit éviter l’idéalisme hégé-
lien encore plus que ne le fait le matérialisme. Ni cause en 
extériorité, ni identité dialectique des contraires, le Réel est 
cause par immanence et détermine la connaissance de sa 
propre syntaxe, de sa causalité, par un processus que l’on 
dira de ‘clonage.’ […] Soit l’objet X à connaître. S’il est affec-
té d’immanence ou capable de DDI, c’est-à-dire vu-en-Un, 
lui-même peut alors ‘se’ cloner à partir du matériau qu’est 
sa transcendance. »
9.  Ibid., 48 : « Lorsque la DDI est la cause ou l’objet immanent 
de sa propre théorie, on dira que cette théorie est  la force 
(de) pensée, la théorie de la force (de) pensée est celle-ci 
même en-dernière-instance. […] L’objet à connaître, tout en 
restant l’objet connu, doit être ainsi capable de déterminer 
sa connaissance. »
10. Ibid. : « Comme si la ‘force de travail’ était capable enfin de 
sa propre théorie ‘prolétarienne,’ sans idéalisme hégélien, 
ou devenait le modèle restreint de l’instance universelle de 
la force (de) pensée. » 
11. Laruelle, Philosophie et non-philosophie, 56-57 : « […] le 
réel se vit, s’éprouve, se consomme en restant en elle-mê-
me […] »
12. Ibid., 57: « On dira que la représentation, dans la vision-
en-Un, est un reflet non-thétique ou non-positionnel (du) 
réel, qu’elle est descriptive, en dernière instance du moins, 
et non constitutive comme prétend l’être la philosophie.» 
Descriptiveness as the method favored by non-philosophy 
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is argued for also at many other places in Philosphie et non-
philosphie, and is often referred to in Intoduction au non-
marxisme as well.
13. Laruelle, Introduction au non-marxisme, 49 : « L’identité de la 
DDI signifie qu’elle est capable, sans opération philosophique, 
de sa propre connaissance. Le vieux problème de la possibilité 
de la connaissance se résout non par l’appel à un sujet trans-
cendantal ou un fondement mais par l’être forclos du Réel à 
la connaissance, de tout objet à sa connaissance, être-forclos 
qui ne rend possible la connaissance mais qui la détermine. »
14. Ibid., 17: « […] le marxisme n’a été évalué et testé que sur 
l’argument de son passage à l’acte ou au réel de l’histoire et 
de la société. Mais peut-être y a-t-il un échec plus profond 
qui relève d’une illusion transcendantale dont il est la sanc-
tion plutôt que d’une réalisation avortée […] Echec théori-
que et autre-que-théorique, qui ne peut se mesurer à des 
critères purement théoriques ? Sans doute. Mais cet échec 
est tout aussi pratique et autre-que-pratique, et ne peut 
davantage se mesurer à des critères prétendus purement 
pratiques. En effet le seul critère de la théorie et de la pra-
tique, c’est l’instance du Réel en tant que précisément elle 
n’est plus un simple critère mais qu’elle est une immanence 
forclose à tout critère théorique et pratique, et capable 
d’autant plus, comme cause-de-dernière-instance, de dé-
terminer une pratique réelle et une théorie rigoureuse. »
15. Slavoj Žižek, Znak, označitelj, pismo [Sign, Signifier, Textual-
ity], (Beograd: BIGZ, 1979).
16. Richard Wolff and Stephen Resnick, “Power, Property and 
Class,” Socialist Review 16 (2), 97-124. 
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